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BRUCE M. KRAMER**  
                                                                                                                 
This article was originally published in the Texas Tech Law Review. See Bruce M. 
Kramer, The Sisyphean Task of Interpreting Mineral Deeds and Leases: An Encyclopedia of 
Canons of Construction, 24 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1 (1993), available at https://ttu-ir.tdl.org/ttu-
ir/bitstream/handle/10601/572/kramer5.pdf?sequence=1. The Journal would like to thank 
Professor Kramer and the editorial staff of the Texas Tech Law Review for their permission 
to republish the article. For more information about the Texas Tech Law Review, visit  
http://texastechlawreview.org/. 
 * Copyright 1993 by Bruce M. Kramer. Preparation of this article was funded in part 
by a generous research grant provided by the Oil, Gas & Mineral Law Section of the State 
Bar of Texas. Chief Justice Shannon described the Sisyphean myth in State Bd. of Ins. v. 
Deffebach, 631 S.W.2d 794, 801 n.9 (Tex. App.—Austin 1982, writ ref’d n.r.e.) as follows: 
 In Hades, Sisyphus was condemned to roll to the top of a hill a huge stone 
which constantly rolled back again, making his task incessant. 
 Then I witnessed the tortures of Sisyphus, as he tackled his huge rock with 
both hands. Leaning against it with his arms and thrusting with his legs, he 
would contrive to push the boulder up-hill to the top. But every time, as he was 
going to send it toppling over the crest, its sheer weight turned it back, and the 
misbegotten rock came bounding down again to level ground. So once more he 
had to wrestle with the thing and push it up, while the sweat poured from his 
limbs and the dust rose high above his head. 
Id. (quoting HOMER, THE ODYSSEY, BOOK XI 187 (Penguin Classics, 1956)). 
 ** Maddox Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law; B.A., University 
of California at Los Angeles, 1968; J.D., U.C.L.A. School of Law, 1972; L.L.M., University 
of Illinois College of Law, 1975. [The author would like to note that this article does not 
contain a discussion of the cases dealing with the issue of what is a “mineral.” They were 
omitted in a vain attempt to shorten the length of the article.] 
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I. Introduction 
The task of preparing an “encyclopedia” of canons of construction of 
mineral deeds and leases is made all the more difficult by the imprecision 
of the English language and the imprecision of the use of canons by the 
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courts.1 Part of our problem with canons derives from the now generally 
accepted view that most written instruments are unambiguous so that parol 
or extrinsic evidence, or even surrounding circumstances, cannot be used to 
determine what the parties intended when they executed a particular written 
instrument. It should be noted that several early Texas cases2 considered 
extrinsic evidence or surrounding circumstances in seeking to ascertain the 
intent of the parties.3 As time passed, however, fewer and fewer deed con-
struction cases allowed such evidence. While there are many good reasons 
for not allowing extrinsic evidence in deed cases, the resulting difficulty in 
attempting to divine the parties’ intent has led the courts to greater and 
greater reliance on these canons. This, in turn, has led to some difficulties 
because of the nature of canons of construction. 
Mineral conveyances do not exist in a vacuum. While this article will 
focus on mineral conveyances, many of the canons had their origin in non-
mineral deed and contract cases. The Texas Supreme Court has noted, on 
numerous occasions, that the canons of construction for deeds are also 
applicable to mineral deeds.4 While mineral conveyances sometimes create 
unique problems for which specific canons of construction have been 
adopted, most mineral conveyancing issues apply canons that are equally 
applicable in the traditional deed situation. Equally prevalent is the court’s 
                                                                                                                 
 1. For the most part, I have cited and discussed cases which involve the transfer of a 
mineral interest. However, the origin of many of the canons is in the contract venue. In 
addition, many early cases involved the adequacy of the description given in a deed 
conveying the unsevered fee simple absolute. In most cases, I will not designate these cases 
as nonmineral conveyance cases because the principles they stand for are just as appropriate 
for mineral deeds as they are for contracts or non-mineral deeds. 
The Texas Supreme Court acknowledged the ad hoc nature of contract and deed 
interpretation issues, as well as the ad hoc nature of the application of canons of construction 
in Myers v. Gulf Coast Minerals Management Corp., 361 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. 1962). In 
interpreting the words “may earn” in a farmout agreement, the court stated: “The courts are 
to ascertain the real intention of the parties, and the very nature of the inquiry dictates that 
there can be no fixed rule, for every case, in a great measure, depends upon its own facts, the 
context of the instrument, and circumstances.” Id. at 196. 
 2. See, e.g., Smith v. Brown, 66 Tex. 543, 1 S.W. 573 (1886); Faulk v. Dashiell, 62 
Tex. 642 (1884); Hunt v. White, 24 Tex. 643 (1860); Hancock v. Butler, 21 Tex. 804 (1858). 
 3. It is also interesting to note that even though Hancock & Smith allowed surrounding 
circumstances to assist the court in determining intent, they both also used traditional canons 
of construction to support the court’s findings. See 66 Tex. at 545, 1 S.W. at 574; 21 Tex. at 
806. 
 4. See, e.g., Murphy v. Dilworth, 137 Tex. 32, 151 S.W.2d 1004 (1941); Duhig v. 
Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 135 Tex. 503, 144 S.W.2d 878 (1940). 
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use of canons for any written instrument, whether it is a contract, a deed or 
a mineral deed.5 
Although discussing statutory canons of construction, Karl Llewellyn 
captured the essence of the difficulty of such judicial reliance on canons. 
Before he listed some 28 pairs of opposing canons, he stated: 
Plainly, to make any canon take hold in a particular instance, the 
construction contended for must be sold, essentially, by means 
other than the use of the canon: The good sense of the situation 
and a simple construction of the available language to achieve 
that sense, by tenable means, out of the statutory language.6 
The following explanation of canons of construction explains why they 
exist, why they are used and why they are so popular: 
Canons of construction are merely statements of judicial prefer-
ence for the resolution of a particular problem. They are based 
on common human experience and are designed to achieve what 
the court believes to be the “normal” result for the problem 
under consideration. Thus, their purpose is not to ascertain the 
intent of the parties to the transaction. Rather, it is to resolve a 
dispute when it is otherwise impossible to ascertain the parties’ 
intent.7 
                                                                                                                 
 5. See Thompson v. Waits, 159 S.W. 82 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1913, writ ref’d) 
(discussing the rule of construction relating to written instruments); see also Faulk v. 
Dashiell, 62 Tex. 642 (1884) (using the “construe against the grantor” canon in a deed 
interpretation); Hancock v. Butler, 21 Tex. 806 (1858) (using the harmonizing canon in a 
deed interpretation). 
 6. KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 521 (1960). 
The following pairs of canons are easily transferable to the mineral deed situation: (1) A 
statute cannot go beyond its text, but to effect its purpose a statute may be implemented 
beyond its text; (2) Where design has been distinctly stated, no place is left for construction, 
but courts have the power to inquire into real - as distinct from ostensible - purpose; (3) If 
language is plain and unambiguous it must be given effect, not when literal interpretation 
would lead to absurd or mischievous consequences or thwart manifest purpose; and (4) 
every word and clause must be given effect, but if inadvertently inserted or if repugnant to 
the rest of the statute, they may be rejected as surplusage. Id. at 522–25. 
 7. 6A RICHARD R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 899[3], at 81A-108 (Patrick 
J. Rohan ed. 1992). In Remuda Oil Co. v. Wilson, 264 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. Civ. App.— 
Galveston 1954, writ ref’d n.r.e.), the court said the following about ascertaining the intent 
of the parties: “Where a doubt arises as to the real intention, an interpretation which plainly 
leads to an injustice should be rejected, and one which does not produce unusual and unjust 
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When understood not to be a substitute for rational thought and common 
sense, canons of construction are very useful and provide a degree of 
certainty to the conveyancing industry. However, when abused, the battle of 
the “canons” replaces rational thought and common sense and leads to 
obfuscation and uncertainty. An example of misuse of canons of 
construction is Gibson v. Watson8 in which the court attempted to determine 
the quantity of acreage conveyed in a particular instrument. Within the 
opinion, one can conservatively count the recitation of at least twelve 
different canons of construction, including several related canons that are 
repeated with minor variations in form. When a court has to cite that many 
canons to interpret an instrument, instead of focusing on the language of the 
instrument, the court loses sight of its primary function, which is to 
interpret the document as the parties have expressed in the written 
instrument.9 
                                                                                                                 
results adopted, subject, however, to the rule that the intention of the parties is to be 
ascertained from the instrument.” Id. at 196 (citing 18 C.J. Deeds § 201 (1919)). 
In many cases, the courts list canons immediately after the recitation of the facts. The 
analysis then follows without a clear indication of how the canons have affected the court’s 
rationale. A good example of this approach is Altman v. Blake, 712 S.W.2d 117, 118 (Tex. 
1986) where the court lists the “intent of the party must be sought,” “four corners” and 
harmonizing cations, before it resolves the constructional issue. None of the canons appears 
to affect the court’s analysis that found that the deed conveyed a non-executive mineral 
interest. Id. 
 8. 315 S.W.2d 48 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1958, writ ref’d n.r.e.); see also Bailey 
v. Mullins, 313 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1958, writ ref’d n.r.e.). In Bailey, 
the court listed eight different canons at the beginning of its analysis relating to the adequacy 
of the legal description and then concluded that the language was sufficiently clear to pass 
title. Id. at 102. 
Courts also have a tendency to list several canons and then suggest that one takes 
precedence over another. See Hedick v. Lone Star Steel Co., 277 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. Civ. 
App.—Texarkana 1955, writ ref’d n.r.e.). In Hedick, the court recited at least nine different 
canons, but set off one in italics and used it to decide that the instrument passed a fee simple 
absolute title rather than a mere easement or lesser interest. In Arnold v. Ashbel Smith Land 
Co., 307 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1957, writ ref’d n.r.e.), the court 
cited at least eight canons, including the “intent prevails over canon” canon. 
 9. Gibson is another multiple fraction case in which the granting clause grants a 1/32 
mineral interest while the subject-to clause referred to a 1/4 interest, a present and future 
delay rental clause referred to a 1/4 interest, and a future interest clause also referred to a 1/4 
interest. 315 S.W.2d at 50–51. Among the canons cited were: (1) typewritten language 
prevails over repugnant printed language; (2) the ancient rules of construction are relaxed; 
(3) the intent of the parties controls when it can be ascertained from a consideration of all 
parts of the instrument; (4) intention if ascertained prevails over arbitrary rules; (5) all 
doubts should be resolved against the grantors; (6) the greatest estate possible should be 
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Justice Calvert, with his usual insight into the law, described the court’s 
thought processes in interpreting written instruments: 
Courts try to solve disputes over the meaning of contracts by 
giving them the meaning the parties intended them to have. This 
is as it should be. But what meaning the parties to a contract 
intended it to have is often unclear. Once a dispute arises over 
meaning, it can hardly be expected that the parties will agree on 
what meaning was intended. It is for this reason that the courts 
have built up a system of rules of interpretation and construction 
to arrive at meaning, ignoring testimony of subjective intent. 
“Intention of the parties” is often guess-work at best. Sometimes 
the true intention of one or even of both parties may be 
defeated . . . . So, while use of rules of interpretation and 
construction may not always result in ascertaining the true 
intention of parties in using particular language . . . , their use yet 
must be better than pure guess-work in most cases else they 
would never have been evolved.10 
If we would all take heed from Chief Justice Calvert’s sage advice, canons 
would take their proper place as a useful tool in resolving legal disputes 
over written instruments. But since Texas Courts have been less than 
sanguine in using canons, we must attempt to push the Sisyphean boulder 
                                                                                                                 
granted; (7) where there is an irreconcilable conflict between the granting, habendum and 
warranty clause and other recitals, the recitals must yield to the specific clauses; (8) where 
the first part of a deed is definite and certain and the remainder is irreconcilable or uncertain 
the first part prevails; (9) do not give effect to language which creates ambiguity; (10) no 
part of the instrument is to be rejected, unless as a last resort it becomes necessary; and (11) 
a general description will not control or override a specific description unless the specific 
description is independently defective or doubtful. Id. at 52–58. 
 10. Southland Royalty Co. v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 378 S.W.2d 50, 59 (Tex. 1964) 
(Calvert, C.J., concurring) (emphasis added). Before it was de rigeur to find most written 
instruments unambiguous, courts would regularly apply the Calvert rationale by stating that 
canons of construction would only apply when the written instrument was ambiguous. For 
example, in Hinson v. Noble, 122 S.W.2d 1082 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1938, no writ), 
a case involving a dispute over which of several dates on a lease was the effective date, the 
court stated the following about judicial construction of written instruments: 
It is only when there is room for reasonable minds to differ as to the meaning of 
language used that a construction thereof is necessary. The term ‘construction’ 
implies uncertainty as to the meaning of language used in a written instrument. 
It has been said that where a contract is clear and unambiguous, there is nothing 
to be construed by the courts. 
Id. at 1087 (citing 10 TEX. JUR. Contracts § 158 (1930). 
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up the hill by analyzing what they have said and hope that the exposition 
will eventually lead to a successful conclusion of having the boulder remain 
at the top of the hill. 
II. The Use of Extrinsic Evidence 
A. The Basic Texas Approach 
There may be an inverse relationship between the liberality of a court’s 
acceptance of extrinsic or parol evidence and a court’s use of canons of 
construction in cases involving the interpretation of a written instrument. 
The more extrinsic evidence that is admitted, the less the court needs to 
resort to canons of construction.11 In Texas, the admission of extrinsic 
evidence is tied to the determination of whether the deed is treated as 
ambiguous or unambiguous, which in recent years has almost always led to 
a finding that the language used is unambiguous.12 
                                                                                                                 
 11. This inverse relationship may also exist in the statutory construction cases. Canons 
of construction were used frequently in the period before the 1950’s. To a certain degree, 
however, canons have lost their predominant role, being replaced by a greater reliance on 
legislative history. See generally Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation - In the 
Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 803–05 (1983) (discussing the 
education of law students in researching legislative history). That trend, however, may 
change as the Supreme Court has expressed discontent over the use of legislative history to 
interpret statutory language that it finds has a “plain meaning.” See, e.g., West Virginia 
Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 111 S. Ct. 1138 (1991); Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 
(1988); Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also 
Arthur Stock, Note, Justice Scalia’s Use of Sources in Statutory Interpretation: How 
Congress Always Loses, 1990 DUKE L.J. 160 (examining and criticizing U.S. Supreme Court 
Justice Antonin Scalia’s disdain for the use of legislative history in statutory construction). 
We may yet return to the problems raised in Posner, supra, at 803–05, and LLEWELLYN, 
supra note 6, at 521–35. 
In addition to the relationship between admission of parol evidence and the use of 
canons, there is a relationship between the number of rules of law and the use of canons. The 
more rules that apply, the less the court needs to rely on canons. But the major trend in the 
past 100 years has been to minimize the number of “intent defeating” rules to govern deed 
construction cases, and increase the use of canons. See infra parts IV, V, and VI. 
 12. See, e.g., Anderson & Kerr Drilling Co. v. Bruhlmeyer, 134 Tex. 574, 583, 136 
S.W.2d 800, 805 (1940); Williford v. Spies, 530 S.W.2d 127, 130 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 
1975, no writ); Chandler v. Hartt, 467 S.W.2d 629, 634 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tyler 1971, writ 
ref’d n.r.e.); Black v. Shell Oil Co., 397 S.W.2d 877, 887–88 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 
1965, writ ref’d n.r.e.). This was not always the case. As stated in Cox v. Rust, 29 S.W. 807 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1895, no writ): 
In every judicial investigation the discovery of the truth should be the aim and 
desire of the court, and obviously, if an instrument of writing is obscure, the 
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A classic view of the problem of ambiguous versus unambiguous 
language in a mineral deed is represented by the court of civil appeals and 
supreme court decisions in Richardson v. Hart.13 The problem related to a 
deed that contained multiple fractions and a mineral/ royalty confusion in 
the granting, subject-to, intention and future lease clauses. The granting 
                                                                                                                 
ascertainment of the intent of the parties to it should be the end sought, and, if 
that end can be accomplished by evidence aliunde, it should be admitted. 
Id. at 808. In Cox the issue was whether a deed description was sufficiently definite in order 
to pass title. Id.; see also Masterson v. Amarillo Oil Co., 253 S.W. 908 (Tex. Civ. App.— 
Amarillo 1923, writ dism’d w.o.j.). In Masterson, the court said that parol evidence can be 
admitted if it relates to post-execution events even if it would have the effect of altering, 
changing, or modifying the written contract. Id. at 914. 
 13. 183 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1944), aff’d, 143 Tex. 392, 185 
S.W.2d 563 (1945). A modern example of the difficulty courts have in dealing with the 
problem of legal ambiguity is Schwartz v. Prairie Producing Co., 727 S.W.2d 289 (Tex. 
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.). The court was construing the royalty 
provision in a standard oil and gas lease that differentiated between “gas” and “sulphur 
mined and marketed.” Id. at 290. The lessee was producing sulfur from a sour gas stream 
and was paying royalties based on the “mined and marketed” standard of $1.00/long ton. Id. 
A similar question had plagued the Fifth Circuit, which had reached different conclusions in 
three different cases. Compare Scott Paper Co. v. Taslog, Inc., 638 F.2d 790 (5th Cir. 1981) 
(stating that when an instrument granted a royalty on “gas including casinghead gas and 
other gaseous substances,” the dividend covered any gas produced) with First Nat’l Bank v. 
Pursue Energy Corp., 784 F.2d 659 (5th Cir.) (holding a mineral lease ambiguous as to 
whether sulphur produced from sour gas was covered for the payment of a royalty), vacated, 
799 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding a lease unambiguous and differentiating between 
royalties on gas and casinghead gas, and all other minerals mined and marketed; sulphur not 
“mined” but “produced”). The Texas court of appeals split three ways. Justice Cohen found 
the language unambiguously required the lessee to pay royalty on “gas.” 727 S.W.2d at 292–
93. He also used the “construe against the lessee” canon to support that conclusion. See infra 
part VII.B. Justice Dunn concurred, but found that the language was ambiguous and 
therefore the summary judgment order should be reversed. 727 S.W.2d at 293 (Dunn, J., 
concurring). Finally, Justice Bass dissented finding that royalty should be paid on the basis 
of the “mined and marketed” standard even if the court found the language ambiguous. 727 
S.W.2d at 294 (Bass, J., dissenting). Justice Bass would use the “four corners” and 
harmonizing canons to support his conclusion. Id. 
When the parties to a deed seek the remedy of reformation, extrinsic evidence should be 
admitted to see if there was the requisite fraud, duress, or mutual mistake. But, as this article 
evidences, Texas courts rarely reform written instruments. See, e.g., Clemmens v. Kennedy, 
68 S.W.2d 321, 323–24 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1934, writ ref’d). But cf. Gilbert v. 
Smith, 49 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1932, judgm’t adopted) (holding that mutual 
mistake as to size of mineral interest conveyed would not defeat reformation); Martin v. 
Snuggs, 302 S.W.2d 676, 680 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1957, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (allowing 
reformation of a deed where the contract failed to express the agreement entered into, and 
the mistake was of such a nature as to justify and require equitable relief). 
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clause referred to the conveyed interest as “an undivided l/16th of l/8th 
interest in and to all of the oil, gas and other minerals. . . .” A right of 
ingress and egress for drilling and exploring purposes was also given. A 
subject-to clause referred to the interest as covering and including “l/16th of 
l/8th of all of the oil royalty. . . .” The intention clause withheld from the 
grantee any delay rentals. The future lease clause said that “none of the 
lease interest and all future rentals . . . for oil, gas and other mineral 
privileges shall be owned by said Grantee, he owning l/16th of l/8th of all 
oil, gas . . . in and under said lands, together with no interest in all future 
rents.”14 
In resolving the conflicting signals between the transfer of a 1/128 
mineral interest and a 1/128 royalty interest, the court of civil appeals 
treated the contract as ambiguous on its face and admitted extrinsic 
evidence. The court then applied a canon of construction for extrinsic 
evidence which finds that the best evidence of the intent of the parties is the 
practical construction and the acts of the parties in implementing the terms 
of the instrument.15 The court affirmed the trial court’s finding that the 
grantee was entitled to a 1/128 share of the oil runs under the existing lease. 
The trial court considered a division order and several deeds which 
reflected that the grantee was to receive the equivalent of a 1/128 royalty.16 
The supreme court, on the other hand, found, without much explanation, 
that the deed was not ambiguous.17 Only upon a showing of fraud, accident, 
or mistake should parol evidence be admitted, and since there were no such 
findings in this case, its admission was error.18 Thus evidence of the 
                                                                                                                 
 14. 143 Tex. at 392, 185 S.W.2d at 563. 
 15. 183 S.W.2d at 235 (citing Texas & N.O.R. Co. v. Orange County, 206 S.W. 539, 
544 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1918, writ ref’d)); see also Cavazos v. Trevino, 73 U.S. (6 
Wall.) 773 (1867) (holding that acts of parties in accepting and using boundaries dispositive 
as to their intent). 
 16. 183 S.W.2d at 236. The court of civil appeals described the interest as 1/128 of all 
the oil produced, which to me is a royalty interest. Yet, in its concluding paragraph, the court 
affirmed the trial court’s finding that the grantee was to receive a 1/128 interest in all the 
minerals in and under the land described therein. If they received a 1/128 mineral interest, 
they should have been receiving only a 1/1024 royalty. 
In Rutherford v. Randal, 593 S.W.2d 949, 952 (Tex. 1980), the Texas Supreme Court 
concluded that a deed, which described the conveyed interest as a 1/240 mineral interest in 
the granting clause and in the description clause, referred to the grantor’s interests as that 
which was recorded, a 1/24 mineral interest, was not ambiguous and therefore, the deed 
could not be construed through the admission of parol evidence. 
 17. 143 Tex. at 395, 185 S.W.2d at 564. 
 18. Id. at 395–96, 185 S.W.2d at 564. 
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parties’ acts and construction of the instrument were inadmissible to vary 
the terms of the written instrument.19 Without relying on any canons of 
construction, the supreme court found that the deed only conveyed a 1/128 
mineral interest, entitling the grantees to a 1/1024 interest in the royalties. 
The court found the subject-to clause language of 1/16 of 1/8 of all the oil 
royalty to be the equivalent of 1/128 of all the oil royalty. That 
interpretation harmonizes all of the clauses and is consistent with Hoffman 
v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.20 because each of the clauses could be different 
fractions or different interests if that is what the parties expressly state. 
Here, the three clauses, as interpreted by the supreme court, are all the same 
fractional interest. In addition, the subject-to clause’s reference to royalty 
merely described the state of a mineral interest that is transferred during the 
existence of a valid lease. 
While the result in Richardson may be correct, it still ignores a 
continuing problem in deed interpretation cases. The Texas Supreme Court 
in McMahon v. Christmann21 stated the problem as follows: 
As is often true in litigation involving the interpretation and 
construction of written instruments both parties insist that the 
instrument is ‘plain and unambiguous’ and admits of no reason-
able meaning other than that for which they contend. 
Petitioners, . . . having taken the position that the lease was plain 
and unambiguous, were not permitted on the trial to introduce 
extrinsic evidence . . . . They were permitted to prove that the 
lease was prepared by respondents, that the typewritten rider . . . 
was prepared by and attached to the lease by petitioners. . . .22 
The court then applied the basic canons for mineral deeds to mineral leases 
without resorting to extrinsic evidence to ascertain the intent of the 
parties.23 
                                                                                                                 
 19. Id.; see, e.g., Harriss v. Ritter, 154 Tex. 474, 279 S.W.2d 845 (1955); Murphy v. 
Dilworth, 137 Tex. 32, 151 S.W.2d 1004 (1941); Henry v. Phillips, 105 Tex. 459, 151 S.W. 
533 (1912). 
 20. 273 S.W. 828 (Tex. 1925). 
 21. 157 Tex. 403, 303 S.W.2d 341 (1957). For the dissenting opinion of Justice 
Garwood in McMahon, see 304 S.W.2d 267. 
 22. 157 Tex. at 406, 303 S.W.2d at 344; see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Harnly, 348 
S.W.2d 856 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1961, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (stating that different 
conclusions reached by opposing parties does not alone make a contract ambiguous). 
 23. 157 Tex. at 411, 303 S.W.2d at 346. The court said: “In the interpretation and 
construction of oil, gas and mineral leases we will seek to give effect to the true intention of 
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In Anderson & Kerr Drilling Co. v. Bruhlmeyer,24 the Texas Supreme 
Court was attempting to determine whether the reservation of “all Minerells 
[sic] Paint Rock &c [sic] found or will be found on said discribed [sic] tract 
of land” included oil and gas.25 The court noted the two views on the 
admission of extrinsic evidence.26 It first recognized the rule that: 
[w]hen an instrument does not by its terms plainly and clearly 
disclose the intention of the parties, or is phrased in language 
fairly susceptible of more than one interpretation, the intention is 
to be ascertained, not solely from the words of the instrument, 
but from its language when read in the light of the circumstances 
surrounding the transaction.27 
The court further stated: 
[i]t is plainly implied, however, from the statement of the rule 
that when the instrument by its terms plainly and clearly 
discloses the intention of the parties, or is phrased in language 
not fairly susceptible of more than one interpretation, the 
intention of the parties is to be ascertained by the court as a 
matter of law from the language used in the writing and without 
aid from evidence as to the attending circumstances.28 
                                                                                                                 
the parties, following in that endeavor established rules used to interpret and construe 
contracts and other bilateral written instruments.” Id. 
 24. 134 Tex. 574, 136 S.W.2d 800 (1940); see also Chandler v. Hartt, 467 S.W.2d 629, 
634 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tyler 1971, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (citing Bruhlmeyer); Easley v. Brookline 
Trust Co., 256 S.W.2d 983, 985 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1952, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (citing 
Bruhlmeyer). 
 25. 134 Tex. at 579, 136 S.W.2d at 803. 
 26. Id. at 583, 136 S.W.2d at 805. 
 27. Id.; see also Gulf Prod. Co. v. Spear, 125 Tex. 530, 84 S.W.2d 452 (1935) (holding 
that intention of parties in a lease susceptible of more than one construction must be 
ascertained from its language, read in light of circumstances surrounding the execution); 
Colquitt v. Eureka Producing Co., 63 S.W.2d 1018 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1933, judgm’t 
adopted) (stating that in determining intent of parties to instrument, assigning oil and gas 
lease in language fairly susceptible of different interpretations, a court must consider 
surrounding circumstances when instrument was executed); Ryan v. Kent, 36 S.W.2d 1007 
(Tex. Comm’n App. 1931, judgm’t adopted) (stating that to ascertain what parties intended 
in the lease, the court may look to the surrounding circumstances when entered into). 
 28. 134 Tex. at 583, 136 S.W.2d at 805 (citing Soell v. Haddon, 85 Tex. 182, 187, 19 
S.W. 1087, 1089 (1892); Reynolds v. McMan Oil & Gas Co., 11 S.W.2d 778, 781, 785 
(Tex. Comm’n App. 1928, holding approved); Benskin v. Barksdale, 246 S.W. 360 (Tex. 
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This duality has existed in Texas jurisprudence for a long time. While 
today the courts clearly favor the finding that most instruments are 
unambiguous, there are still cases that follow the view espoused in the 
Restatement of Property that surrounding circumstances may be used to 
interpret a written instrument.29 It is important to note that while the 
Bruhlmeyer language refers to the instrument as having more than one 
meaning, which is the traditional definition of an ambiguous document, it 
also says that surrounding circumstances can be used where the language 
does not “plainly and clearly” disclose the intention of the parties. There is 
at least a suggestion, although one that has not been generally followed, that 
surrounding or attendant circumstances can be used even if the language is 
not ambiguous, but if the intention of the parties is not plainly and clearly 
disclosed. 
Another issue, relating to the determination of whether a deed is 
ambiguous, is whether the court should apply the canons of construction to 
render what might be an ambiguous document unambiguous. In Davis v. 
Andrews30 the issue was whether a twenty year limit contained in the 
warranty clause of a mineral deed affected only the length of the warranty, 
or the nature of the estate granted. In addition to the original deed, the 
parties had executed a correction deed in which the language restricting the 
warranty to twenty years was omitted. In rejecting the claim that the 
language of the original deed was ambiguous, and therefore allowing the 
admission of extrinsic evidence, the court said: “A contract is not 
ambiguous in the sense that parol evidence is admissible to explain its 
meaning unless application of the pertinent rules of interpretation leave a 
real uncertainty as to which of two or more possible meanings represent the 
true intention of the parties.”31 
The court’s conclusion contains some valuable insights into the 
interpretational process. Initially, the court admits that the issue is one 
involving “legal” ambiguity, not “layperson” ambiguity. Secondly, the 
court imposes a standard of “real uncertainty” as to the dual meanings. This 
would suggest a high standard and burden of proof on the party claiming 
ambiguity. This point may in fact be moot since in most deed cases neither 
                                                                                                                 
Comm’n App. 1923, holding approved); Graham’s Estate v. Stewart, 15 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. 
Civ. App.— Fort Worth 1929, writ ref’d)). 
 29. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 242 (1940); see infra part II.B; see also Kuklies v. 
Reinert, 256 S.W.2d 435, 443 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1953, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (following 
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 242). 
 30. 361 S.W.2d 419 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1962, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
 31. Id. at 425. 
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party claims that the instrument is ambiguous. Lastly, the court would apply 
the canons of construction as a condition precedent to the finding of 
ambiguity, and only if, after applying those canons the language was 
capable of two or more meanings would extrinsic evidence be admitted. 
Given the fact that there are many canons covering almost every 
conceivable issue, it would appear unlikely that a court would find an 
instrument ambiguous under that approach. In Davis, for example, the court 
cites some eleven different canons in reaching its conclusion that the twenty 
year limit only applied to the warranty clause.32 While not all of the cited 
canons necessarily support the court’s interpretation, they clearly make it 
difficult to prove that a “real uncertainty” exists regarding the intent of the 
parties.33 
The approach of using canons before determining legal ambiguity is 
borrowed from the contract arena. However, in contract cases, it appears 
that the burden of proof on the party claiming ambiguity is not as difficult 
as that applied in Davis. For example, in Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. 
Daniel,34 the Texas Supreme Court said: “[I]f after applying established 
rules of interpretation to the contract it remains reasonably susceptible to 
more than one meaning it is ambiguous, but if only one reasonable meaning 
clearly emerges it is not ambiguous.”35 
However, even when this more lenient standard is applied in the context 
of mineral deeds, the result consistently remains that the language is 
unambiguous.36 The Universal C.I.T. test has been interpreted to suggest 
that only where there is “genuine uncertainty” in which one of two 
reasonable meanings is proper after the application of the rules of 
construction can an instrument be deemed ambiguous.37 This appears to be 
                                                                                                                 
 32. Id. at 423–26. Some of the cited canons are “the granting clause prevails,” “the 
intention of the parties prevails,” “the intention of the parties as expressed prevails,” the 
“four corners” canon, the “greatest estate” canon and the “liberal construction of grants” 
canon. Id. 
 33. Two courts recently have applied the canon that the court does not determine 
ambiguity until after it has applied the “appropriate rules of construction.” See Buffalo 
Ranch Co. v. Thomason, 727 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref’d 
n.r.e.); Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Cone, 673 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1984, 
writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
 34. 150 Tex. 513, 243 S.W.2d 154 (1951). 
 35. Id. at 517, 243 S.W.2d at 157. This quote was cited in Ellis v. Waters, 308 S.W.2d 
169, 172 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1957), rev’d, 158 Tex. 342, 312 S.W.2d 231 (1958). 
 36. Prairie Producing Co. v. Schlachter, 786 S.W.2d 409 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1990, 
writ denied). 
 37. Id. at 413. 
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a narrow reading of the Texas Supreme Court’s language and is much more 
consistent with the mineral deed cases discussed earlier. 
The issue of whether or not there is an ambiguity is a question of law for 
the court.38 But is the issue of what constitutes a clear and plain disclosure 
of intent an additional loophole for the admission of extrinsic evidence? For 
example, in a leading case involving land descriptions, Gulf Production Co. 
v. Spear,39 the court allowed surrounding circumstances to be considered 
where the deed did not “clearly and plainly” describe the land and used 
language that was “susceptible of more than one construction.”40 Clear and 
plain language is undoubtedly unambiguous, but it does not necessarily 
follow that language which is not clear and plain is legally ambiguous. 
Where the instrument is held to be unambiguous it is “the duty of the 
trial court to give the deed [a] . . . construction as a matter of law, without 
looking to the attending or surrounding circumstances for explanation.”41 
Yet, as the next section shows, courts have on occasion allowed the use of 
surrounding circumstances to assist in the interpretation of a written 
instrument even where the court has not found the instrument ambiguous. 
But, the majority of deed and mineral deed cases clearly prefer the route of 
using other canons and not extrinsic evidence or surrounding circumstances 
to ascertain the intent of the parties. 
B. The Use of “Surrounding Circumstances” 
Notwithstanding the general Texas rule regarding the admission of 
extrinsic or parol evidence, the Restatement of Property, in discussing 
general rules of construction, allows the “circumstances of the formulation” 
of the conveyance to be used in reaching the “judicially ascertained intent” 
                                                                                                                 
 38. Myers v. Gulf Coast Minerals Management Corp., 361 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. 1962). 
 39. 125 Tex. 530, 84 S.W.2d 452 (1935). The Texas Commission of Appeals issued 
three opinions within two weeks regarding the adequacy of land descriptions. In the other 
two, the court did not discuss the canon of allowing “surrounding” circumstances to be 
considered to determine intent. Sun Oil Co. v. Burns, 125 Tex. 549, 84 S.W.2d 442 (1935); 
Sun Oil Co. v. Bennett, 125 Tex. 540, 84 S.W.2d 447 (1935). In Spear, the court specifically 
noted that the description in its deed was not “plain and unambiguous.” 125 Tex. at 534, 84 
S.W.2d at 454 (contrasting that deed with the deed in Bums and Bennett). 
 40. 125 Tex. at 535, 84 S.W.2d at 455; see also Crumpton v. Scott, 250 S.W.2d 953, 
956 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1952, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (stating that when a mineral deed 
does not clearly and plainly describe the intent of the parties, intent is to be ascertained from 
the deed’s language in light of circumstances surrounding the transaction). 
 41. Williford v. Spies, 530 S.W.2d 127, 130 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1975, no writ). 
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of the parties.42 This was not intended to bring in all forms of extrinsic 
evidence. The comments to the Restatement make it clear that the type of 
evidence that is relevant is limited to pre-conveyancing issues. The 
comments suggest that vocabulary peculiar to the conveyor, utilization of a 
drafting agent or use of a form instrument, the skill of the scrivener in the 
use of language or terms of art, the prevailing manners of expression at the 
time, and other evidence that has affected the formulation of the terms of 
the instrument can be admitted to ascertain the intent of the conveyor.43 
Yet, clearly these limited surrounding circumstances, if relevant, would call 
for the admission of extrinsic evidence to ascertain the intent of the parties. 
The first use of the “surrounding” circumstances rule typifies the 
difficulties encountered with this rule and the parol evidence rule. The issue 
in Hunt v. White44 was one of the construction of a will. The court first 
announced that “extrinsic evidence of intention, as an independent fact, is 
inadmissible.”45 But then went on to say that: 
                                                                                                                 
 42. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 242 (1940). While the rules of construction are 
located in the section dealing with future interests, the comments suggest that the rules are 
applicable in other types of conveyancing situations. The source of the need to look to these 
surrounding circumstances is stated as follows: 
Language consists of words which are mere symbols of ideas. The ideas of the 
conveyor and the symbols selected by him for their expression are determined 
by the circumstances of the conveyor at the time of the conveyance and by his 
experiences prior thereto. Consequently any ascertainment of the meaning of 
language requires consideration of the atmosphere in which the conveyance 
originated. . . . 
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 241 (Comment on Subsection (1)) (1940). These provisions of 
the Restatement have been followed in Texas. See, e.g., Chadwick v. Bristow, 204 S.W.2d 
65, 67 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1947) (will construction), aff’d, 146 Tex. 481, 208 S.W.2d 
888 (1948); Bryson v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 196 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. Civ. App.—
Austin 1946, writ ref’d). But cf. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Bryson, 148 Tex. 86, 219 
S.W.2d 799 (1949) (deed construction). 
 43. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 242 cmts. c–f (1940). 
 44. 24 Tex. 643 (1860); see also Heirs of Watrous v. McKie, 54 Tex. 65 (1880) 
(holding that extrinsic evidence is admissible to show consideration and purpose of the 
agreement); Self v. King, 28 Tex. 552, 554 (1866) (holding that a court may read a 
document in light of surrounding circumstances but cannot hear parol evidence on the 
language used in the writing). In Right of Way Oil Co. v. Gladys City Oil, Gas & Mfg. Co., 
106 Tex. 94, 102, 157 S.W. 737, 739 (1913), the Texas Supreme Court looked at the 
“attending facts and circumstances” to determine if a deed conveyed a corporeal or 
incorporeal estate. At the same time the court also used the “construe against the grantor” 
canon. Id. at 102–03; 157 S.W. at 739–40. . 
 45. 24 Tex. at 652. 
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[i]t is competent to admit parol evidence, . . . to explain a will (or 
other written instrument) by showing the situation of the testator, 
in his relation to persons and things around him; or as it is often 
expressed, by proof of the surrounding circumstances; in order 
that his will may be read in the light of the circumstances in 
which he was placed at the time of making it. His intent must be 
ascertained from the meaning of the words in the instrument, and 
from those words alone. But as he may be supposed to have used 
language, with reference to the situation in which he was 
placed . . . the law admits extrinsic evidence. . . .46 
The conundrum raised by this early decision has never been satisfactorily 
resolved as cases admitting surrounding circumstances, cases applying the 
                                                                                                                 
 46. Id.; see also Faulk v. Dashiell, 62 Tex. 642, 646 (1884) (using the “surrounding 
circumstances” canon in a will construction); Parrish v. Mills, 102 S.W. 184 (Tex. Civ. 
App.— Austin 1907) (interpreting a trust instrument), aff’d, 101 Tex. 276, 106 S.W. 882 
(1908). 
If we think that modern courts have difficulty with the use of canons interpreting deeds 
and further think that it might have been easier to deal with interpretational problems by 
admitting evidence of “surrounding circumstances,” this excerpt, as I read it, has as many 
pitfalls in it as does the modern use of canons: 
The first rule of exposition, which governs every other, is that contracts should 
be so interpreted as to give effect to the intention of the parties; and, while the 
words selected by the parties themselves as a symbol to denote their purpose 
are usually the primary source from which intention is drawn, and the best and 
surest guide to its discovery, yet being employed sometimes by designing 
persons to disguise rather than to express the true thought, and being liable to 
careless misuse or ignorant misapplication, it is always the duty of the court, in 
all cases where they are susceptible of different constructions, to take into 
consideration the circumstances attending the transaction, the particular 
situation of the parties, and the state of the thing granted, for the purpose of 
ascertaining the true intent; for the intention of the parties is manifestly 
paramount to the manner chosen to effect it. The courts, therefore, may avail 
themselves of the same light which the parties enjoyed when the contract was 
executed, and may place themselves in the same situation as the parties who 
made it, in order that may view the circumstances as those parties viewed them, 
and so judge the meaning of the words and the correct application of the 
language and the things described; and if any of the terms used seem to 
contradict the manifest intention, as clearly indicated by the agreement as a 
whole, the intention must govern. 
Stevens v. Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry., 212 S.W. 639, 642 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1919, judgm’t 
adopted) (citing Lockwood v. Ohio River Ry., 103 F. 243 (4th Cir. 1900), cert. denied, 180 
U.S. 637 (1901)). 
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parol evidence rule and cases applying the “four corners” canon still co-
exist in a somewhat uneasy peace. 
Another early Texas case which allowed a court to look at the 
“attendant” or “surrounding” circumstances was Smith v. Brown,47 an 1886 
decision of the Texas Supreme Court. The issue was whether a deed gave 
the land to the grantee as a trustee for third parties or for the grantee’s own 
use. The court, after citing the canon that the intent must be ascertained, 
stated that “to arrive at this intention, the situation of the parties and the 
subject-matter at the time of contracting should be considered.”48 While 
also citing the four corners canon, the court relied on the surrounding 
circumstances, including the fact that the beneficiaries were the issue of the 
grantee, to conclude that the deed intended to pass only naked legal title to 
the grantee who held the land in trust for the designated beneficiaries.49 
Another example where the court admitted “surrounding” circumstances 
without specifically finding the instrument ambiguous was Hedick v. Lone 
Star Steel Co.50 There the issue was whether the deed passed a fee simple 
                                                                                                                 
 47. 66 Tex. 543, 1 S.W. 573 (1886). 
 48. Id. at 545, 1 S.W. at 574 (citing Brannan v. Mesick, 10 Cal. 95, 106 (1858)). 
 49. Id. In another early case involving a contract for the sale of land, the court also 
looked at the surrounding circumstances to determine whether or not the contract was 
executory or executed. See Lipscomb v. Fuqua, 103 Tex. 585, 131 S.W. 1061 (1910); see 
also Crumpton v. Scott, 250 S.W.2d 953, 957 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1982, writ ref’d 
n.r.e.) (holding that surrounding circumstances were admissible to determine whether a 
contract was executory or executed with respect to a conveyance of a mineral interest). 
 50. 277 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1955, writ ref’d n.r.e.). In Thomas v. 
Texas Osage Co-Op Royalty Pool, Inc., 248 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Civ. App.—Eastland 1952, 
writ ref’d n.r.e.), the court found that surrounding circumstances could be considered if the 
language was susceptible to more than one meaning (ambiguous), or if the instrument did 
not “by its terms clearly and plainly describe the land affected.” Id. at 205. This clearly 
suggests that a lesser standard than legal ambiguity would justify looking into the 
surrounding circumstances. See also Gulf Prod. Co. v. Spear, 125 Tex. 530, 535, 84 S.W.2d 
452, 455 (1935) (holding that evidence of surrounding circumstances admissible where 
language in an instrument is susceptible to more than one meaning); Colquitt v. Eureka 
Producing Co., 63 S.W.2d 1018, 1021 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1933, judgm’t adopted) (holding 
that evidence of surrounding circumstances admissible to prove intent of parties); Ryan v. 
Kent, 36 S.W.2d 1007, 1010 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1931, judgm’t adopted) (holding that 
evidence of surrounding circumstances admissible to prove intent of parties with respect to 
oil and gas lease); Remuda Oil Co. v. Wilson, 264 S.W.2d 192, 194 (Tex. Civ. App.—
Galveston 1954, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (holding that evidence of surrounding circumstances 
admissible to prove intent of parties in drafting deed where terms of deed ambiguous); 
Leopard v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 220 S.W.2d 259, 263 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1949, 
writ ref’d n.r.e.) (holding that evidence of surrounding circumstances admissible to prove 
intent of parties in ambiguity in lease). In an early case trying to define the term “minerals” 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
152 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 3 
 
  
absolute estate in iron ore or merely an easement to explore for such ore. 
The court found that the language was sufficient to constitute a “good and 
sufficient” description of the property interest to be conveyed. Yet, the 
court also applied the canon that “the intention of the parties is to be 
ascertained and given effect, as gathered from the entire instrument, 
together with the surrounding circumstances. . . .”51 
Sometimes a court states that it is admitting surrounding circumstances, 
but then looks solely at the language of the instrument to interpret it. In 
Bailey v. Mullens,52 the court was attempting to interpret a written 
instrument to determine if it was a valid deed.53 Justice Barrow looked 
exclusively at the written instrument to determine that a valid deed was 
executed although there was some contrary indications contained in the 
instrument.54 Nonetheless, language allowing the consideration of 
surrounding circumstances was cited.55 
The surrounding circumstances rule has also been cited, although not 
relied on, in Psencik v. Wessels,56 a case finding that sand and gravel were 
not included in a reservation of “all minerals.” The trial court had admitted 
                                                                                                                 
in a grant, the court said that surrounding circumstances could be used to ascertain the intent 
of the parties. See Atwood v. Rodman, 355 S.W.2d 206, 212 (Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 
1962, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
The Texas Supreme Court in Gibson v. Turner, 156 Tex. 289, 297, 294 S.W.2d 781, 785 
(1956) clearly followed the earlier cases finding that surrounding circumstances could be 
considered even where the written instrument was not ambiguous. 
 51. 277 S.W.2d at 929. The source of the canon is cited as 14 TEX. JUR. Deeds § 132 
(1956). See Murphy v. Dilworth, 137 Tex. 32, 151 S.W.2d 1004 (1941); Lipscomb v. Fuqua, 
103 Tex. 585, 131 S.W. 1061 (1910); Self v. King, 28 Tex. 552 (1866); Dublin Elec. & Gas 
Co. v. Thompson, 166 S.W. 113 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1914, no writ); see also 
Hoffer Oil Corp. v. Hughes, 16 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1929, no writ) 
(holding that all surrounding circumstances are considered in determining whether to give a 
peremptory instruction to either party). 
 52. 313 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1958, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
 53. Id. at 102. 
 54. See id. at 103. 
 55. Id. at 102. The source of the canon was 14 TEX. JUR. Deeds § 132 (1956). In some 
cases the opposite analytical scheme may be followed. In Pierce Estates, Inc. v. Howard, 100 
S.W.2d 749 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1936, writ dism’d w.o.j.), the court applied the 
“four corners” canon and ostensibly limited its review to the language of the instrument. Yet 
the court’s analysis looks at the surrounding circumstances in finding that a specific 
description of a 132 acre tract would control over a general description that included an 
additional 400 acre tract. See 100 S.W.2d at 752. The court looked at the field notes and 
discussed the source of title to both tracts in determining that only 132 acres were intended 
to be conveyed. Id. at 751–52. 
 56. 205 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1947, writ ref’d). 
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parol evidence but the court of civil appeals suggested that it should have 
been excluded. Nonetheless, evidence about the surface destruction that 
would follow the sand and gravel extraction was considered by the court in 
its determination.57 
The tendency of courts to admit surrounding circumstances has declined 
in recent years.58 The surrounding circumstances rule is a victim of the 
courts’ general reluctance to admit parol evidence in mineral deed cases. 
The difficulty in admitting evidence of surrounding circumstances existing 
at the time the instrument was executed, or more broadly admitting 
extrinsic evidence of events that occur after the execution of the instrument 
is evident. Title examiners would no longer be able to rely on the written 
word. Individual adjudication of deeds would lead to disparate results 
depending on factors extraneous to the instrument. The fact that from its 
inception many courts treated the admission of surrounding circumstances 
as being a part of the four corners canon, which ostensibly limits the court 
to looking solely at the written document, suggests the courts felt 
uncomfortable moving away from the instrument to ascertain the intent of 
the parties.59  
III. The Use of Canons in Resolving 
the Multiple Fraction Problem 
With the overruling of Alford v. Krum,60 the problems of interpreting 
multiple grant deed forms and subject-to clauses will not disappear. Instead, 
prior caselaw will have to be reviewed once again to see if there existed any 
                                                                                                                 
 57. Id. at 659. For other cases applying this canon, see Victoria Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Cooley, 417 S.W.2d 814 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1967, writ ref’d n.r.e.), in 
which the court applied the canon even when the deed was unambiguous. But, in Milam v. 
Coleman, 418 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. Civ. App.—Corpus Christi 1967, writ ref’d n.r.e.), the court 
cited the canon, but seemingly gave more credence to the four corners canon and cited Smith 
v. Allison, 157 Tex. 220, 301 S.W.2d 608 (1956), a case in which the deed was considered 
ambiguous. 
 58. For other cases admitting surrounding circumstances, see Gulf Oil Corp. v. 
Southland Royalty Co., 478 S.W.2d 583, 586, (Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 1972), aff’d, 496 
S.W.2d 547 (Tex. 1973); City of Pinehurst v. Spooner Addition Water Co., 432 S.W.2d 515 
(Tex. 1968). Pinehurst was a contract case, but the use of surrounding circumstances has had 
a wider use in the contract interpretation arena. See 478 S.W.2d at 586. 
 59. See Myers v. Gulf Coast Minerals Management Corp., 361 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. 1962). 
In Myers, the court emphasized the ad hoc nature of instrument interpretation and stated that 
every case depends “upon its own facts, the context of the instrument, and circumstances.” 
Id. at 196. 
 60. 671 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1984). 
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common thread or rationale for dealing with the problems caused by the use 
of form deeds with multiple grant provisions. These decisions can raise 
difficult interpretational problems because the parties include inconsistent 
provisions within the multiple grant sections of the deed. Two excellent 
articles by Ernest Smith61 and Tevis Herd62 discuss the many problems that 
followed the incorporation of the subject to clause into standard deed forms. 
This section will not re-plow those fertile fields, but will instead focus on 
the use of canons of construction in the individual cases to determine if they 
were used consistently until Alford so that post-Luckel courts will be able to 
apply them in a meaningful way. In most of these cases, the courts are 
given the choice of harmonizing the inconsistent provisions or treating one 
or more of the provisions as controlling.63 
The starting point must be Hoffman v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.64 In 
Hoffman, the grantor conveyed a 1/2 mineral interest in a 90 acre tract. The 
deed contained a clause which stated: “It is understood and agreed that this 
sale is made subject to said lease but covers and includes one-half of all the 
oil royalty and gas rental or royalty due to be paid under the terms of said 
lease.”65 The grantor had owned and leased a 320 acre tract, of which the 
90 acres was a part. Oil was produced on the 230 acres not conveyed. 
Under the non-apportionment doctrine, the grantee would not be entitled to 
any royalties if his interest was restricted to the described 90 acres. 
                                                                                                                 
 61. Ernest Smith, The “Subject To” Clause, 30 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 15-1 (1984). 
 62. Tevis Herd, Deed Construction and the “Repugnant to the Grant” Doctrine, 21 
TEX. TECH L. REV. 635 (1990). 
 63. The courts could also treat the instrument as ambiguous and admit parol evidence or 
find that the deed needs to be reformed. Both of those options are rarely used. See Herd, 
supra note 62 at 649–50. The following cases allowed the deeds to be reformed: Thalman v. 
Martin, 635 S.W.2d 411, 413 (Tex. 1982); State v. Wales, 271 S.W.2d 728, 732 (Tex. Civ. 
App.—Beaumont 1954, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Craft v. Hahn, 246 S.W.2d 897, 900 (Tex. Civ. 
App.—Eastland 1952, writ ref’d n.r.e.). In only a few cases have the courts admitted parol 
evidence after finding the deeds ambiguous. See, e.g., Klein v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 126 
Tex. 450, 86 S.W.2d 1077 (1935); cf. McMahon v. Christmann, 157 Tex. 403, 407, 303 
S.W.2d 341, 344 (1957) (allowing parol evidence only after applying rules of interpretation 
and ambiguity in the contract still exists). 
 64. 273 S.W. 828 (Tex. 1925). Hoffman, of course, was preceded by Caruthers v. 
Leonard, 254 S.W. 779 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1923, holding approved), which held that a 
transfer of a mineral interest that had been leased did not transfer either the delay rentals or 
the royalties payable under the existing lease. Caruthers was overruled in Harris v. Currie, 
142 Tex. 93, 176 S.W.2d 302 (1943). 
 65. 273 S.W. at 830. 
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Typical of many deed interpretation cases, the Texas Commission of 
Appeals listed, seriatim, several canons of construction that were to control 
its decision. The court said: 
This deed, if its intention be ambiguous, is to be construed 
against grantors rather than against grantee; and yet, if what it 
purports to convey is distinctly pointed out in a manner and 
under circumstances showing that royalty as to wells located 
outside of the 90 acres was not in contemplation, although the 
contrary could be construed as within other language when 
considered separately, the specific and restricted intent would 
control. . . . But the instrument must, if possible, be considered 
and made to speak consistently, as a whole, without the rejection 
of any words, and so as to declare the evident intention of the 
parties, and the latter is the principal rule to apply.66 
In light of the result finding that the grantor intended to make two grants, 
one limited to the 90 acres and another encompassing all of the 320 acres 
contained in the existing lease, it is hard to ascertain which, if any, of the 
listed canons is critical. The general canon of attempting to ascertain the 
“evident intention” of the parties is meaningless. The remaining three 
canons all support the result. However, the court’s suggestion that the 
language only be construed against the grantor if the language is ambiguous 
suggests that the “construe against the grantor” canon was not a decisive 
factor since the court never makes a finding of ambiguity and no parol 
evidence seemed to have been admitted.67 The court does not mention the 
greatest estate canon which would also support its finding that the grantee 
received an interest in the entire 320 acre leasehold estate during the life of 
the existing lease. 
The two other canons might be treated as somewhat inconsistent. 
Although inartfully worded, the court seemed to apply the “harmonizing” 
canon so that the two apparently conflicting grants could both be 
implemented. This would support a finding of two grants by giving effect to 
each clause. Yet the court also applied the “specific controls the general” 
canon which gives greater weight to the subject-to clause than to the more 
general granting clause.68 The court deemed critical the use of the language 
                                                                                                                 
 66. Id. The court cited the following cases as supporting the application of the canons so 
named: Regan v. Hatch, 91 Tex. 616, 45 S.W. 386 (1898); Cartwright v. Trueblood, 90 Tex. 
535, 39 S.W. 930 (1897); Cullers v. Platt, 81 Tex. 258, 16 S.W. 1003 (1891). 
 67. See infra part VII.C for a discussion of the “construe against the grantor” canon. 
 68. See 273 S.W. at 830. 
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“all” to describe royalties under the terms of “said lease.” Because the lease 
covered the entire 320 acres, the court reasoned the parties must have 
intended the subject-to clause to include not just the 90 acre tract but the 
totality of the acreage in the existing lease.69 It appears that the court tried 
to harmonize the two clauses rather than give one preemptive weight, but 
nonetheless, used the “specific controls the general” canon to find that two 
independent grants were contained in the single deed. 
Without the Hoffman conclusion that the parties could create two 
different interests in a single instrument, the present debate over the 
multiple grant issue probably would have never developed. In mixed 
fraction or mineral/royalty situations, the issue after Hoffman was not 
which of the clauses would necessarily prevail and govern the others, but 
could the court give effect to all of the inconsistent provisions. Without the 
two grant approach, one would have to go with an anti-harmonizing canon 
giving one part of the deed controlling authority. However, the two grant 
approach essentially harmonizes the inconsistent provisions by giving effect 
to all parts of the deed. 
Ernest Smith used Mitchell v. Simms70 to illustrate the difficulty in 
applying the multiple grants theory on the basis that it reflects the intent of 
the parties.71 In Mitchell, the grantor conveyed 1/2 of the minerals 
underlying the east 1/2 of a 320 acre tract that was subject to an existing 
lease.72 A typical subject-to clause was used so that the transfer included 
1/2 of the rents and royalties payable under the lease. If Hoffman is applied 
then the grantee has a right to 1/2 of the royalties from production 
anywhere on the 320 acres as long as the existing lease remains alive. In a 
second transaction, the grantor conveyed 1/2 of the minerals underlying the 
west 1/2 of the 320 acres in an instrument containing a similar subject-to 
clause. Although the issue was not before the court, the court suggested that 
if Hoffman were followed, the grantor would retain no royalty interests 
under the existing lease.73 The court found that the first grantee by virtue of 
the subject-to clause received a 1/2 interest in the full 320 acres and the 
second grantee likewise received a 1/2 interest in the entire 320 acre 
leasehold estate. That left the grantee with no royalty interest under the 
                                                                                                                 
 69. Id.; see Smith, supra note 61, at 15-5 (criticizing this result as not reflecting the 
intent of the parties since it was “atypical” and “extraordinary” to believe that the parties 
actually intended to have two separate grants within the single deed). 
 70. 63 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1933, holding approved). 
 71. See Smith, supra note 61, at 15-5. 
 72. 63 S.W.2d at 372. 
 73. Id. at 373. 
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existing lease, a result clearly not intended by the grantor, but dictated by 
the application of Hoffman. Because a construction of the respective deeds 
was not needed, the issue in the case being the late tender and acceptance of 
delay rental payments, the court did not apply any canons of construction.74 
The difficulty of applying Hoffman in cases involving only areal 
inconsistencies, as opposed to fractional or mineral/royalty inconsistencies, 
is reflected in the court of civil appeals and supreme court opinions in 
Woods v. Sims.75 Areal inconsistencies arise when a mistake is made about 
the amount of land described in the deed.76 In Woods, several deeds 
purported to transfer a 25/200 mineral interest in land already leased.77 The 
granting clause used that fractional share. The subject-to clause covered and 
included a 25/200 share of all of the royalties and rentals due. A rental 
clause conveyed a 25/200 share and the future interest clause also referred 
to a 25/200 mineral interest. The intention clause, however, said: “It being 
the intention of the grantor to convey . . . an undivided Twenty-five acre 
mineral interest. . . .”78 As it turned out, the land described in the deeds and 
the lease actually contained 226.88 acres. The grantor claimed that the 
                                                                                                                 
 74. Id. at 373–74. 
 75. 154 Tex. 59, 273 S.W.2d 617 (1954), rev’g 267 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort 
Worth 1954). 
 76. In Olvey v. Jones, 95 S.W.2d 980, 980 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1936, writ 
dism’d w.o.j.), the deed conveyed a 1/2 mineral interest with a subject-to clause including 
1/2 of the royalty under the lease. The future lease clause also referred to the interest as 1/2 
of the minerals. The description clause stated that the lands contained “55 acres, more or 
less.” However, the actual description encompassed 83.23 acres. The consideration for the 
deed was $2,750 allegedly reflecting the price of $100/acre. The grantors alleged that the 
grantees were only entitled to a 27.5/83.23 share of royalties, while the grantees alleged they 
were entitled to 1/2 of the royalties. Id. at 981. The trial judge ordered the deed reformed to 
reflect the transfer of a 27.5/83.23 mineral interest. The court of civil appeals reversed, 
finding that even if the granting clause was reformed, the grantee was entitled to a full 1/2 
interest because of the subject-to clause’s granting of 1/2 of the royalties due under the lease. 
Id. at 982. The court’s finding was based on Hoffman without the citation of any canons. Id. 
While the result may be justified on other grounds, the use of the Hoffman two-grants theory 
was probably inappropriate. The deed consistently transfers a 1/2 interest in the land 
described. Unless all of the clauses relating to the 1/2 interest are to be ignored or preempted 
by the intention clause’s reference to 55 acres, the deed taken as a whole expressed an intent 
to transfer 1/2 of the mineral interest. On later trial and appeal, the court found that 
reformation of both the granting clause and the subject-to clause was appropriate. Olvey v. 
Jones, 137 Tex. 639, 642–47, 156 S.W.2d 977, 978–81 (1941). 
 77. 154 Tex. at 62–63, 273 S.W.2d at 619. 
 78. Id. 
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grantees were entitled to a 25/226.88 mineral interest, while the grantees 
argued they were entitled to a 25/200 mineral interest.79 
The trial court found that the grantees were entitled to a 25/200 share of 
royalties under the existing lease, but if the lease terminated they would 
only receive a 25/226.88 mineral interest.80 The court of civil appeals 
disagreed and found the grantees were only entitled to a 25/226.88 share of 
both existing royalties and the future interest in the mineral estate.81 The 
court of civil appeals cited several different canons in support of its 
decision and basically found that the intent clause, identifying the quantum 
of interest to be conveyed as 25 mineral acres, controlled over the other 
clauses.82 The canons cited, however, are as inconsistent as the intention 
clause and the other clauses. For example, the court stated: 
Courts may not by construction destroy any provision of a deed 
when all may be harmonized; and when it can be done, all of 
them must be allowed to stand without regard to any relative 
value of conventional clauses.83 
Then the court added: “It has been held that specific language of an 
instrument will control general terms.”84 Applying the harmonizing canon 
to resolve the multiple fraction problem is consistent with the Hoffman 
result because the harmonizing canon gives effect to all of the provisions, 
notwithstanding the apparent conflict. In Woods, the court of civil appeals 
gave preemptive effect to the intention clause, even though all of the other 
provisions of the lease gave a contrary signal as to the fractional share of 
the mineral estate that was conveyed.85 The Woods court clearly chose an 
                                                                                                                 
 79. Id. at 63, 273 S.W.2d at 620. The litigant/grantees either owned an aggregated 47.5/ 
200 interest or a 47.5/226.88 interest. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 65–66, 273 S.W.2d at 620–21. 
 83. Sims v. Woods, 267 S.W.2d 571, 574 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth), rev’d, 154 
Tex. 59, 273 S.W.2d 617 (1954) (citing Sun Oil Co. v. Bums, 125 Tex. 549, 84 S.W.2d 442 
(1935); Moore v. City of Waco, 85 Tex. 206, 20 S.W. 61 (1892); Ogletree v. Abrams, 67 
S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1934, judgm’t adopted); Scheller v. Groesbeck, 231 S.W. 
1092 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1921, judgm’t adopted)); see infra part V (discussing the 
harmonizing and anti-harmonizing canons). 
 84. 267 S.W.2d at 574 (citing Reynolds v. McMan Oil & Gas Co., 11 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. 
Comm’n App. 1928, holding approved)). 
 85. See id. at 572–73. The court of civil appeals also cited the following canons: 
The intention of the parties may be expressed anywhere in the instrument, and 
when it may be ascertained it should be given effect, without regard to 
technical rules of construction. . . . Such construction must be given to a deed 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss2/3
2017]        An Encyclopedia of Canons of Construction 159 
 
 
anti-harmonizing canon to resolve the conflicting language even though the 
result required the court to ignore four different references to a 25/200 
interest.86 
The Woods court rejected applying Hoffman, although it is ostensibly 
applicable and would lead to a contrary result.87 The court did so because 
the subject-to clause conveyed all the royalty “in so far as it covers the 
above described land.”88 In addition, the Hoffman deed did not have an 
intention clause. This latter distinction is probably more important because 
it is the reason for the inconsistency. The result reached by the court of civil 
appeals is an improvement over the trial court’s finding of two different 
fractional grants. While the intention clause follows the granting clause and 
precedes the subject-to and future interest clauses, the intention clause is 
not by its terms limited in application to the granting clause. If the intention 
clause is to be given effect, which in this case means preemptive effect, it 
should apply to the possibility of reverter as well as the right to share in 
existing lease royalties. 
The Texas Supreme Court reversed, using some of the same canons of 
construction as the court of civil appeals.89 The supreme court cited an 
extended definition of the harmonizing canon and added that only when 
there is an irreconcilable conflict can the court apply an anti-harmonizing 
canon.90 The court used the Hoffman rationale to find that the intent clause, 
referring to the twenty-five acres, modified the grant of the possibility of 
reverter that was conveyed in the granting clause.91 Thus, the Texas 
Supreme Court reinstated the trial court’s finding that as to future leases, 
the grantor would receive a 25/226.88 mineral interest. This result does 
harmonize, but whether it reflects the true intent of the parties is less than 
clear. Again, it is hard to believe that the parties intended to create two 
different grants, one under the existing lease and one for future leases given 
the continued reference to a 25/200 share. Although reformation of the deed 
                                                                                                                 
as will effectuate the intention of the parties, if it is legally possible to do so . . . 
the question being, not what the parties meant to say, but the meaning of what 
they said. The intention of the grantor as gathered from the deed as a whole 
controls the interpretation. . . . 
Id. at 573–74. 
 86. See id. at 573. 
 87. Id. at 574. 
 88. See id. at 573. 
 89. See Woods v. Sims, 154 Tex. 59, 273 S.W.2d 617 (1954). 
 90. See id. at 64, 273 S.W.2d at 620–21. 
 91. See id. at 66, 273 S.W.2d at 621–22. 
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was not sought, given the parties mistake about the number of acres in the 
tract, reforming the deed to change all of the denominators to the actual 
acreage in the tract might have been appropriate. 
A good example of the use of the Hoffman approach to solve 
discrepancies between the granting, subject-to, and future lease clauses is 
Richardson v. Hart.92 As discussed earlier,93 the Texas Supreme Court 
found, without use of any canons of construction, that two different estates 
were transferred when there was a conflict between the granting, future 
lease, and intention clauses and the subject-to clause.94 The first three 
clauses conveyed a 1/128 mineral interest while the court interpreted the 
subject-to clause as conveying a 1/128 royalty interest. The court concluded 
that two grants were included in the deed.95 This was consistent with 
Hoffman because the court could conclude that the parties intended two 
different grants when the conflict was between the subject-to clause and the 
granting and future lease clauses. In effect, the grantor conveyed a 1/128 
mineral interest in the possibility of reverter and a separate 1/128 royalty 
interest during the life of the existing lease. The fractions were the same, 
but, as interpreted by the court, the subject-to clause was treated as 
conveying a 1/128 royalty, not a 1/128 of royalty.96 The court of civil 
appeals had harmonized the descriptions by treating all of the interests as a 
1/128 mineral estate, but had admitted extrinsic evidence that the supreme 
court excluded because it had found the deed unambiguous.97 When the 
conflict is between the subject-to and the granting or future lease clauses, 
use of the harmonizing canon is consistent with the Hoffman two grant ap-
proach because one can give effect to both signals. As suggested above, 
however, it is not evident in these cases whether the parties intended to 
create two separate grants. It appears more likely that confusion regarding 
the “transformation” of mineral interests into royalty interests, after a lease, 
has led to the inconsistent or conflicting use of fractions or descriptions. 
Four cases of the Texas Supreme Court illustrate the practical and 
conceptual difficulties the court has grappled with in resolving multiple 
                                                                                                                 
 92. 143 Tex. 392, 185 S.W.2d 563 (1945); see also Porter v. Shaw, 12 S.W.2d 595 
(Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1928, no writ) (finding that the writing of an instrument 
showed that the parties were contracting with reference to two subjects). 
 93. See supra notes 13–20 and accompanying text. 
 94. See 143 Tex. at 396, 185 S.W.2d at 564–65. 
 95. See id. at 396, 185 S.W.2d at 564. 
 96. See id. at 396, 185 S.W.2d at 565. 
 97. See id. at 395–96, 185 S.W.2d at 564. 
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grant deed cases.98 The four cases reflect the use or misuse of canons of 
construction that should not be substituted for sound judgment and reason. 
The first case is the five to four decision in Garrett v. Dils Co.99 In Garrett, 
the granting clause conveyed “an undivided one sixty-fourth interest” in the 
mineral estate.100 The subject-to clause conveyed “one-eighth of all of the 
oil royalty and gas rental” and “one-eighth of the money rentals which may 
be paid to extend the term . . . of said lease.” The future lease clause 
conveyed “an undivided one-eighth of the lease interest and all future ren-
tals.”101 Finally, an intention clause stated that the grantee owned “one-
eighth of one-eighth of all oil, gas and other minerals in and under said 
lands, together with one-eighth interest in all future rents.”102 
The inconsistent fractions are clear. The granting clause and the first part 
of the intention clause appear to transfer a 1/64 mineral interest. The 
subject-to, future lease, and last part of the intention clauses appear to 
transfer a 1/8 mineral interest. The original lease terminated and the issue 
was whether the grantee was entitled to a 1/64 or a 1/512 royalty.103 
The majority opinion used four canons to reach its conclusion that the 
parties intended to convey a 1/8 mineral interest, thereby entitling the 
grantee to a 1/64 royalty. The first canon is: “[T]he intention of the parties, 
                                                                                                                 
 98. See Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. 1991); Alford v. Krum, 671 S.W.2d 870 
(Tex. 1984); Garrett v. Dils Co., 157 Tex. 92, 299 S.W.2d 904 (1957). 
 99. 157 Tex. 92, 299 S.W.2d 904 (1957). 
 100. Id. at 93, 299 S.W.2d at 905. 
 101. Id. The Court interpreted the term “lease interest” as not to encompass the 
possibility of reverter, but merely to describe the executive power. Id. at 96, 299 S.W.2d at 
907. Thus, in cases such as Delta Drilling Co. v. Simmons, 161 Tex. 122, 338 S.W.2d 143 
(1960), in which the granting clause and the future lease clause both gave the grantee a 1/4 
mineral interest, but none of the lease interests, the court was able to harmonize by 
concluding that the grantee received a 1/4 mineral interest with none of the executive power. 
Id. at 126, 338 S.W.2d at 146. This is consistent with the general rule that the owner of a 
mineral estate is free to convey or reserve any of the constituent elements of a mineral estate. 
See Altman v. Blake, 712 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. 1986). 
 102. 157 Tex. at 94, 299 S.W.2d at 905. 
 103. Id. The trial court found that the grantee was entitled to a 1/512 royalty while the 
court of civil appeals found the grantee should receive a 1/64 royalty. Id. The court skirted 
the issue of whether a division order signed by the grantees and giving them a 1/512 royalty 
would be binding. Id. The court concluded that because the lease was unambiguous, no 
extrinsic evidence could be admitted and therefore the division order could not vary the 
terms of the deed. Id. The court did not answer the question of whether the division order 
would bind the royalty owner until it was revoked. See id. at 906. For a contrasting 
approach, see Richardson v. Hart, 183 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1944), aff’d 
on other grounds, 143 Tex. 392, 185 S.W.2d 563 (1945). 
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when it can be ascertained from a consideration of all parts of the 
instrument, will be given effect when possible.”104 The second canon then 
states: “That intention, when ascertained, prevails over arbitrary rules.”105 
This looks like the four corners or harmonizing canon that would attempt to 
reconcile and give meaning to all of the inconsistent fractions. The court 
does not identify what “arbitrary rules” it otherwise would have applied had 
it not ascertained the intent of the parties. 
The third and fourth canons are related. As stated by the Garrett court: 
“should there be any doubt as to the proper construction of the deed, that 
doubt should be resolved against the grantors, whose language it is, and be 
held to convey the greatest estate permissible under its language.”106 These 
two canons clearly lead to the result reached by the court. 
By applying the four corners canon, the court had to deal with the 
granting and intention clause fractions that indicated a grant of a 1/64 
mineral interest. Since at the time of the deed the land was under lease, the 
transfer of a mineral interest, without more, was a transfer of that fractional 
share of the leasehold benefits, including royalty, and that fractional share 
of the possibility of reverter.107 The court could have applied Hoffman, 
which might have treated the deed as conveying two separate grants, one 
involving interests under the existing lease and the other involving the 
possibility of reverter. When a mineral deed is executed while a lease is in 
existence and the conflicting fractions are in the granting and future lease 
clause, the conflicting clauses cannot be harmonized. Both clauses 
essentially describe the same interest. Only when the subject-to and 
granting or future lease clauses are inconsistent can Hoffman be 
legitimately applied. 
Instead, the court looked at the language of the subject-to clause as 
defining what the parties really meant when they used the fraction 1/64 and 
the mineral estate language.108 The subject-to clause is properly construed 
to transfer a 1/64 royalty and a 1/8 share of delay rentals. Likewise, with the 
                                                                                                                 
 104. 157 Tex. at 95, 299 S.W.2d at 906 (quoting Harris v. Windsor, 156 Tex. 324, 294 
S.W.2d 798 (1956)). 
 105. Id. at 96. 299 S.W.2d at 906. 
 106. Id. For a discussion of the “construe against the scrivener” or grantor rule, see infra 
part VII.A, and for a discussion of the greatest estate canon, see infra part VII.D. 
 107. See id. at 96–97, 299 S.W.2d at 906–07. This result has been the law in Texas since 
Harris v. Currie, 142 Tex. 93, 176 S.W.2d 302 (1943) (overruling Carruthers v. Leonard, 
254 S.W. 779 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1923, judgm’t adopted)). 
 108. 157 Tex. at 96, 299 S.W.2d at 906. The court readily admitted that the clear and 
unambiguous language of the granting clause transferred an undivided 1/64 mineral interest. 
Id. 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss2/3
2017]        An Encyclopedia of Canons of Construction 163 
 
 
intention clause, the court construed the conflicting term “one-eighth of 
one-eighth” to reflect a royalty interest and not a mineral interest.109 In 
effect, the court is giving greater weight to the subject-to and future lease 
clauses by overriding the clear signals in the granting clause that only a 
1/64 mineral interest was to be granted. The majority’s opinion in Garrett is 
clearly consistent with the construe against the scrivener and greatest estate 
canons because it results in the grantee receiving a 1/8 rather than a 1/64 
mineral interest.110 
The dissenting justices, on the other hand, expressly relied on only one 
canon, namely that the intention of the parties must “be ascertained from 
the language contained therein.”111 Because that general canon does not 
provide much guidance, other than to exclude extrinsic evidence, the 
dissenting justices’ conclusion was based on their reading of some earlier 
cases and their reluctance to so easily disregard the express language of the 
granting clause.112 It is not clear, however, whether the reliance on 
Richardson and its application of the Hoffman two grant approach or the 
reluctance to ignore the plain language of the granting clause led Justice 
Norvell to conclude that the parties had conveyed a l/64th mineral interest 
in the possibility of reverter as evidenced by the granting and future lease 
clauses and a l/64th royalty interest under the subject-to clause. 
The next major milestone was Alford v. Krum.113 In Alford, the granting 
clause conveyed “one-half of the one-eighth interest” in the mineral 
estate.114 The subject-to clause conveyed “1/16 of all the oil royalty and gas 
rental or royalty due,” while the future lease clause provided that the 
grantee would own “a one-half interest” in the mineral estate. The subject-
                                                                                                                 
 109. Id. at 96, 299 S.W.2d at 907. 
 110. If the majority were relying on these two canons, the results would be different even 
when the fractions were identical if the deed reserved, rather than granted, the interest. But, 
if the court was applying the four corners canon, a different result would not be required. 
 111. 157 Tex. at 97, 299 S.W.2d at 907 (Norvell, J., dissenting). 
 112. See id. at 99, 299 S.W.2d at 908. Justice Norvell stated: 
It is clear enough that [the grantor] intended to convey . . . an undivided l/64th 
interest in and to all of the oil, gas and other minerals in and under the tract of 
land involved. The formal granting clause expressly so provides. The remaining 
question is whether there is other language in the deed which would expand or 
increase the interest specifically conveyed in the formal granting clause. . . . 
Id. at 97, 299 S.W.2d at 907. This language is similar to the “granting clause prevails” 
approach adopted by the court in Alford, although it is not written to require that the granting 
clause language always prevails. 
 113. 671 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1984). 
 114. Id. at 871. 
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to clause, however, provided that the grantees were to receive none of the 
money rentals under the existing lease. In Alford, the conflicting signals 
occurred between the granting and subject-to clauses and the future lease 
clause, whereas in Garrett, the conflict existed between the granting clause 
and the subject-to and future lease clauses. It is the conflict between the 
granting and future lease clauses that creates the problem. Conflicts 
between the subject to and future lease clauses can be resolved, as they 
were in Richardson, through the use of the Hoffman two grant approach, 
which gives effect to the entire instrument.115 But when, as in Garrett and 
Alford, the conflict is between the granting and future lease clauses, they 
both cannot be given effect. Either the granting clause language must 
prevail or the future lease clause language must prevail.116 
Alford cited at least eight canons of construction, although it is obvious 
that only two were critical to the court’s rationale.117 Three of the canons 
related to the court’s function of trying to ascertain the intent of the parties 
to the instrument.118 
The court’s departure from prior decisions, however, came in its 
juxtaposition of the harmonizing and anti-harmonizing canons.119 Prior 
cases had principally relied on the harmonizing or four corners canon to 
deal with multiple fraction problems. The results were not always 
consistent but the approach was the same. In Alford, the court cited the 
harmonizing canon, noting that the parties in effect are presumed to want to 
give effect to all parts of the deed.120 But then the court applied another 
                                                                                                                 
 115. See Richardson v. Hart, 143 Tex. 392, 396, 185 S.W.2d 563, 564–65 (1945); 
Hoffman v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 273 S.W. 828, 830 (Tex. 1925). 
 116. As will be seen shortly in the discussion of Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 819 S.W.2d 466 
(Tex. 1991), see infra note 158 and accompanying text, there is a third approach which does 
give meaning to both the granting clause and the future lease clause. I believe, however, that 
the Snow analysis is fatally flawed and based on an erroneous assumption about what 
interests are retained by a mineral owner after a lease has been executed. See infra notes 
158–81 and accompanying text. 
 117. See 671 S.W.2d at 872–73. 
 118. Id. at 872. The court began with the canon, “The primary duty of the court . . . is to 
ascertain the intent of the parties,” followed by “that it is not the intention that the parties 
may have had but failed to express in the instrument, but it is the intention that is expressed 
by said instrument,” and concluded with “[w]e must construe this language as it is written 
and we have no right to alter it by interpolation of substitution.” Id. If any canon need be 
cited it is the second canon that it is the intention of the parties as expressed in the 
instrument that is controlling. See infra part IV.A.l. 
 119. See infra part VI. 
 120. 671 S.W.2d at 872 (citing Woods v. Sims, 154 Tex. 59, 64, 273 S.W.2d 617, 620 
(1954)); see supra notes 75–91 and accompanying text. 
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canon that can only be used when harmonizing is impossible. The court 
stated: “[W]e realize that irreconcilable conflicts do exist; therefore, when it 
is impossible to harmonize internally inconsistent expressions of intent, the 
court must give effect to the ‘controlling language’ of the deed and not 
allow ambiguities to ‘destroy the key expression of intent’ included within 
the deed’s terms.”121 
As noted above, when the conflict is between the granting clause and the 
future lease clause, one cannot give effect to both unless one follows the 
approach taken in Snow. A transfer of a mineral interest that has been 
leased is a transfer of the possibility of reverter and the economic benefits 
under the lease.122 If the fraction or areal descriptions between the granting 
and future lease clause are different only one can be given effect. The other, 
by the very nature of the problem, must be preempted. Or, as was done in 
Garrett, rather than apply a canon that chooses between the two competing 
clauses, a more general “party-related” canon can be used, such as the 
“construe against the scrivener” or greatest estate canon, to resolve the 
conflict.123 
Having opted for an anti-harmonizing preemptive canon, the Alford court 
then had to choose a canon that would signify which clause was to have 
preemptive effect.124 The court concluded: 
the “controlling language” and the “key expression of intent” is 
to be found in the granting clause, as it defines the nature of the 
permanent mineral estate conveyed. [citation omitted] It 
                                                                                                                 
 121. Id. The court cited Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co. v. Masterson, 160 Tex. 548, 553, 334 
S.W.2d 436, 439 (1960) as the source of these canons. The quote really contains two 
different canons. One is that when irreconcilable conflicts do exist the court should give 
effect to the controlling language and the other is that it should not allow ambiguities to 
destroy the key expression of intent. 671 S.W.2d at 872. The Masterson case involved a 
deed that conveyed “[a]ll of the unsold portion containing 186.4 acres out of the 640 acres 
known as the Manuel Tigerino Survey.” 160 Tex. at 551, 334 S.W.2d at 438. The issue was 
whether the court should give effect to the term “all the unsold portion,” or to the description 
“containing 186.4 acres.” In a 6-3 decision, the court applied the harmonizing canon but 
modified it by stating that key words must be given effect. See id. at 552, 334 S.W.2d at 439. 
The court concluded that the key words were “all the unsold portion” which meant that a 1/4 
mineral estate in lands outside of the 186.4 acres were also conveyed by the deed. Id. The 
court also relied on the greatest estate canon that probably is more appropriately used in the 
context of the Masterson case. See id. (citing Cartwright v. Trueblood, 90 Tex. 535, 537–38, 
39 S.W. 930, 931 (1897)). 
 122. Harris v. Currie, 142 Tex. 93, 99–100, 176 S.W.2d 302, 305 (1943). 
 123. See Garrett v. Dils Co., 157 Tex. 92, 95, 299 S.W.2d 904, 906 (1957). 
 124. See 671 S.W.2d at 872. 
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logically follows that when there is an irreconcilable conflict 
between clauses of a deed, the granting clause prevails over all 
other provisions.125 
The grant of a 1/16 mineral interest in the granting clause in effect gives the 
grantee a 1/16 share of the economic benefits under the existing lease, and a 
1/16 share of the possibility of reverter. The future lease clause reference to 
a 1/2 interest is inconsistent with, and makes ambiguous, the earlier 
reference to a 1/16 interest. Applying the “granting clause prevails” canon 
and the canon that it is impermissible to give effect to language which 
creates an ambiguity or destroys certainty, the majority found that only a 
1/16 mineral interest was conveyed.126 
Chief Justice Pope, in dissent, basically mirrored the Garrett 
approach.127 He correctly read the majority opinion as disregarding the 
future lease clause in favor of the granting clause. However, he runs into 
the same trap as the Garrett court. It is impossible to harmonize 
inconsistent fractions in the granting and future lease clause when the 
mineral interest being conveyed has been leased. One must give preemptive 
weight to either clause. The Hoffman approach is likewise inapplicable 
                                                                                                                 
 125. Id. The court cites Kokernot v. Caldwell, 231 S.W.2d 528, 531–32 (Tex. Civ. 
App.— Dallas 1950, writ ref’d) as the basis of the granting clause prevails canon. Kokernot 
did not involve conflicting fractional grants, but involved conflicting temporal limits 
between the granting and subject-to clauses. The granting clause created a fixed term 
mineral interest of 20 years while the subject-to clause only referred to the terms of the 
existing lease. 231 S.W.2d at 530–31. The grantee alleged that the subject-to clause was a 
transfer of an estate, which was to last as long as the lease, while the grantor alleged that the 
interest was to terminate after 20 years. See id. at 531. Because the dispute was between the 
granting and subject-to clauses, the court could have relied on Hoffman and found that the 
granting clause created a term for years mineral estate in the grantor’s possibility of reverter, 
and the subject-to clause created a second interest that was to last as long as the existing 
lease. But, instead, the court relied on several other canons, including the irreconcilable 
conflicts canon, to give preemptive effect to the granting clause limitation of 20 years. See 
671 S.W.2d at 873–74. The court acknowledged that two separate estates could be created in 
a single mineral deed but found that a reasonable construction of the language of this deed 
would not support such an interpretation. See id. at 873. But cf. Acklin v. Fuqua, 193 S.W.2d 
297 (Tex. Civ. App.— Amarillo 1946, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (stating that two separate and distinct 
mineral estates can be conveyed by one instrument to subsist during and beyond the life of 
an existing lease, and a royalty to be due and payable under the lease). 
 126. 671 S.W.2d at 874. 
 127. See id. at 876 (Pope, C.J., dissenting). 
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because both clauses effectively seek to transfer the same possibility of 
reverter.128 
Alford was a clear departure from previous decisions that had clearly 
favored giving effect to the future lease provisions rather than granting 
clause. The Alford approach has the advantage of certainty, but as a 
departure from prior caselaw, it upset the expectations of those in the 
conveyancing industry. When the conflict was between differing fractions 
in the granting and the future lease clause, the granting clause fraction 
would prevail. A number of court of appeals decisions noted the change and 
followed the Alford analysis.129 
In Luckel v. White,130 the Texas Supreme Court overruled Alford in a 
case involving conflicting fractions in a royalty deed.131 
The following are the clauses that created the difficulty: 
 [Granting Clause] I, Mary Etta Mayes . . . [convey to] L.C. 
Luckel, Jr. an undivided one thirty-second (l/32nd) royalty inter-
est in and to the following described property. . . 
 [Habendum and Warranty Clauses] TO HAVE AND TO 
HOLD the above described l/32nd royalty interest . . . unto the 
[grantee] . . . to warrant and forever defend . . . the said l/32nd 
royalty interest. 
 [Subject-to Clause] It is understood that said premises are 
now under lease . . . and that the grantee herein shall receive no 
part of the rentals as provided for under said lease, but shall 
receive one-fourth of any and all royalties paid under the terms 
of said lease. 
 [Future Lease Clause] It is expressly understood and agreed 
that the grantor herein reserved [sic] the right upon expiration of 
the present term of the lease on said premises to make other and 
                                                                                                                 
 128. Id. at 875 (Pope, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Pope is correct in noting that with 
this particular form deed one can have the grant of a mineral interest with a different 
fractional share of either the executive power or the right to receive delay rentals. Under 
these circumstances, all of the provisions can be given effect as the grantor is free to divide 
his mineral estate into as many of the constituent elements as he pleases. 
 129. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 724 S.W.2d 878, 886 (Tex. App.— 
Waco 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Stag Sales Co. v. Flores, 697 S.W.2d 493, 495 (Tex. App.— 
San Antonio 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
 130. 819 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. 1991). 
 131. See id. at 464. 
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additional leases . . . and the grantee shall be bound by the terms 
of any such leases . . . [and] shall be entitled to one-fourth of any 
and all royalties reserved under said leases. 
[Final Clause] It is understood and agreed that [grantor] is the 
owner of one-half of the royalties to be paid under the terms of 
the present existing lease, the other one-half having been 
transferred by her to her children and by the execution of this 
instrument, [grantor] conveyed one-half of the one-sixteenth 
(l/16th) royalty now reserved by her.132 
The existing lease expired, and the conveyed royalty interest had been the 
subject of five different oil and gas leases.133 Four of those leases provided 
for a royalty of 1/6. The grantee’s successors claimed that they were 
entitled to a 1/24 royalty, while the grantor’s successors argued that the 
grant was absolutely limited to a fixed 1/32 royalty.134 If Alford were to 
apply, the fixed fraction of a 1/32 royalty in the granting clause would 
prevail over the inconsistent signal of a 1/4 of royalty in the future lease and 
other clauses. This was the result in the court of appeals.135 
In a 5-4 decision, the Texas Supreme Court overruled Alford.136 What 
may be more important than the overruling of Alford is what analytical 
methodology replaces the “granting clause prevails” canon. Unfortunately, 
ascertaining that methodology and applying it to other situations was made 
difficult by the fact that the Luckel deed was a royalty deed, while most of 
the prior cases involved mineral interests. The majority aptly points out that 
for many purposes, a royalty and a mineral conveyance are analogous.137 
They both involve the transfer of an interest in real property, both are 
subject to the traditional canons of construction, and both must comply with 
the various formalities required for a transfer of an interest in realty.138 
The court, however, ignored a basic difference between the conveyance 
of a mineral and a royalty interest. As noted earlier, the transfer of a mineral 
interest that has been leased is in effect the transfer of a future interest 
                                                                                                                 
 132. Id. at 461. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See id. 
 135. See Luckel v. White, 792 S.W.2d 485, 490 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990), 
rev’d, 819 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. 1991). 
 136. 819 S.W.2d at 461 (Tex. 1991). Justice Mauzy concurred in the result to add the 5th 
vote, while Chief Justice Phillips authored a dissent joined by Justices Gonzalez, Cook and 
Hightower. 
 137. See id. at 463–64. 
 138. Id. 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss2/3
2017]        An Encyclopedia of Canons of Construction 169 
 
 
(possibility of reverter) and the transfer of the right to receive economic 
benefits, including royalty, under the existing lease. Neither the present 
development, possessory or executive rights are transferred. A royalty 
interest is a single element interest. When it is transferred, the fact that a 
lease exists is irrelevant. The parties convey the right to present and future 
royalty, unless of course the royalty is specifically conveyed as a future 
interest.139 Thus, the conflict between the granting, subject-to and future 
lease clauses may be resolved by using the Hoffman harmonizing analysis 
without having to worry about any of the clauses having preemptive effect. 
While different fractional or areal descriptions of mineral estates in the 
granting and future lease clauses are “clearly repugnant” when the mineral 
estate has been leased, such is not the case with a royalty interest. In any 
event, because the court treated the interests as analogous, the reader must 
presume that the Luckel analysis applies to both mineral and royalty deeds 
which have different descriptions in the various clauses. 
The majority’s analysis begins with a typical litany of several canons of 
construction, including the two that gave rise to the conflict between Alford 
and Garrett.140 Initially, the court applied what it labeled the “four corners” 
rule which is the rule that the court must ascertain the intent from all of the 
language.141 Although this is a helpful canon, it is reasonably meaningless 
and does not resolve the conflict. A second canon is that the intent which is 
ascertained from the “four corners” prevails over arbitrary rules.142 
The battle of the canons, however, is between the harmonizing canon, 
which requires a court to harmonize contradictory or inconsistent 
provisions of a deed, and the anti-harmonizing canon, which states that a 
court can opt not to give effect to language that destroys another part of the 
deed.143 This canon, however, only allows a court to choose one part of the 
                                                                                                                 
 139. For example, O can transfer a 1/8 royalty interest to A for A’s life and to B and his 
heirs. A gets the present life estate in any royalties while B has an indefeasibly vested 
remainder in the royalties. 
 140. See 819 S.W.2d at 461–62. 
 141. 819 S.W.2d at 461 (citing Garrett v. Dils Co., 157 Tex. 92, 299 S.W.2d 904 (1957)). 
 142. Id. at 462 (citing Harris v. Windsor, 156 Tex. 324, 294 S.W.2d 798 (1956)). The 
court does not identify what arbitrary rules or canons should be ignored. See infra part IV.B. 
 143. 819 S.W.2d at 462. Symptomatic of the difficulty courts have in defining the 
harmonizing canon, the court used three different sentences to describe the canon. It stated: 
The court, when seeking to ascertain the intention of the parties, attempts to 
harmonize all parts of the deed. . . . “[T]he parties to an instrument intend every 
clause to have some effect and in some measure to evidence their 
agreement.” . . . Even if different parts of the deed appear contradictory or 
inconsistent, the court must strive to harmonize all of the parts, construing the 
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deed over another. It does not require any particular clause to prevail. For a 
particular clause to prevail, a second canon is required, such as the 
“granting clause prevails canon” used in Alford. 
In Luckel, the conflicting signals were contained in the granting, 
habendum and warranty, and final clauses, which refer to a 1/32 royalty 
interest, and the subject-to and future lease clauses, which refer to a 1/4 of 
royalty.144 The court of appeals applied the harmonizing canon and took 
judicial notice that at the time of the deed, a leasehold royalty of 1/8 was 
universally reserved.145 By harmonizing the clauses, the court of appeals 
concluded that 1/4 of royalty was undoubtedly the same as 1/4 of 1/8 or a 
1/32.146 Therefore, the grantee was only entitled to a fixed 1/32 royalty 
interest. 
The supreme court disagreed, not with the use of the harmonizing canon, 
but with its application. Instead of treating the 1/4 of royalty as 1/4 of 1/8, 
the majority concluded that the parties intended to give a 1/4 of all reserved 
royalty since a 1/32 was a 1/4 of the 1/8 royalty contained in the existing 
lease.147 Because the harmonizing canon did not lead to a clear result, the 
court applied other canons as the basis for resolving these difficulties.148 
The court went back to the basic intent canon that “the actual intent of the 
parties as expressed in the instrument as a whole, ‘without reference to 
matters of mere form, relative position of descriptions, technicalities, or 
arbitrary rules.’ ” must be sought.149 This canon is not particularly helpful 
in dealing with the Luckel deed’s use of inconsistent fractions. The court 
then cited another, somewhat disingenuous canon, namely that courts 
“should give effect to the substance of unambiguous provisions.”150 The 
court then found the subject-to and future lease clause language as 
                                                                                                                 
instrument to give effect to all of its provisions. 
Id. (citing Benge v. Scharbauer, 152 Tex. 447, 451, 259 S.W.2d 166, 167 (1953)). See 
generally infra part VI (discussing the harmonizing and anti-harmonizing canons). 
 144. 819 S.W.2d at 460. 
 145. Id. at 462. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 462–63. 
 149. Id. at 462. The court cited Sun Oil Co. v. Burns, 125 Tex. 549, 84 S.W.2d 442 
(1935), and suggested that the arbitrary rules, which are to be ignored, are the “ancient” rules 
relating to deed descriptions. 
 150. 819 S.W.2d at 463. I had thought that the primary purpose of deed interpretation 
cases was to give effect to the language used by the parties without resorting to parol 
evidence. The difficulty is not in giving effect to unambiguous language, but in resolving 
conflicts or inconsistencies between individually unambiguous provisions. 
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unambiguously giving 1/4 of royalty to the grantee. The court did not 
explain why the equally unambiguous granting, warranty and habendum, 
and final clauses did not operate to convey a 1/32 royalty. The court cited 
several additional canons that require a court to “construe this language as it 
is written and . . . [the court has] no right to alter it by interpolation or 
substitution.”151 At this point in the opinion, even without a direct 
overruling of Alford, it would seem clear that when there were fractional 
differences between the granting and subject-to or future lease clauses, the 
fraction used in the latter clauses would prevail. The court’s further writings 
suggest, however, that such a simple analysis is not intended.152 This would 
be a return to the approach taken in Garrett, as well as the rejection of 
Alford. 
The Luckel majority, in specifically overruling Alford, suggested that the 
problems in Alford and Luckel were identical. One cannot give effect to the 
granting clause of a mineral deed when that fraction is different from the 
fraction contained in the subject-to and future lease clauses. Any other 
conflict can be harmonized if the court chooses to follow the Hoffman 
multi-grant approach. In a royalty deed case, however, the irreconcilable 
conflict exists when there is a fractional conflict between the granting and 
subject-to clauses within an existing lease. Conflicts between either of those 
clauses and the future lease clause can be harmonized if the court follows 
the Hoffman approach. Because the existing lease had lapsed, the “ir-
reconcilable conflict” that had existed in Luckel between the subject-to and 
the granting clause was a moot point. The court merely could have applied 
Hoffman at this point and stated that the grantor conveyed a 1/4 of royalty 
interest that would take effect at the expiration of the existing lease. 
The court, however, in describing this future interest in the royalty, 
called it a possibility of reverter.153 This was needlessly confusing since the 
                                                                                                                 
 151. Id. (citing Dalberg v. Holden, 150 Tex. 179, 183, 238 S.W.2d 699, 701 (1951). 
 152. See id. 
 153. Id. at 464. Although possibilities of reverter were not alienable inter vivos at early 
common law, most states treat them as alienable. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 4.70 
(1952). Texas has allowed possibilities of reverter to be conveyed since 1923. Caruthers v. 
Leonard, 254 S.W. 779, 782 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1923, holding approved); see also Bagby 
v. Bredthauer, 627 S.W.2d 190, 197 (Tex. App.—Austin 1981, no writ) (holding that a 
grantor may expressly reserve a possibility of reverter); York v. Kenilworth Oil Co., 614 
S.W.2d 468, 471 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (excepting a possibility of 
reverter from a grant does not pass this interest to a grantee); Murphy v. Jamison, 117 
S.W.2d 127, 130 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1938, writ ref’d) (recognizing that a mineral 
rights owner has the power to sever his estate in the minerals from his estate in the 
remainder). 
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royalty was no longer part of the possibility of reverter that had become 
possessory when the first lease terminated. When the royalty conveyance 
was executed, a “fee simple absolute” estate was passed. The royalty was 
not a possessory interest but was a present interest of infinite duration. The 
owner became immediately entitled to the fractional royalty share 
regardless of the existence of a lease.154 In effect, if the court wanted to 
continue to use the common law estate system to describe a non-possessory 
interest, the deed could have been described as transferring either a 1/4 of 
royalty or a 1/32 royalty in a fee simple subject to an executory limitation 
and an executory interest in a 1/4 of royalty.155 It would be the equivalent of 
O transferring a 1/32 royalty to A so long as the existing lease exists and 
then a 1/4 of royalty to A and his heirs. This would have been entirely 
consistent with the Hoffman multi-grant approach. The Luckel court’s 
discussion of the transfer of part of the possibility of reverter is confusing, 
but reaches the same result as suggested above. 
The court, however, was left with the dilemma of giving some meaning 
to the granting clause. It found that the 1/32 fixed royalty was a minimum 
royalty, so that even if a future lease provided for a leasehold royalty of less 
than 1/8, the grantee would receive no less than 1/32 royalty. This 
harmonizing does give some meaning to the granting clause, but believing 
that the use of a fixed fraction in the granting clause was intended to be a 
minimum fraction is a leap of faith that is difficult to accept. The court, 
however, was constrained by its embrace of the harmonizing canon to give 
effect to the granting and other clauses, and therefore, chose an 
interpretation that gave it an unlikely, but rather harmless meaning.156 
Chief Justice Phillips, in dissent, concluded that the overruling of Alford 
was premature, although the use of the harmonizing canon in light of the 
inconsistent fractions suggested that Alford would not last much longer. 
The dissent’s approach was based on the following assumption: “The oft-
repeated expression that a grantor has the power to convey by one 
instrument different interests in the possibility of reverter and under the 
                                                                                                                 
 154. 819 S.W.2d at 465. 
 155. The use of the inconsistent fractions in the deed, along with its mootness, did not 
require the court to resolve that “irreconcilable conflict.” If the court had treated the subject-
to clause as controlling the granting clause then the grantee received a 1/4 of royalty in fee 
simple absolute. 
 156. Justice Mauzy, in concurring, would merely apply the harmonizing canon and find 
as a matter of law that a 1/4 of royalty was intended. 819 S.W.2d at 465 (Mauzy, J., 
concurring). He saw the canons used in Alford as within the category of “arbitrary rules” that 
must fall in the face of the parties’ intent. Id. He would adopt Chief Justice Pope’s dissent in 
Alford. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
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subsisting lease should not obscure the fact that very few grantors really 
intend to convey interests of different magnitude.”157 This assumption 
implicitly rejects the result in Hoffman in the absence of clear language to 
the contrary. But it does not resolve the difficulty of harmonizing different 
fractional or areal signals when they are in clear conflict. The dissent read 
the same deed as the majority and the concurring justices, and harmonized 
by concluding that the parties intended a 1/32 fixed royalty. Justice Mauzy 
and the court of appeals read the same language, applied the harmonizing 
canon and found that the parties intended to transfer a 1/4 of royalty. Ay, 
there’s the rub with the harmonizing canon and the multiple fraction 
problem. 
The difficulty of applying the Luckel analysis has been geometrically 
increased by the supreme court’s opinion in Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow,158 
which was decided at the same time as Luckel. The approach taken in Snow 
unnecessarily complicates the job of the title opinion attorney. Dean Frank 
Elliott noted the problem raised by the Snow approach over 30 years ago 
when he stated: 
The greatest source of confusion is the failure to understand the 
exact nature of the property interest of a landowner after the 
execution of an oil and gas lease. The lessor often thinks of his 
ownership as a l/8th royalty interest rather than a possibility of 
reverter in all the minerals.159 
By leasing, the mineral owner conveys his entire (100 percent) possessory 
estate in the minerals, burdened by the lessee’s obligations to pay a 
fractional royalty and other leasehold benefits. The mineral owner after the 
lease retains no part of the present possessory mineral estate, but merely a 
possibility of reverter of 100 percent of the minerals. Thus, when the lease 
expires, the lessor’s possibility of reverter becomes a fee simple absolute in 
100 percent of the mineral estate. 
In Tipps v. Bodine160 the granting clause stated that the grantee was to 
receive “an undivided 1/16 interest in and to all of the oil, gas and other 
                                                                                                                 
 157. 819 S.W.2d at 466 (citing 2 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 340.2, 
at 242–43 (1990)). 
 158. 819 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. 1991). 
 159. Frank W. Elliott, The Fractional Mineral Deed “Subject To” a Lease, 36 TEX. L. 
REV. 620, 622 (1958). 
 160. 101 S.W.2d 1076 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1936, writ ref’d). Prior to Snow, the 
Tipps case had been cited in only 6 cases. The only case that involved a multiple fraction and 
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minerals in and under. . . .”161 The subject-to clause stated that it “covers 
and includes one-half of all the oil royalty and gas rental . . . [and] one-half 
of the money rentals which may be paid to extend the term. . . .”162 The 
future lease clause provided that if the existing lease expired “an undivided 
one-half of the lease interests and all future rentals on said land for oil, gas 
and other mineral privileges shall be owned by the said Grantee . . . owning 
1/16 of all oil, gas and other minerals in and under said lands, together with 
one-half interest in all future events.’’163 The granting clause and the final 
clause suggest that the grantee was to receive a 1/16 mineral interest while 
the subject-to and future lease clauses suggest that the grantee was to 
receive a 1/2 mineral interest.164 
The court only applied one canon of construction, namely that the intent 
of the parties is “to be gathered from the instrument as a whole. . . .”165 The 
extant lease expired and the issue was whether the grantee received a 1/16 
or a 1/2 interest.166 The trial court had reformed the deed placing the 
fraction 1/2 wherever the fraction 1/16 was located.167 The court of civil 
appeals agreed with the result but not the analysis.168 
The court mysteriously concluded that the granting clause of a 1/16 
interest in all the minerals was in effect a grant of 1/2 of the l/8th interest 
retained by the lessor after the lease.169 As noted above, the lessor retained 
no mineral interest after a lease.170 The lessor could not have transferred a 
possessory interest in the minerals while an outstanding lease on the 
premises existed. The lessor owned a royalty interest and economic benefits 
that burden the lessee’s 100 percent possessory estate. The lessor also 
owned a 100 percent interest in the possibility of reverter. But, the court did 
                                                                                                                 
did not follow the Tipps analysis was Delta Drilling Co. v. Simmons, 161 Tex. 122, 338 
S.W.2d 143 (1960). 
 161. 101 S.W.2d at 1076. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 1076–77. 
 164. See id. at 1077–79. 
 165. Id. at 1078 (citing Reynolds v. McMan Oil & Gas Co., 11 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. 
Comm’n App. 1928, holding approved)); see also Sun Oil Co. v. Burns, 125 Tex. 549, 84 
S.W.2d 442 (1935) (utilizing the canon of construction followed in Reynolds and Tipps). 
 166. See 101 S.W.2d at 1078. 
 167. Id. 
 168. See id. at 1078–79. 
 169. See id. 
 170. See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
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not want to ignore the express terms and fraction used in the granting 
clause.171 
Moving on to the future lease clause, the court said that this was in effect 
a transfer of a fractional share of the possibility of reverter.172 Why the 
granting clause that transfers a mineral interest is not itself a transfer of the 
possibility of reverter is not discussed. The court then compounds the 
confusion by saying that the grantor intended to transfer 1/2 of the 7/8 
possibility of reverter.173 If one follows the court’s own internal logic, 
maybe the result makes sense, but that requires one to treat the lessor as the 
owner of a present possessory 1/8 mineral estate after a lease. The result 
may be defensible given the mixed signals and the likelihood of confusion 
regarding what the landowner believed she owned while the minerals were 
under lease. It looks like the lessor wanted to transfer a 1/16 royalty under 
the existing lease as well as a 1/2 share of the other economic benefits, or as 
the trial court concluded, the lessor wanted to transfer a 1/2 mineral estate 
but was confused as to how to accomplish that transfer given the existence 
of a lease.174 
The Tipps approach is consistent with the canon that attempts to give 
effect to the instrument as a whole, but is inconsistent with the essence of 
what follows the execution of an oil and gas lease. Tipps was not widely 
followed in multiple fraction cases until it was resuscitated by the supreme 
court in Snow. In Snow, the granting clause conveyed a 1/16 mineral 
interest.175 The subject-to clause provided that the grantee was to “receive 
1/16 part of the oil, gas or other mineral . . . produced by the holder of the 
lease . . . , that grantors herein now intend to convey 1/2 of the interest they 
now have.”176 The future lease clause conveyed an “undivided 1/2 of all 
[the oil].”177 An intention clause also stated that “in the event the lease now 
on said land is forfeited . . . the grantee . . . [is] to have and hold under this 
conveyance an equal undivided one-half of all such minerals.”178 
                                                                                                                 
 171. See 101 S.W.2d at 1078–79. 
 172. See id. at 1078. 
 173. See id. 
 174. See id. 
 175. See Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 819 S.W.2d 466, 467 (Tex. 1991). 
 176. The supreme court opinion did not reproduce the subject-to clause since the existing 
lease had expired and was not at issue; it was reproduced by the court of appeals. Snow v. 
Jupiter Oil Co., 802 S.W.2d 354, 356 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1990), rev’d, 819 S.W.2d 466 
(Tex. 1991). 
 177. Id. at 356. 
 178. 819 S.W.2d at 468. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
176 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 3 
 
  
The conflict here is between the granting clause and the first part of the 
subject-to clause, and the other part of the subject-to clause, the future lease 
and intention clauses. Refusing to acknowledge the similarity between these 
clauses and those in Alford and Garrett, the majority rejected the 
application of the Luckel analysis. Justice Hecht, in his concurrence, stated: 
 I am puzzled, however, that the Court considers Alford . . . , 
inapplicable to this case. I fail to see a meaningful distinction 
between this case and Alford . . . . 
 If Alford and this case are not twins, there is certainly a strong 
resemblance between them. In Luckel and this case both, we 
depart from the rule stated in Alford and adopt the rule proposed 
in its dissent. The confusion left by the Court’s failure to say so 
is unnecessary.179 
The Snow court, in contrast to Luckel, only mentioned one canon of 
construction, which was that the deed is to be read as a whole and all 
paragraphs must be reconciled to ascertain the intent of the party. This 
canon came from the Tipps opinion. However, the court falls into the same 
trap as Garrett of having to give some meaning to the granting clause that 
mentions a 1/16 interest. The court stated that the “deed immediately gave 
the grantee a 1/16 interest in the mineral estate.”180 It is clear that no present 
possessory estate, containing either the right to develop or the power to 
lease, could be immediately transferred by the grantor. The grantor could 
immediately transfer her share of the possibility of reverter, her share of the 
royalty reserved in the lease, and her share of the economic benefits. But, 
she cannot immediately transfer a present possessory l/16th mineral estate. 
The court continued to follow Tipps and concluded that the future lease 
clause transferred 1/2 of the 7/8 possibility of reverter.181 This conclusion 
presumed that the grantor retained a 1/16 present possessory estate after the 
lease, otherwise the possibility of reverter would have been a 15/16 interest 
and 1/2 of that interest would have been a 15/32 mineral estate. To that 
15/32 one would have to add the previously granted 1/16 so that the 
fraction conveyed should have been 17/32. 
                                                                                                                 
 179. Id. at 469 (Hecht, J., concurring). It is also interesting to note that Luckel was a 5-4 
decision, while all nine justices joined in Snow, with Justice Hecht concurring. 
 180. 819 S.W.2d at 468–69. 
 181. Id. at 469. If the court is saying that the future lease clause transfers at some later 
date the grantor’s possibility of reverter, there is a Rule Against Perpetuities problem similar 
to that found in Peveto v. Starkey, 645 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. 1982). 
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Because Snow involved a typical multiple grant mineral deed, while 
Luckel involved a royalty deed, it is unclear whether a title opinion writer 
should follow the Snow or Luckel approaches when mineral deeds are 
involved. While the result in Snow is consistent with the result in Garrett, 
which gives preference to the future lease clause fraction, the approach 
cannot work if the fraction stated in the granting clause exceeds 1/8. Snow 
was also based on the false notion that a lessor retains a possessory mineral 
interest after a lease. For these reasons, caution should be used in relying on 
the Snow approach in dealing with these multiple fraction mineral deed 
cases. 
IV. The “Big Picture” or General Intent Canons 
A. “Intent of the Party Must Be Sought and Ascertained” Canon 
While today this canon is generally considered to be a truism, as 
originally developed, this canon was a break from the prior rules and 
canons that tended to be intent defeating when they were applied.182 It is 
universally cited and is clearly not outcome determinative. The first clear 
expression and use of this canon was in Smith v. Brown.183 In Smith, the 
court stated: “In construing a written instrument the lawful intent of the 
                                                                                                                 
 182. This difference was noted by Professors Williams and Meyers. They stated: 
The critics may see no difference between the technical rules of the old 
common law and the technical rules of modern law but age. We think there are 
differences and important ones. The common law rules defeated clear and 
obvious intent in almost every case. The modern rules . . . comport with the 
ordinary, reasonable meaning of the words selected by the conveyancer. 
1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 157, § 314; see also Herd, supra note 62, at 656–57 
(describing the Williams & Meyers approach to deed construction as a plea to use common 
sense). 
 183. 66 Tex. 543, 1 S.W. 573 (1886). The Smith court cited Hancock v. Butler, 21 Tex. 
804 (1858) as support for the use of the canon, but the language used in Hancock is not a 
clear statement of the “intent of the parties” canon. In Berry v. Wright, 14 Tex. 270, 273 
(1855), the court said that minor errors in deed descriptions would not defeat the overall 
intent of the parties to convey an interest in land that was otherwise evident from the 
language contained in the deed. See also Cravens v. White, 73 Tex. 577, 579, 11 S.W. 543, 
544 (1889) (holding that an exception of 120 acres in a conveyance was not void, although 
repugnant to another clause in the deed, because the intent to retain the 120 acres was clear 
from the language); Faulk v. Dashiell, 62 Tex. 642, 646 (1884) (discerning that the intent of 
a deed of trust encompassed consideration of the surrounding circumstances of the 
transaction, the position of the parties, and the granted property’s state). 
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parties must be looked to, and must govern.”184 Smith also reflected a break 
from the “technical rules” of the conveyancer because the court admitted 
that a “technical conveyancer would probably have used apter words to 
express the idea.”185 That idea or intent was for the grantee to take legal 
title, but solely as trustee for his children. 
Shortly after Smith, the Texas Supreme Court held in Witt v. Harlan186 
that the court must not only ascertain the intent of the parties, but when so 
ascertained, that intent will control the interpretation of the written 
instrument. This concept of intent controlling the interpretation also 
constituted a break from the early rules of construction that gave controlling 
effect to the rules and were often intent defeating. For example, in Cook v. 
Smith,187 the court was faced with determining whether a particular deed 
was merely a quitclaim or an effective conveyance of an interest in land. 
The court said: 
The intention of the instrument is to be confined, of course, to 
that which its terms reveal; but . . . if, taken as a whole, it 
discloses a purpose to convey the property itself, as 
distinguished from the mere title of the grantor, such as it may 
be, it should be given the effect of a deed, although some of its 
characteristics may be those of a quit claim [sic] deed.188 
Thus, the court gave paramount weight to the purpose or intent of the 
parties as expressed in the entire instrument, even if there were conflicting 
signals that would otherwise detract from that “discovered” purpose.189 
The general intent canon is often combined with the four corners or 
harmonizing canons to describe the interpretive process. For example, the 
                                                                                                                 
 184. 66 Tex. at 545, 1 S.W. at 574. The court also applied the harmonizing canon and 
looked at surrounding circumstances in interpreting the terms of the deed. 
 185. Id. 
 186. 66 Tex. 660, 662–63, 2 S.W. 41, 42 (1886). Witt involved an allegedly vague deed 
description. 
 187. 107 Tex. 119, 174 S.W. 1094 (1915). 
 188. Id. at 122, 174 S.W. at 1095. 
 189. From this early language, the canon of construction that intent prevails over 
arbitrary rules was developed. See infra part IV.B. It is sometimes said that the court must 
ascertain the intent of the parties “as of the time the instrument was executed.” First Nat’l 
Bank in Dallas v. Kinnabrew, 589 S.W.2d 137, 148 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tyler 1979, writ ref’d 
n.r.e.). This is another way of stating that evidence regarding the parties conduct after the 
deed is executed is immaterial unless the language is ambiguous. See also Black v. Shell Oil 
Co., 397 S.W.2d 877, 887 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1965, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (concluding 
that the intent of what the grantor conveyed or the grantee received was discernible from the 
deed itself because the deed was not ambiguous). 
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supreme court in Luckel stated: “The primary duty of a court when 
construing such a deed is to ascertain the intent of the parties from all of the 
language in the deed by a fundamental rule of construction known as the 
‘four corners’ rule.”190 Likewise, the Texas Supreme Court has said: “The 
intention must be gathered primarily from a fair consideration of the whole 
instrument . . . and the construction given it should harmonize with the 
terms of the deed. . . .”191 
Had this canon been followed in Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co.,192 
the Duhig rule might merely be the Duhig canon. The court of civil appeals 
in Duhig supported its finding that the grantee was to receive a 1/2 interest 
on the “apparent intention of the parties.”193 Justice Smedley, in writing the 
Duhig opinion, candidly admitted that it was his personal view that the 
judgment should have been affirmed based on the court’s reading of the 
intent of the parties.194 The supreme court majority, however, determined 
that the basis for finding the deed conveyed the 1/2 interest, 
notwithstanding the outstanding reserved interest, was a combination of 
estoppel by deed and the doctrine of after-acquired title.195 Thus was born 
the Duhig rule, which may be intention defeating in certain cases and where 
the results are preordained should the rule be held applicable. 
The “intent of the parties must be ascertained” canon has also been used 
in lease interpretation cases. For example, in Sun Oil Co. v. Burns,196 the 
court, in giving effect to a Mother Hubbard clause in a lease, stated that “we 
must seek to ascertain from the instrument the true intention of the parties. 
                                                                                                                 
 190. Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. 1991). It was not surprising that a 
similar statement was made by the court in Alford v. Krum, 671 S.W.2d 870, 872 (Tex. 
1984). 
 191. Fleming v. Ashcroft, 142 Tex. 41, 49, 175 S.W.2d 401, 406 (1943) (quoting the 
court of civil appeals case at 168 S.W.2d at 304); see also Citizens Nat’l Bank in Abilene v. 
Texas & Pac. Ry., 136 Tex. 333, 338, 150 S.W.2d 1003, 1006 (1941) (construing the intent 
of a contract from the language of the contract as a whole), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 656 
(1941); Anderson & Kerr Drilling Co. v. Bruhlmeyer, 134 Tex. 574, 580–81, 136 S.W.2d 
800, 804 (1940) (holding that the absence of a comma and misspelling of “minerals” in the 
reservation clause at a deed did not preclude the grantor from reserving 1/2 interest in oil and 
gas); Rio Bravo Oil v. Weed, 121 Tex. 427, 443–46, 50 S.W.2d 1080, 1087–88 (1932) 
(interpreting a partition deed to include the partitioning of a railroad right of way running 
across the conveyed land even though not expressly mentioned in the deed), cert. denied, 
288 U.S. 603 (1933). 
 192. 135 Tex. 503, 144 S.W.2d 878 (1940). 
 193. Id. at 506, 144 S.W.2d at 879. 
 194. Id. at 506–07, 144 S.W.2d at 879–80. 
 195. Id. 
 196. 125 Tex. 549, 84 S.W.2d 442 (1935). 
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This is the object of all rules of interpretation or construction. ‘The ultimate 
purpose in construing a deed is to ascertain the intention of the grantor.’ ”197 
The Burns decision also embraced the “intent when ascertained must 
control” canon.198 Whether it is used alone or in conjunction with other 
general canons, the “ascertain the intent of the parties” canon is now firmly 
entrenched as the polestar for judicial construction of written instruments, 
including deeds and/or leases.199 
1. “Intent as Expressed Controls” Canon 
While courts universally state that they are seeking to ascertain the intent 
of the parties in deed interpretation cases, this particular canon reflects what 
the courts are really doing. In an early contract interpretation case, the 
canon was expressed as follows: “The intention is to be ascertained as 
expressed by the language used, and not the intention which may have 
existed in the [maker’s] minds . . . , but is not expressed by their 
language.”200 
                                                                                                                 
 197. Id. at 552, 84 S.W.2d at 443 (quoting Gibbs v. Barkley, 242 S.W. 462, 464 (Tex. 
Comm’n App. 1922, judgm’t adopted)). 
 198. See infra part IV.B. 
 199. See generally Garrett v. Dils Co., 157 Tex. 92, 94–95, 299 S.W.2d 904, 906 (1957) 
(considering all parts of an instrument in determining the intent of the parties); Harris v. 
Windsor, 156 Tex. 324, 326–28, 294 S.W.2d 798, 799–800 (1956) (ascertaining the intent of 
the grantor by considering all parts of a deed to conclude that a reservation clause meant a 
reservation of 3/8 in 1/2 interest of oil, gas, and minerals); Germany v. Turner, 132 Tex. 491, 
497–98, 123 S.W.2d 874, 877 (1939) (considering all parts of a deed in determining that the 
grantor intended to convey title to 20-1/3 acres of land rather than grantor’s undivided 1/2 
interest); Klein v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 126 Tex. 450, 454–55, 86 S.W.2d 1077, 1079 
(1935) (giving effect to the intent of the parties in a series of different instruments with 
respect to a 1/8 mineral reservation); Vogel v. Allen, 118 Tex. 196, 200, 13 S.W.2d 340, 342 
(1929) (“[E]very part of a deed should be harmonized and given effect to, if this can be 
done; but if it is found that there is in the instrument inherent conflict of intentions, then the 
main intention, the object of the grant being considered, shall have controlling influence.”); 
Pugh v. Mays, 60 Tex. 191 (1883) (applying the rule that every part of a deed should be 
harmonized and given effect if possible, to construe the contract of the parties when deeds 
were exchanged). 
 200. Slavens v. James, 229 S.W. 317, 318 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1921, judgm’t adopted); 
see also Cook v. Smith, 107 Tex. 119, 123–24, 174 S.W. 1094, 1095 (1915) (holding that 
the use of the term “quitclaim” in a deed does not make the instrument a quitclaim deed 
when the terms of the instrument considered as a whole reveal an intention to convey 
property itself rather than mere title to property); Trinity County Lumber Co. v. Ocean 
Accident & Guarantee Corp., 228 S.W. 114 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1921, judgm’t adopted) 
(“The intention sought is not the secret unexpressed intention of one or of all the parties, but 
the intention which finds expression in the language used.”). In more recent times, the courts 
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The canon has its origin in a contract case involving an agreement 
whereby one party was to confess judgment in a pending case, if in another 
case one of the parties “recovered.”201 Whatever the parties may have 
“actually” intended, their use of the term “recover” governed and was 
enforced even where the other suit was never tried on the merits, but was 
decided on a plea of abatement.202 The contracting parties could have made 
the confession of judgment contingent on a decision on the merits of the 
other case, but they did not include that intention in the written contract.203 
In a series of cases, courts have used this canon in combination with the 
intent prevails canon. For example, in Bumpass v. Bond,204 the court said: 
“The dominant purpose in construing a deed is to ascertain the intention of 
the parties as expressed in the deed itself; and such intention expressed 
                                                                                                                 
have defined the canon as follows: “The rights of the parties are governed by the language 
used and the choice of words is of controlling importance.” Large v. T. Mayfield, Inc., 646 
S.W.2d 292, 293 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (surface/mineral reservation). 
 201. Heirs of Watrous v. Mekie, 54 Tex. 65, 66–67 (1880). 
 202. See id. at 71. 
 203. See id.; see also Trinity County Lumber Co. v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp., 
228 S.W. 114, 116 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1921, judgm't adopted) (citing Heirs of Watrous v. 
Mekie, 54 Tex. 65, 71 (1880)). The court also dealt with the conundrum of admitting 
surrounding circumstances to determine the intent of the parties even though it was the intent 
as written that the courts were seeking. See 54 Tex. at 70; supra part II.B; see also Chandler 
v. Hartt, 467 S.W.2d 629, 634 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tyler 1971, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (basing 
decision on a study of the deed itself and all surrounding facts and circumstances); Peterson 
v. Barron, 401 S.W.2d 680 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1966, no writ) (holding that extrinsic 
evidence was not appropriate to alter plain and unambiguous terms of easement deed); 
Martin v. Snuggs, 302 S.W.2d 676, 680 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1957, writ ref’d n.r.e.) 
(holding that when deed failed to express the actual agreement, it was subject to 
reformation); First Nat’l Bank of Snyder v. Evans, 169 S.W.2d 754, 756 (Tex. Civ. App.—
Eastland 1943, writ ref’d) (holding that in construing a deed, it was proper to consider 
provisions of instruments executed contemporaneously); Holloway’s Unknown Heirs v. 
Whatley, 104 S.W.2d 646, 649 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1937) (holding that intent to 
alter the legal meaning of “land” was not manifest in the deed), aff’d, 133 Tex. 608, 615, 131 
S.W.2d 89, 92 (1939); Wilson v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 82 S.W.2d 1095, 1096 (Tex. Civ. 
App.—Texarkana 1935, writ ref’d) (stating that the intent of the parties must be gleaned 
from the language of the instrument); Amarillo Oil Co. v. McBride, 67 S.W.2d 1098, 1101 
(Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1934, writ ref’d) (stating that any construction of a deed contrary 
to its plain language was immaterial). In Whalley, the court was aware of the harsh results 
that may accompany the use of this canon, especially when the court presumes that the 
parties knew the legal meanings of the words chosen, but relied on the policy of title stability 
to justify the result. 104 S.W.2d at 650. 
 204. 131 Tex. 266, 114 S.W.2d 1172 (1938); see also Bass v. Harper, 441 S.W.2d 825, 
827 (Tex. 1969) (stating that the deed was presumed to express the intentions of the parties). 
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therein is a controlling factor.”205 The issue was whether a vendor’s lien 
attached to the entire undivided interest or merely to a fraction of that 
interest. In construing the various instruments involved, including the lien, 
the deed, and the note, the Texas Supreme Court concluded that the 
language used clearly evinced an intent to have the lien cover the full 
interest, even though the deed only warranted title to a fractional interest.206  
This canon appears in a variety of contexts. It was cited in Woods v. 
Sims,207 a multiple fraction case involving a subject-to clause. There was 
apparently no dispute about the ambiguity of the language used, so the 
canon was not particularly useful in deciding how to interpret the deed in 
question.208 The same canon was cited, however, in Alford, even though the 
Alford court reached a different conclusion regarding the interpretation of a 
multiple fraction deed.209 In Alford, the supreme court recognized that the 
“intent as expressed” canon is a subset or modification of the “intent 
governs” canon when it said: 
This rule [intent governs] of construction, however, must be 
modified with the restriction that it is not the intention that the 
parties may have had but failed to express in the instrument, but 
it is the intention that is expressed by said instrument. That is, 
                                                                                                                 
 205. 131 Tex. at 271, 114 S.W.2d at 1174 (citing Totton v. Smith, 131 Tex. 219, 222, 
113 S.W.2d 517, 518 (1938)). Sometimes, this canon is used as a justification for the 
exclusion of parol evidence or surrounding circumstances evidence. See, e.g., Davis v. 
George, 104 Tex. 106, 110, 134 S.W. 326, 328 (1911) (“It is too well settled to admit of 
doubt that such a deed can not be collaterally attacked by the parties . . . by evidence tending 
to show an intention different from that which its language unmistakably expresses.”). 
The real issue is whether the language of the deed “unmistakably expresses” an intent that 
can be divined by the court. In Bumpass, the Texas Supreme Court also used this canon to 
state that courts cannot rewrite instruments executed by the parties and cannot “thwart the 
intention of the parties expressed in a deed and other instruments.” 131 Tex. at 272, 114 
S.W.2d at 1175. 
 206. See 131 Tex. at 273, 114 S.W.2d at 1175. The canon has also been used in a 
mineral/royalty dispute, in which a court concluded that the reserved interest was a mineral 
estate. Buffalo Ranch Co. v. Thomason, 727 S.W.2d 331, 334 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 
Dist.] 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
 207. 154 Tex. 59, 64, 273 S.W.2d 617, 620 (1954); see also Anderson & Kerr Drilling 
Co. v. Bruhlmeyer, 134 Tex. 574, 583, 136 S.W.2d 800, 805 (1940) (stating that when an 
instrument clearly discloses the intention of the parties, that intent is to be ascertained as a 
matter of law, without consideration of surrounding circumstances); Williford v. Spies, 530 
S.W.2d 127, 130 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1975, no writ) (holding that because the deed was 
not ambiguous, it was to be construed without reference to attending circumstances). 
 208. See 154 Tex. at 64, 273 S.W.2d at 620. 
 209. See Alford v. Krum, 671 S.W.2d 870, 874 (Tex. 1984). 
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the question is not what the parties meant to say, but the meaning 
of what they did say.210 
The canon has since reappeared in many post-Alford multiple fraction 
cases.211 Because the canon is also used by the supreme court in Luckel, its 
impact on the outcome of these cases is questionable.212 
Merely saying that the court is to carry out the intent of the parties as 
expressed in the deed does not necessarily require a court to validate a 
particular instrument that fails to properly identify the subject matter of the 
conveyance. For example, in Harlan v. Vetter,213 the court applied the 
canon to first find that the instrument was an effective conveyance of title 
in a future interest. But, it also found that the instrument did not contain a 
sufficient description of the interests to be conveyed.214 Thus, the court 
concluded that the grantor had not conveyed the mineral interests that he 
had owned at the time the instrument was executed.215 
A variation of this canon has been expressed as follows: “Each mineral 
deed must be construed from the language used in that particular deed.”216 
                                                                                                                 
 210. Id. at 872 (citing Canter v. Lindsey, 575 S.W.2d 331, 334 (Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 
1978, writ ref’d n.r.e.) and Davis v. Andrews, 361 S.W.2d 419, 423 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 
1962, writ ref’d n.r.e.); see also First Nat’l Bank in Dallas v. Kinnabrew, 589 S.W.2d 137, 
148 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tyler 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (applying “intent as expressed” canon to 
give effect to assignment of royalty interest); First Nat’l Bank of Snyder v. Evans, 169 
S.W.2d 754, 756 (Tex. Civ. App.—Eastland 1943, writ ref’d) (applying “intent as 
expressed” canon to determine the nature of the conveyance under the deed). 
 211. See, e.g., Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 462 (Tex. 1991), rev’g 792 S.W.2d 485, 
488 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990); Snow v. Jupiter Oil Co., 819 S.W.2d 466, 468 
(Tex. 1991), rev’g 802 S.W.2d 354, 356 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1990); Prairie Producing Co. 
v. Schlacter, 786 S.W.2d 409, 412 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1990, writ denied); Stag Sales 
Co. v. Flores, 697 S.W.2d 493, 494 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.). In 
Luckel, the canon was cited by both the court of appeals and supreme court opinions even 
though they reached opposite results. 
 212. For other cases citing the canon, see Buffalo Ranch Co. v. Thomason, 727 S.W.2d 
331 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (mineral/royalty reservation); 
Harlan v. Vetter, 732 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Smith v. 
Graham, 705 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (mineral or 
working interest being conveyed); Bentley v. Grewing, 613 S.W.2d 49 (Tex. Civ. App.—
Fort Worth 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (overriding royalty interest reservation). 
 213. 732 S.W.2d 390, 393 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
 214. Id. at 394. 
 215. Id. at 394–95. 
 216. Kokernot v. Caldwell, 231 S.W.2d 528, 532 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1950, writ 
ref’d); see also Peveto v. Starkey, 645 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1982) (holding that language 
postponed the vesting of an interest until an uncertain future date); Gibson v. Watson, 315 
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This canon suggests that prior case law interpreting other mineral deeds is 
irrelevant unless the language of the deeds is identical. That undoubtedly 
overstates what should be the common sense approach to deed 
interpretation cases; namely, that similar clauses and language should be 
interpreted consistently so that persons who convey real property can be 
reasonably assured that the language they employ will lead to an intended 
result. As this article otherwise illustrates, using different canons in 
interpreting similar or identical language has led to different results. This 
uncertainty, which has undesirable societal impacts, merely adds to the 
“transaction costs” of dealing with property or mineral interests. Courts 
should seek a level of consistency while still adhering to the general canon 
that the parties’ intent as expressed should be the goal of the interpretational 
process. 
2. “Ascertain the Intent of the Grantor” Canon 
While most courts have applied the “intent of the parties” canon, a 
number of cases have applied, without explanation, the canon that the court 
is to seek the intent of the grantor in deed interpretation cases. For example, 
in Kennedy v. Shipp,217 the court said: “The primary purpose in the 
construction of the deed is to arrive at the intention of the grantor.”218 
The origin of this canon appears to be Gibbs v. Barkley.219 In Gibbs, the 
issue was whether a deed created a contingent remainder or an indefeasibly 
                                                                                                                 
S.W.2d 48, 53 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1958, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (stating that the intention 
of the parties must be ascertained from the language contained in the deed). 
This canon has been phrased as follows: 
The court cannot make a new contract for the parties or base its decision on 
what it perceives to be the wisdom of the agreement. Neither can the court put 
into effect an intention which it believes the parties meant to express but which 
they failed to express. The contract must be enforced as written. 
SMK Energy Corp. v. Westchester Gas Co., 705 S.W.2d 174, 176–77 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.); see also Hastings v. Pichinson 370 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tex. Civ. 
App.—San Antonio 1963, no writ) (construing leases to determine whether they had 
revived); Texas Co. v. Parks, 247 S.W.2d 179, 181-82 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1952, 
writ ref’d n.r.e.) (stating that the intent of the parties prevailed, declaring the lease 
terminated). 
 217. 135 S.W.2d 204 (Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 1939, writ dism’d judgm’t cor.). 
 218. Id. at 208. The issue in Kennedy was the size of the grant where the grantor 
conveyed a 1/14 interest in land. Id. at 206. The court found that the conveyance was 
effective not only as to the grantor’s 1/14 surface estate but also as to his mineral estate, 
which was subject to an existing lease. See id. at 208. 
 219. 242 S.W. 462 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1922, judgm’t adopted). There appears to be 
some language in Hancock v. Butler, 21 Tex. 804, 806 (1858) which suggests that the court 
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vested remainder in the grantee’s children.220 In answering that question, 
the court stated: “The ultimate purpose in construing a deed is to ascertain 
the intention of the grantor. When this intention is ascertained, that 
construction which carries the intention into effect, when such intention is 
lawful, governs and controls.”221 The court gives no explanation of why the 
intent of the grantor, rather than the intent of the parties, governs. That 
result can be partially explained by the fact that the conveyance appears to 
be a gift to the grantor’s daughter and grandchildren.222 Nonetheless, as a 
general proposition, the court should be concerned with the intent of the 
parties to the deed rather than seek to follow only the intent of the 
grantor.223 
The Texas Supreme Court apparently rejected the application of this 
canon in Smith v. Allison.224 In the original opinion, the majority applied the 
“ascertain the intent of the grantor” canon to help it determine whether a 
Mother Hubbard clause included lands in a quarter section, which was 
otherwise not specifically described in the deed.225 In the opinion on motion 
for rehearing, however, the court stated the following: 
                                                                                                                 
should seek to ascertain and implement the intent of the grantor. However, Gibbs is the most 
oft-cited case for the ascertain the intent of the grantor canon. 
 220. See id. at 464. 
 221. Id.; see also Robinson v. Glenn, 150 Tex. 169, 172, 238 S.W.2d 169, 170 (1951) 
(holding that the grantor’s intent was to convey a life estate); Reeves v. Towery, 621 S.W.2d 
209, 212 (Tex. Civ. App.—Corpus Christi 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (holding that a deed did 
not reserve land for the grantor); Kritser v. First Nat’l Bank of Amarillo, 463 S.W.2d 751, 
753 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1971) (holding that the grantor’s intent in a deed was to 
distribute the remainder interest to descendants of predeceased children), writ ref’d per 
curiam, 461 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. 1971); Black v. Shell Oil Co., 397 S.W.2d 877, 887 (Tex. 
Civ. App.— Texarkana 1965, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (holding that unambiguous mineral deed 
conveyed a 1/2 interest in minerals). 
 222. See 242 S.W. at 465. 
 223. For other cases citing this canon, see Minchen v. Hirsch, 295 S.W.2d 529, 533 (Tex. 
Civ. App.—Beaumont 1956, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Alexander v. Byrd, 114 S.W.2d 915, 916 
(Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 1938, writ ref’d); W.T. Carter & Bros. v. Davis, 88 S.W.2d 596, 
599 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1935, writ dism’d w.o.j.). 
 224. 157 Tex. 220, 301 S.W.2d 608 (1956). In Rutherford v. Randal, 593 S.W.2d 949 
(Tex. 1980), a grantee unsuccessfully tried to use Smith to find a deed ambiguous when the 
language of the description clause seemingly referred to a larger fractional estate than that 
expressly stated in the granting clause. Id. at 952. 
 225. See 158 Tex. at 231, 301 S.W.2d at 616. The deed specifically described an 
undivided 1/2 mineral interest under the southeast and northwest 1/4 of section 124. The 
grantor also owned a mineral interest in the northeast 1/4 of section 124. Id. at 223, 301 
S.W.2d at 610. 
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we have concluded that the correct rule to be followed in the 
construction of a deed passing from a seller to a buyer for a 
valuable consideration is rather that the intention of the parties is 
to be ascertained. This must be true because the deed purports to 
express a bilateral agreement. It is to evidence a meeting of the 
minds of both parties as to the property intended to be conveyed 
and paid for.226 
Thus, with the possible exception of a gift deed, the court rejected the 
application of the “ascertain the intent of the grantor” canon.227 
B. “Intent Prevails Over Canons/Rules” Canon 
This canon has been recently expressed as follows: “[T]he intention of 
the parties, when ascertained, prevails over arbitrary rules of 
construction.”228 As so stated, the canon appears to be tautological. If the 
                                                                                                                 
 226. Id. at 232, 301 S.W.2d at 616. The court cited Superior Oil Co. v. Stanolind Oil & 
Gas Co., 150 Tex. 317, 240 S.W.2d 281 (1951); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Mullican, 144 
Tex. 609, 192 S.W.2d 770 (1946); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Ellison, 134 Tex. 140, 132 
S.W.2d 395 (1939); Bumpass v. Bond, 131 Tex. 266, 114 S.W.2d 1172 (1938); Totton v. 
Smith, 131 Tex. 219, 113 S.W.2d 517 (1938); Rio Bravo Oil Co. v. Weed, 121 Tex. 427, 50 
S.W.2d 1080 (1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 603 (1933). 
 227. A number of post-Smith cases have applied the canon in both gift deed and non-gift 
deed situations. Compare Kritser v. First Nat’l Bank of Amarillo, 463 S.W.2d 751, 753 
(Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1971) (gift deed situation where the court held that the intent of 
the grantor controls), writ ref’d per curiam, 467 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. 1971) and Newsom v. 
Newsom, 378 S.W.2d 842, 844 (Tex. 1964) (holding that the proper construction of a deed is 
based on the intent of the parties) with Black v. Shell Oil Co., 397 S.W.2d 877, 886 (Tex. 
Civ. App.— Texarkana 1965, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (holding that the construction which is most 
consistent with the intent of the grantor is the true one). There is some language in Reeves v. 
Towery, 621 S.W.2d 209, 212 (Tex. Civ. App.—Corpus Christi 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.) that 
suggests the court was applying the “ascertain the intent of the grantor” canon in a non-gift 
deed situation. Yet, the court also recited the intent of the parties canon in its general 
discussion of applicable canons, suggesting that it was following the Smith holding. Id. at 
214; see also Atwood v. Rodman, 355 S.W.2d 206, 213 (Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 1962, writ 
ref’d n.r.e.) (holding that the intent of the parties should control, as it was consistent with the 
customs and usages of that area and time). 
 228. Large v. T. Mayfield, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 292, 294 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1983, writ 
ref’d n.r.e.). The canon can also be stated so that the court should first attempt to ascertain 
the intent of the parties, and if that “ ‘does not banish all doubt concerning the conclusions to 
be drawn from such language and circumstances,’ then rules of construction may be resorted 
to, in aid of such ascertainment.” Bryson v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 196 S.W.2d 532, 
537 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1946, writ ref’d). Bryson was a deed construction case relating 
to the creation of a life estate that followed the Restatement of Property approach to canons 
of construction. See also Robinson v. Glenn, 233 S.W.2d 214, 217 (Tex. Civ. App.—
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intent of the parties is ascertainable, there should be no dispute as to the 
meaning of the terms in the instrument. Therefore, no constructional aids 
would be required. The canon also suggests that only rules of construction 
which are arbitrary are to be preempted, implying that rational rules or 
canons are not preempted. 
Part of the confusion with the use of the canon reflects the loose use and 
interchange of the terms “canon” and “rule.” Because canons, if properly 
used, are aids in determining intent, it is disingenuous to state that intent 
prevails over canons. However, because rules of law are usually intent-
destroying when applied, the canon might have some application when the 
court interprets the instrument to avoid running afoul of such a rule. An 
example would be when a court construes an instrument to create a vested 
rather than a contingent remainder in order to avoid having the contingent 
remainder voided because it would otherwise violate the rule against 
perpetuities. Unfortunately, the courts using this canon have not so limited 
its application. 
One of the earliest uses of this canon occurred in Benskin v. 
Barksdale.229 The court defined the canon as follows: “When the intention 
of the parties can be plainly ascertained arbitrary rules are not to be resorted 
to.”230 The court never stated which arbitrary rules it avoided in its 
interpretation of an instrument that was being used to claim a shorter statute 
of limitations in order to adversely possess the title owner’s interest. The 
instrument was either a quitclaim of the grantor’s tenancy or a purported 
transfer of fee simple absolute, which at the time of the deed was owned by 
a third party.231 After applying several canons, including the “intent prevails 
over arbitrary rules” canon, the court concluded that the parties intended to 
transfer more than a leasehold interest, therefore, a five year statute of 
limitations was applicable.232 
                                                                                                                 
Amarillo 1950) (holding that if the true intent of the testator can be determined, the technical 
rule is not applied), aff'd, 150 Tex. 169, 238 S.W.2d 169 (1951). 
 229. 246 S.W. 360 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1923, holding approved). Typical of the 
confusion regarding the use of canons, the Texas Digest suggests that Smith v. Brown, 66 
Tex. 543, 1 S.W. 573 (1886) is the source for this canon. Smith actually used several canons 
to interpret a particular deed and followed the early rule that one could look at the 
surrounding circumstances in order to ascertain the intent of the parties. Id. at 545, 1 S.W. at 
574. The court also applied the four corners rule and stated that “the whole deed should be 
taken together.” Id. 
 230. 246 S.W. at 363. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. 
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Because the court used several canons of construction and never 
identified the arbitrary rules it was ignoring, it is hard to discern why this 
canon was applicable. Use of the harmonizing canon probably would have 
been sufficient to justify the court’s interpretation. Another problem with 
Benskin is that it cited, as its authority for use of this canon, three cases in 
which the canon was not expressly stated.233 In one case, the court used two 
canons to interpret a trust deed to avoid a result that would have defeated 
the obvious intent of the grantor to provide for certain beneficiaries during 
their lifetimes.234 The court applied the “intent of the grantor must prevail” 
and the harmonizing canons to define the term “lineal descendants” to 
defeat a claim by collateral beneficiaries that would eliminate some life 
estates.235 Nowhere in the opinion did the court suggest that intent prevails 
over canons or rules. In fact, the court used two canons to support its 
interpretation. The second case dealt more with the parol evidence rule and 
the requirements for valid delivery of a deed than it did with canons of 
construction.236 Essentially, a grantor sought to have parol evidence 
admitted to prove that he lacked intent in delivering two deeds, which on 
their face transferred two tracts of land to his incompetent wife.237 The 
court focused on the apparent lack of intent to make an effective delivery 
without mentioning the canon.238 Finally, in the third case, dealing with the 
effectiveness of an exception of a 120 acre tract out of a 190 acre tract, the 
court also did not mention the canon.239 The court in this last case did not 
actually use any canons to ascertain the intent of the parties, including the 
“intent controls over canons/rules” canon. The court merely read the 
language of the deed as evincing a clear intent to except the 120 acres so 
that the grantee could not have reasonably expected to receive that 
acreage.240 
The “intent prevails over canons/rules” canon was probably used as a 
further break from the “rules” of construction that had dominated deed 
interpretation cases prior to the middle of the 18th Century. As with the 
four corners and harmonizing canons, this canon was used to avoid 
                                                                                                                 
 233. Id. (citing Parrish v. Mills, 101 Tex. 276, 106 S.W. 882 (1908); McCartney v. 
McCartney, 93 Tex. 359, 55 S.W. 310 (1900); Cravens v. White, 73 Tex. 577, 11 S.W. 543 
(1889)). 
 234. See 101 Tex. at 282, 106 S.W. at 885. 
 235. See id. at 284, 106 S.W. at 886. 
 236. See McCartney v. McCartney, 93 Tex. 359, 55 S.W. 310 (1900). 
 237. Id. at 361, 55 S.W. at 310. 
 238. See id. at 359, 55 S.W. at 310. 
 239. Cravens v. White, 73 Tex. 577, 11 S.W. 543 (1889). 
 240. Id. at 579, 11 S.W. at 544. 
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applying intent-defeating rules, especially those rules that applied to deed 
descriptions. The canon was used, for example, in Associated Oil Co. v. 
Hart241 to validate a reservation of a mineral estate when the grantee had 
urged that the reservation was “repugnant” to the grant and therefore void. 
The court said: “The strictness of the ancient rule as to repugnancy in deeds 
is now much relaxed, and the saner method is applied of permitting all parts 
of the instrument to stand where possible and to gather the intention of the 
parties from the whole instrument.”242 
If understood to be a departure from the intent defeating rules of the 
ancient common law, the canon clearly served a positive function in Texas 
jurisprudence. However, its continued use long after the courts have 
abandoned those ancient rules tends to confuse, rather than clarify because 
the courts do not always expressly state which ancient, arbitrary, or 
unreasonable rule they are opting not to apply. Likewise, this canon causes 
confusion when courts define the canon as one where intent prevails over 
canons, rather than rules. As noted previously, canons are aids in 
determining intent. Intent is the polestar of any judicial interpretation of a 
written instrument. When intent is obvious on the face of the instrument, no 
resort to canons is justified. 
While its origins may have been clouded, the canon has been endorsed 
by the Texas Supreme Court in Harris v. Windsor.243 Harris involved a 
Duhig-type problem.244 Windsor conveyed an interest to Harris that referred 
to an earlier Federal Land Bank (FLB) deed to Windsor in which the FLB 
reserved a 1/2 mineral interest. Windsor further reserved a 3/8 mineral 
interest. Harris claimed that Duhig was applicable and that he should have 
received a 5/8 mineral interest. The court distinguished Duhig by looking at 
the reference in the deed to the earlier FLB deed that was made “for all 
                                                                                                                 
 241. 277 S.W. 1043 (Tex. 1925). 
 242. Id. at 1044; see infra parts V, VI (complete discussion of the four corners and 
harmonizing canons). 
 243. 156 Tex. 324, 294 S.W.2d 798 (1956); see also Citizens Nat’l Bank in Abilene v. 
Texas & Pac. Ry., 136 Tex. 333, 338–39, 150 S.W.2d 1003, 1006 (holding that arbitrary 
rules of construction will not be used by the courts when the intention of the parties is 
unambiguous), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 656 (1941); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Connellee, 11 
S.W.2d 158, 15960 (Tex. 1928) (concluding that no rules of construction should be used 
where the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous); Large v. T. Mayfield, Inc., 646 
S.W.2d 292, 294 (Tex. Civ. App.—Eastland 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (holding that the 
intention of the parties, when ascertained, prevails over arbitrary rules of construction). 
 244. 156 Tex. at 325, 294 S.W.2d at 800; see Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 135 
Tex. 503, 144 S.W.2d 878 (1940). 
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legal purposes.”245 Thus, the court concluded that the intent of the parties 
was clear, only a 1/8 mineral interest was to be conveyed to Harris.246 
Although unnecessary to reach this result, the court made the following 
interesting statement: 
We have long since relaxed the strictness of the ancient rules for 
the construction of deeds, and have established the rule for the 
construction of deeds as for the construction of all contracts, that 
the intention of the parties, when it can be ascertained from a 
consideration of all parts of the instrument, will be given effect 
when possible. That intention, when ascertained, prevails over 
arbitrary rules.247 
This excerpt suggests the historical basis of the canon. But, because the 
court was trying to avoid the application of the Duhig rule, which was 
developed in 1940,248 the canon’s use is not so limited. Here, the use of the 
canon deflected the court from its more daunting task, limiting the 
application of Duhig even though the only difference in Harris was the 
existence of the reference to the prior deed that reserved the interest. Why 
the reference in the deed would defeat the Duhig rule, which itself was 
applied where the grantees had actual knowledge of the prior outstanding 
mineral interest, was left up in the air. 
This canon has also been frequently used by courts to distinguish earlier 
decisions that might lead to a different result. For example, in Garrett v. 
Dils Co.,249 a classic multiple fraction case, the court cited Harris to 
support its conclusion that each of the described fractional interests were to 
be given their literal application.250 As the dissent noted in Garrett,251 an 
earlier Texas Supreme Court decision interpreting a very similar deed had 
reached a contrary result.252 While noting that the technical rules of 
construction were not to be used, the court used the four corners and 
                                                                                                                 
 245. 156 Tex. at 329, 294 S.W.2d at 801. 
 246. Id. at 327, 294 S.W.2d at 800. A similar result was reached in Remuda Oil Co. v. 
Wilson, 264 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. Civ. App.—Galveston 1954, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
 247. 156 Tex. at 328, 294 S.W.2d at 800 (citing Benskin v. Barksdale, 246 S.W. 360 
(Tex. 1923); Sun Oil Co. v. Burns, 125 Tex. 549, 84 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. 1935)). 
 248. See Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 135 Tex. 503, 144 S.W.2d 878 (1940). 
 249. 157 Tex. 92, 299 S.W.2d 904 (1957). 
 250. Id. at 94–95, 299 S.W.2d at 906. 
 251. Id. at 97, 299 S.W.2d at 906 (Norvell, J., dissenting). 
 252. See Richardson v. Hart, 143 Tex. 392, 185 S.W.2d 563 (1945); see also Porter v. 
Shaw, 12 S.W.2d 595 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1928, no writ) (applying the four corners 
canon in finding parol testimony immaterial). 
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harmonizing canons to support its interpretation that the future lease clause 
granted a 1/8 of 1/8 royalty and not a 1/64 of 1/8 royalty as had been stated 
in the granting clause.253 
Similar use of the “intent prevails over canons/rules” canon was made by 
the court of appeals and then by the supreme court in Luckel v. White.254 It 
was used by the court of appeals to buttress its “suggestion” that Alford v. 
Krum255 should be overruled because the canon the Alford court applied to 
the multiple fraction/multiple grant deed issue was misused.256 This 
suggestion was accepted by the supreme court. Citing Harris, the supreme 
court stated: “That intention, when ascertained prevails over arbitrary 
rules.”257  
This canon has also been used by the supreme court in Jupiter Oil Co. v. 
Snow.258 There the granting clause conveyed a 1/16 mineral interest while 
the future interest clause stated that the grantee was to receive a 1/2 mineral 
interest.259 Treating the future interest clause as a transfer of 1/2 of the 
mineral owner’s possibility of reverter, the supreme court reversed a court 
of appeals decision based in part on Alford and other canons of 
construction. The supreme court concluded: “the court of appeals . . . erred 
in resorting to rules of construction which are inapplicable absent clear 
conflict.”260 The court failed to mention that the Alford court treated similar 
inconsistent language as a clear repugnancy, requiring it to apply several 
canons to reach a different result. The cases cited for this proposition all 
used canons to reach their results.261 Yet, it is unclear that there was a 
specific finding of a clear conflict in the language of the deed in any of 
these cited cases. As discussed earlier, Snow raised several questions, 
including the use of the “intent prevails canons/rules” canon, when at the 
                                                                                                                 
 253. 157 Tex. at 95, 299 S.W.2d at 906. 
 254. 819 S.W.2d 459, 462 (Tex. 1991), rev’g 792 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. App.—Houston 
[14th Dist.] 1990). 
 255. 671 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1984). 
 256. See 792 S.W.2d at 489–91. 
 257. 819 S.W.2d at 462. For a more complete discussion of Alford and Luckel, see supra 
part III. 
 258. 819 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. 1991), rev’g 802 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1990). 
 259. Id. at 468. 
 260. Id. at 469 (citing Harris v. Windsor, 156 Tex. 324, 328, 294 S.W.2d 798, 800 
(1956); Sun Oil Co. v. Burns, 125 Tex. 549, 552, 84 S.W.2d 442, 445–56 (1935); Averyt v. 
Grande, Inc., 717 S.W.2d 891, 893 (Tex. 1986). 
 261. See 156 Tex. at 328, 294 S.W.2d at 800; 125 Tex. at 552, 555–58, 84 S.W.2d at 
443–47; 717 S.W.2d at 893. 
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same time the supreme court was using several canons, including the 
harmonizing canon, to resolve similar issues in Luckel.262  
Reference to the ancient rules of construction of deeds was also made in 
the earlier Texas Commission of Appeals opinion in Sun Oil Co. v. 
Burns.263 Again, the opinion cited other canons including “intent of the 
parties prevails” and the “intent is to be ascertained from the written 
instrument.”264 In fact, the court struggled with the various canons that deal 
with general and specific descriptions.265 The court was dealing with a 
“Mother Hubbard,” or “cover-all” clause in an oil and gas lease and had no 
difficulty finding that the lease included non-specifically described acreage 
owned by the lessor.266 The lease covered “any and all other land owned or 
claimed by lessor,” which the court found would include a non-described 
3.736 acre tract.267 
The strongest language used to describe the canon occurred in Arnold v. 
Ashbel Smith Land Co.268 The court said: “There being no ambiguity in the 
language of the contract, resort to rules of construction is not 
permissible.”269 While this strong language suggests that the court will not 
use other canons of construction, the Arnold court cited at least seven other 
canons to interpret a deed which reserved a “1/4 royalty in all oil, gas and 
other minerals in and under or hereafter produced from the above-described 
land.”270 Only after an extensive discussion of several canons did the court 
conclude that the plain language showed an intent to reserve a full 1/4 
royalty interest, not a 1/4 of royalty interest.271 
The canon has also been used in “description” cases when one party has 
challenged, on any of a number of grounds, the legal adequacy of the 
                                                                                                                 
 262. See 819 S.W.2d at 459, 461–62; see also supra text accompanying notes 158–81. 
 263. 125 Tex. 549, 552, 558, 84 S.W.2d 442, 443–47 (1935). 
 264. See id. at 552, 84 S.W.2d at 443. 
 265. See id. at 557, 84 S.W.2d at 446; see also infra part VI.B.2.(b–c) (discussing the 
“specific clauses prevail’’ and the “general versus particular language” canons). The Texas 
Commission of Appeals decided two other cases the same day dealing with descriptions in 
oil and gas leases. Sun Oil Co. v. Bennett, 125 Tex. 540, 84 S.W.2d 447 (1935); Gulf Prod. 
Co. v. Spear, 125 Tex. 530, 84 S.W.2d 452 (1935). 
 266. See 125 Tex. at 558, 84 S.W.2d at 447. 
 267. Id. at 551, 558, 84 S.W.2d at 443, 447. 
 268. 307 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston 1957, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
 269. Id. at 824 (citing Wood Motor Co. v. Nebel, 150 Tex. 86, 93, 238 S.W.2d 181, 185 
(1951) (involving an issue of contract interpretation)). 
 270. Id. at 820, 823–25. 
 271. See 307 S.W.2d at 820. For other cases citing this canon, see Martin v. Snuggs, 302 
S.W.2d 676 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1957, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Kennedy v. Shipp, 135 
S.W.2d 204, 208 (Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 1939, writ dism’d). 
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description contained in the deed. The canon has been stated as the 
following: “Our duty is to effectuate the intention of the parties as far as 
possible, and disregard technical designations, or rules of construction, 
except as may be absolutely necessary in ascertaining the intention.”272 The 
canon does have application in description situations because this area 
historically has been plagued by arbitrary rules for determining the meaning 
of terms used to describe the subject-matter of the grant or reservation. 
The canon has been used in a number of different contexts. It has been 
cited in a case interpreting an instrument as a partition deed rather than 
merely an agreement to partition a mineral estate.273 In another case, the 
canon was used to interpret a deed to determine whether it conveyed an 
easement or a corporeal estate.274 Finally, the canon has been used to 
determine whether a correction deed, which failed to incorporate the 
mineral reservation contained in the first deed, controlled so as to eliminate 
the mineral reservation.275 The court found that the correction deed was 
merely intended to correct the erroneous descriptions contained in the 
original deed and did not cancel the reservation contained in the original 
deed.276 
                                                                                                                 
 272. Worley v. Empire Gas & Fuel Co., 129 Tex. 532, 537, 103 S.W.2d 368, 370 (1937). 
Worley is cited in Lebow v. Weiner, 454 S.W.2d 869, 874 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 
1970, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
 273. See 129 Tex. at 537, 103 S.W.2d at 370. The court also employed the four corners 
canon to resolve the constructional issue. 
 274. See Shaw v. Williams, 332 S.W.2d 797, 799 (Tex. Civ. App.—Eastland 1960, writ 
ref’d n.r.e.). The court also used the four corners canon of construction. 
 275. See Parker v. McKinnon, 353 S.W.2d 954, 956 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1962, 
writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
 276. Id. In Rio Bravo Oil Co. v. Weed, 121 Tex. 427, 50 S.W.2d 1080 (1932), cert. 
denied, 288 U.S. 603 (1933), the court used this canon in a different context. The issue 
involved one of the adequacy of the legal description in the deed to pass title to the middle of 
an abutting street or highway. The court first stated that there was a legal presumption of an 
intent to convey title to the center of an abutting street line. Id. at 437–38, 50 S.W.2d at 
1084. This presumption is in effect a canon of construction, sometimes called the “strip or 
gore” theory. Id. at 440, 50 S.W.2d at 1085. Earlier cases determined that broad social and 
public policy considerations favor this presumption. Id. at 437, 50 S.W.2d at 1084. But, as 
with other canons, the presumption should only be used where it is appropriate. The Texas 
Supreme Court has said: 
We think the legal presumption is sustained by sound reasons when it is based 
upon the fact that valuable rights and privileges appurtenant to property should 
be presumed to pass in a conveyance thereof in the absence of a clear and 
unequivocal intention to the contrary. It is going a long way, however, when 
such presumption is given effect strictly upon considerations of public policy, 
based upon the strip or gore theory. . . . In construing an instrument involving 
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In general, this canon does not appear to be “outcome determinative.” Its 
inclusion in an opinion does not give rise to a prediction as to how a court 
will resolve the interpretational issue before it. The canon has been used in 
a variety of contexts without a degree of consistency that would allow any 
conclusions to be drawn from such use. With the possible exception of the 
times it is used to avoid applying other canons, such as in Harris, Garrett 
and Luckel, the canon does not appear to serve any specific function. It is a 
canon, however, that is supported by “common sense” and sound reason. 
Courts should not apply canons of construction until every attempt is made 
to read the instrument as written to see if a clear or plain meaning is 
evident. Obviously, in the context of litigation, rational arguments usually 
have been made to support conflicting interpretations. Nonetheless, a court 
should make every effort to avoid using canons until a careful scrutiny of 
the language and prior case interpretations of such language has been made. 
Finally, the canon is usually ignored because in almost all cases where it 
appears, the courts have used other canons to interpret the contested 
document. 
C. The “Canon Prevails” Canon 
To confirm Llewellyn’s thesis that for each canon there is an “equal and 
opposite” canon, the court in Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Kirkindall,277 in 
resolving a dispute about the adequacy of a description, stated: 
[t]he more sensible rule obtains, in all cases, to ascertain and 
give effect to the intention of the parties as gathered from the 
entire instrument, together with the surrounding circumstances, 
unless such intention is in conflict with some unbending canon 
of construction or settled rule of property, or is repugnant to the 
terms of the grant.278 
This statement clearly suggests that canons, which may be in conflict with 
the intent of the parties, prevail. On appeal, the Texas Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                 
the conveyance of land, courts should be concerned more in arriving at and 
effectuating the true intention of the parties than in enforcing an arbitrary rule 
of construction based solely upon considerations of public policy. 
Id. at 440, 50 S.W.2d at 1085. 
 277. 119 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1938), aff’d, 136 Tex. 103, 145 
S.W.2d 1074 (1941). 
 278. Id. at 734. 
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affirmed the holding of the court of civil appeals, but did not use this 
“canon prevails” canon.279 
The source of this canon is unclear.280 It has also been cited much less 
than its counterpart. As with its counterpart, this canon is not outcome-
determinative and appears to have little influence on the court’s actual 
decision.281 This canon probably should be discarded insofar as it deals with 
“unbending canons of construction.” Canons, as discussed earlier, are 
merely tools designed to assist a court in ascertaining the intent of the party 
rather than rules of law that may be used to defeat that intent. A canon is 
not like the Rule in Shelley’s Case or the Rule Against Perpetuities. Canons 
should never prevail over the language used in the instrument. 
A related question is whether canons should be used before the court 
makes a determination that an instrument is ambiguous or unambiguous. In 
Davis v. Andrews,282 the court interpreted a deed and a subsequent 
correction deed to determine whether a twenty year time limit contained in 
the warranty clause applied to the warranty or to the mineral estate being 
conveyed.283 The successors-in-interest to the grantors claimed that the 
language was ambiguous. The court disagreed, concluding that only after 
applying the appropriate canons of construction and then finding a “real 
uncertainty” about the meaning of the instrument, should parol evidence be 
admitted. In Davis, the court found no ambiguity after citing some eleven 
canons of construction in support of its conclusion that the twenty year limit 
only applied to the warranty and not to the nature of the interest 
conveyed.284  
  
                                                                                                                 
 279. 136 Tex. at 108–10, 145 S.W.2d at 1076–77. The court did apply both the four 
corners canon and the parol evidence to ascertain the intent of the parties. Id. at 109–10, 145 
S.W.2d at 1077. 
 280. The “canon prevails” canon is also cited, but apparently not used, in Hedick v. Lone 
Star Steel Co., 277 S.W.2d 925, 928 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1955, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
Both Hedick and Kirkindall cited the first edition of Texas Jurisprudence for this canon. 
 281. For other cases citing the canon, see Hudgins v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 144 F. 
Supp. 192, 196 (E.D. Tex. 1956) (mineral/royalty reservation); Dilbeck v. Bill Gaynier, Inc., 
368 S.W.2d 804 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1963, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (trespass to try title suit 
involving a commercial zoning provision). 
 282. 361 S.W.2d 419 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1962, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
 283. Id. at 20–21. 
 284. Id. 
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D. “Construe to Validate” Canon285 
From an early date, Texas courts adopted the contractual canon that 
favors constructions that validate, rather than nullify, written instruments. 
Three early cases applied this canon in a variety of different 
circumstances.286 The earliest decision was Cleveland v. Sims.287  The issue, 
relating to the use of the canon, was whether a suit to quiet title should be 
dismissed due to a variance between the description contained in the deed 
and that contained in the petition. The court stated: 
Under accepted maxims of the law, we must construe the deed, if 
possible, so that it may have effect; especially if, from other 
portions of it, the lot intended to be conveyed is clearly indi-
cated.288 
The validation canon was similarly used to validate a deed in Curdy v. 
Stafford289 and Vineyard v. O’Connor,290 which likewise had vague 
descriptions. 
The basis for the rule was stated by the Texas Supreme Court in Waters 
v. Ellis,291 when it said: “It is to be presumed that the parties intended to 
effect a conveyance and a construction affirming the validity of a deed will 
be adopted in preference to one which would nullify the instrument.”292 
Because people do not enter into transactions involving deeds or other 
                                                                                                                 
 285. While not really a general intent canon, I have placed the “construe to validate” 
canon here because it reflects the intent of the parties to enter into a relationship which will 
have some legal effect. Obviously, parties do not execute deeds unless they believe they are 
conveying some interest in land. 
 286. See Vineyard v. O’Connor, 90 Tex. 59, 36 S.W. 424 (1896); Curdy v. Stafford, 88 
Tex. 120, 30 S.W. 551 (1895); Cleveland v. Sims, 69 Tex. 153, 6 S.W. 634 (1887). 
 287. 69 Tex. 153, 6 S.W. 634 (1887). 
 288. Id. at 155, 6 S.W. at 635. In Coker v. Roberts, 71 Tex. 597, 9 S.W. 665 (1888), the 
validation canon was cited, but the court still found the description in the deed too vague to 
effectively pass title to the grantee. The court said: “It is true, . . . [that] every presumption 
should be indulged that some interest should pass; but when a deed between individuals is 
utterly devoid of any matter of identity whatever, . . . it must be held to be void.” Id. at 602, 
9 S.W. at 667; see also Kennedy v. Shipp, 135 S.W.2d 204, 208 (Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 
1939, writ dism’d judgm’t cor.) (action to try title of a royalty interest). 
 289. 88 Tex. 120, 124, 30 S.W. 551, 552 (1895). 
 290. 90 Tex. 59, 63, 36 S.W. 424, 425 (1896). 
 291. 158 Tex. 342, 312 S.W.2d 231 (1958). The canon can be “shrunk down” so that 
sentences are interpreted to give them effect rather than choosing an interpretation which 
makes them “ineffective or meaningless.” Hasty v. McKnight, 460 S.W.2d 949, 953 (Tex. 
Civ. App.—Texarkana 1970, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
 292. 158 Tex. at 347, 312 S.W.2d at 234. 
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written instruments without the intent to have the written instrument treated 
as an effective conveyance, this canon gives the court substantial flexibility 
to carry out that obvious intent.293 
In addition to the problems with deed descriptions, the validation canon 
has been applied to interpret an instrument that had conflicting language as 
to whether it was a deed of conveyance or a deed of trust.294 In Bailey v. 
Mullens,295 the opening paragraph of a written form instrument referred to 
the instrument as a deed of trust.296 However, the remaining parts of the 
instrument clearly evinced an intent to effect a transfer of the property 
interest described in the instrument. The court applied the validation canon, 
among others, and found that it was an effective deed.297 The court also 
suggested another sub-species of the validation canon, namely that where 
                                                                                                                 
 293. The following cases are all illustrative of the court finding a way to validate a vague 
description, even though earlier decisions might have found the instruments too vague to be 
enforced. See Pan Am. Petroleum Co. v. Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 340 S.W.2d 548, 553 
(Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 1960, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (mineral deed conveyance); Heirs & 
Unknown Heirs of Barrow v. Champion Paper & Fibre Co., 327 S.W.2d 338, 341 (Tex. Civ. 
App.— Beaumont 1959, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (contract for sale); Kuklies v. Reinert, 256 S.W.2d 
435, 442 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1953, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (royalty deed under unitization 
agreement); Crumpton v. Scott, 250 S.W.2d 953, 956 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1952, 
writ ref’d n.r.e.) (contract for sale and mineral deed); Davis v. Field, 222 S.W.2d 697, 699 
(Tex. Civ. App.— Fort Worth 1949, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (mineral deed); Rhoden v. Bergman, 
75 S.W.2d 993, 99697 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1934, writ ref’d) (description of survey 
in deed); see also Lebow v. Weiner, 454 S.W.2d 869, 874–75 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 
1970, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (action for specific performance of alleged contract to convey realty). 
 294. See Bailey v. Mullens, 313 S.W.2d 99, 102 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1958, 
writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
 295. 313 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1958, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
 296. Id. at 101. 
 297. Id. at 102–03. The court also cited the “construe against the grantor” canon and the 
four corners canon. The court placed great weight on the “construe the instrument as a 
whole” canon along with the validation canon. See Vineyard v. O’Connor, 90 Tex. 59, 63, 
36 S.W. 424, 424–25 (1896) (an earlier case reaching a similar result); see also Hedick v. 
Lone Star Steel Co., 277 S.W.2d 925, 929–31 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1955, writ ref’d 
n.r.e.) (trespass to try title suit for construction of deed); Rhoden v. Bergman, 75 S.W.2d 993 
(Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1934, writ ref’d) (suit contesting validity of survey of land for 
want of description). In Clark v. Wisdom, 403 S.W.2d 877, 883 (Tex. Civ. App.—Corpus 
Christi 1966, writ ref’d n.r.e.), the court used the validation canon to find that a deed created 
a life estate and vested remainder, rather than a trust that would have excluded the named 
remaindermen from receiving any benefits. 
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there is a clause in the deed that is repugnant to, or destructive of, the 
validity of the deed, that clause can be ignored.298 
This canon has also been used to deal with problems concerning the Rule 
Against Perpetuities. The difficulty with the application of a canon to the 
Rule is that the Rule by definition is an “intent-defeating” rule of property. 
Nonetheless, several decisions have applied the validation canon to avoid 
finding a Rule problem. For example, in Bagby v. Bredthauer,299 a future 
interest was saved from invalidation by application of the canon. The 
original grantor reserved a 1/16 royalty interest for a period of fifteen years 
and so long thereafter as oil and gas is produced in paying quantities. This 
would seemingly create in the grantee an executory interest that would 
violate the Rule, since it would not vest or fail to vest within a life in being 
plus 21 years.300 The court noted the difference between a rule and a canon, 
yet it nonetheless concluded that 
[t]he interpretation of a written instrument . . . is ordinarily 
required for application of the rule. Where the instrument is 
capable of two constructions, one of which will give effect to the 
whole of the instrument, while the other would defeat it in whole 
or in part, preference is given to the construction that will uphold 
the instrument.301 
In theory, the court was correct. However, as the canon was applied in this 
case, the court was not merely construing the instrument, but creating a 
legal fiction in order to validate it. As written, there was nothing to 
construe. The deed saved, excepted, and reserved the defeasible term 
                                                                                                                 
 298. 313 S.W.2d at 103; see Waters v. Ellis, 158 Tex. 342, 347, 312 S.W.2d 231, 234 
(1958); Coker v. Roberts, 71 Tex. 597, 602, 9 S.W. 665, 667 (1888); Hopkins v. Walters, 
224 S.W. 516, 519 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1920, no writ); Martin v. Rutherford, 153 
S.W. 156, 158 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1912, no writ); see also infra part VI.B (general 
discussion of the anti-harmonizing canon). 
 299. 627 S.W.2d 190, 194 (Tex. App—Austin 1981, no writ). 
 300. Had the grantor retained the future interest and conveyed the defeasible fee royalty 
interest there would have been no Rule problem. The grantee would have received a fee 
simple determinable and the grantor would have retained a possibility of reverter, which is 
not subject to the Rule. See id. at 195; see also State Nat’l Bank of Corpus Christi v. 
Morgan, 135 Tex. 509, 519, 143 S.W.2d 757, 762 (1940) (allowing the admission of 
extrinsic evidence to determine whether payments were royalty or bonus payments and 
recognizing that a landowner may create a royalty interest by grant, reservation, or 
exception). 
 301. 627 S.W.2d at 194. For other applications of this principle to will construction 
cases, see Rekdahl v. Long, 417 S.W.2d 387, 389-91 (Tex. 1967); Rust v. Rust, 147 Tex. 
181, 214 S.W.2d 462 (1948). 
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royalty interest. Because the future interest was in a party other than the 
grantor, that interest had to be an executory interest and the reserved 
interest had to be a fee simple subject to an executory limitation. Instead, 
the court applied the legal fiction that a reservation is really the transfer of 
the fee simple absolute to the grantee and a “re-grant” of the reserved 
interest back to the grantor.302 That would make the original grantee a 
grantor of the present possessory estate and a reserver of the future interest 
in the form of a possibility of reverter. This result could have been reached 
by the use of two simultaneous deeds, but with the court’s application of the 
fiction and the canon, two deeds were not needed to avoid application of the 
Rule. To justify the result on the basis that the parties obviously intended 
the deed to be effective is to render the Rule Against Perpetuities 
meaningless. The validation canon may properly be used when the 
language is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, but in 
Bagby, the language was susceptible of only one meaning.303 
V. The Four Corners Canon 
This general canon arose in the nineteenth century in response to the use 
of various arbitrary rules and canons that dominated the deed interpretation 
arena.304 In its purest form, and the form in which I shall be defining it, the 
canon merely means that the court must look at the entire instrument to 
ascertain the intent of the parties.305 This form departs from earlier rules 
and canons that tended to give preemptive weight to particular clauses, 
                                                                                                                 
 302. 627 S.W.2d at 196. 
 303. See id. at 197. For arguments for and against the use of “savings” constructions in 
Rule cases, see the majority and dissenting opinions in Rekdahl v. Long, 417 S.W.2d 387 
(Tex. 1967) (Steakley, J., Calvert, C.J., Greenhill, J., and Norvell, J., dissenting). See also 
Kelly v. Womack, 153 Tex. 371, 268 S.W.2d 903 (1954) (holding that an instrument equally 
open to two constructions will be rendered valid by one construction rather than void). 
 304. See generally 6A POWELL, supra note 7, § 901(l)(a) (discussion of the general focus 
today on determining the true intent of the grantor); 7 GEORGE W. THOMPSON, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 3136 (1962) (discussion of the 
progression of deed theories to the modern approaches now followed). 
 305. Tevis Herd treats the four corners canon and the “harmonization” canon as 
essentially the same. Herd, supra note 62, at 643. The “four corners” canon has been applied 
to validate a deed where the actual description was unclear, but where the parameters of the 
description could be ascertained from looking to the entire document. See Davis v. Field, 
222 S.W.2d 697, 699 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1949, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Likewise, courts 
look to the entire language of a reservation in order to ascertain the meaning of the 
reservation. Easley v. Brookline Trust Co., 256 S.W.2d 983, 987 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 
1952, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
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phrases or other individual parts of a deed. The “four corners” approach 
does not necessarily require the reader to “harmonize” all parts once read, 
but with the widespread adoption of the “harmonizing” canon, such has 
been the result. The four corners canon is infrequently used alone, but is 
often combined with other canons to assist the court in interpreting a deed. 
It is a canon that reflected a change in the court’s overall treatment of deed 
interpretation issues; however, once the canon became widely accepted as 
the norm, it lost its persuasive punch. This canon is frequently cited today, 
but rarely is it outcome determinative. The real battle in modern caselaw is 
between the harmonizing canon and those canons that tend to give 
preemptive weight to certain parts of deeds where “harmonizing” is not 
possible. 
Acklin v. Fuqua306 exemplifies how the four corners canon is used, while 
remaining subordinate to other canons.307 The dispute was whether a deed 
conveyed a 1/8 royalty or a 1/8 mineral interest. The granting clause 
appeared to describe a royalty interest, but it was followed by a clause that 
clearly described a mineral interest. The court cited the four corners canon 
and used the canon to consider language indicative of describing a mineral 
interest. The court used several other canons to support the conclusion that 
the description of the interest as “all of the royalty” contained in the 
granting clause should not control the language describing the interest as a 
mineral-estate.308 
One of the earliest cases to apply a true four corners canon was Cook v. 
Smith.309 The Cook court tried to determine whether the instrument was a 
deed or merely a quitclaim of the grantor’s interests. The court stated: 
                                                                                                                 
 306. 193 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1946, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
 307. See id. at 300; see also Arnold v. Ashbel Smith Land Co., 307 S.W.2d 818, 824–25 
(Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1957, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (referring to Acklin and its 
application of canons of construction). 
 308. See 193 S.W.2d at 299–300. The court applied the “unequal weight” canon and the 
“particular controls the general” canon to support its conclusion that a mineral estate was 
conveyed. See id.; see also Fleming v. Ashcroft, 142 Tex. 41, 48–49, 175 S.W.2d 401, 406 
(1943) (holding that the intention of the deed is determined from the whole instrument and 
the terms of the deed should be harmonized); Sun Oil Co. v. Burns, 125 Tex. 549, 557, 84 
S.W.2d 442, 446 (1935) (holding that the real intent of the deed is gathered from the general 
and the particular description). 
 309. 107 Tex. 119, 174 S.W. 1094 (1915). Although the “four corners” canon was used 
in Roswurm v. Sinclair Prairie Oil Co., 181 S.W.2d 736, 743–44 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort 
Worth 1944, writ ref’d w.o.m.) where the same issue was involved, the Roswurm court also 
cited the “construe against the grantor” canon. Id. at 743. Courts use the canon to find that an 
instrument was merely a contract for sale rather than a deed, even though conveying 
language was included. In Continental Royalty Co. v. Marshall, 239 S.W.2d 837, 840–41 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss2/3
2017]        An Encyclopedia of Canons of Construction 201 
 
 
The intention of the instrument is to be confined, of course, to 
that which its terms reveal; but it should be considered in its 
entirety, and if, taken as a whole, it discloses a purpose to 
convey the property itself, as distinguished from the mere title of 
the grantor, such as it may be, it should be given the effect of a 
deed. . . .310 
Many of the early cases combined the four corners and harmonizing 
canons.311 In Bumpass v. Bond312 the Texas Supreme Court distilled the 
“four corners” canon to a more “pure” form when the court stated: “It is the 
rule that the intention of the parties must be gathered from the entire 
instrument and not from some isolated clause or paragraph. The entire 
instrument must be construed as a whole in order to arrive at the intention 
of the parties.”313 This canon requires the court to look not at isolated terms, 
                                                                                                                 
(Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1951, no writ) the court looked at the instrument as a whole to 
discover the parties’ intent to prepare a later instrument that would constitute the actual 
conveyance. See also Crumpton v. Scott, 250 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 
1952, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (discussing that a general description prevails over a particular 
description when the parties’ intent is determined to be general, and a particular description 
prevails when repugnance between a general and a particular description exists). 
 310. 107 Tex. at 120, 174 S.W. at 1095. For other early cases, see Scheller v. Groesbeck, 
231 S.W. 1092 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1921, judgm’t adopted); Stevens v. Galveston, H. & 
S.A. Ry., 212 S.W. 639 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1919, judgm’t adopted); Martin v. Rutherford, 
153 S.W. 156 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1912, no writ); Morse’s Heirs v. Williams, 142 
S.W. 1186 (Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 1911, writ ref’d); Lauchheimer v. Saunders, 27 Tex. 
Civ. App. 484, 485, 655 S.W. 500, 501 (1901, no writ). 
 311. In the fountainhead of deed canon cases, the court in Hancock v. Butler, 21 Tex. 
804, 806 (1858) announced: “The governing rule is that every part of the instrument should 
be harmonized and given effect to, if it can be done.” See also Pugh v. Mays, 60 Tex. 191, 
193 (1883) (giving effect to the deed by harmonizing all the parts). In both Hancock and 
Pugh, the court limited the harmonization canon by admitting that conflicts could still exist. 
If the conflicts did exist, the court admitted that it would have resorted to other canons. By 
1890, the Texas Supreme Court moved away from the harmonization canon to the four 
corners canon. In Smith v. Westall, 76 Tex. 509, 13 S.W. 540 (1890), the court said: “It is a 
general rule that a deed must be construed so as to give effect to all its parts, if it can be 
done.” 
 312. 131 Tex. 266, 114 S.W.2d 1172 (1938). 
 313. Id. at 271, 114 S.W.2d at 1174. In Reynolds v. McMan Oil & Gas Co., 11 S.W.2d 
778, 781 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1928, holding approved), the court stated: “In determining the 
legal effect of a deed, whether as to grant, exception, reservation, consideration or other 
feature, the inquiry is not determined alone from a single word, clause, or part but from 
every word, clause, or part that is pertinent.” See also Gibbs v. Barkley, 242 S.W. 462 (Tex. 
Comm’n App. 1922, holding approved) (holding that the grantor’s intent is obtained from 
the entire instrument, not an isolated paragraph). The four corners canon has been cited in a 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
202 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 3 
 
  
phrases, and clauses, but to the “four corners” of the entire instrument 
before the court can ascertain the intent of the parties. 
One use of the four corners canon has been in interpreting “Mother 
Hubbard” clauses. In Holloway’s Unknown Heirs v. Whatley,314 the court 
attempted to determine whether a severed mineral estate owned by the 
grantor would be conveyed to the grantee when the “Mother Hubbard” 
clause only referred to “lands” owned by the grantor. The court 
predominantly used the “four corners” canon to ascertain that the grantor 
and grantee must have intended the term “lands” to refer to all property 
interests, including the severed mineral interest. Therefore, the court found 
that the grantee received the severed mineral estate.315 The court rejected 
the older rule that specific descriptions control general descriptions in favor 
of the “four corners” canon.316 Rather than looking solely at one part of the 
deed, the court examined the entire instrument to ascertain the intent of the 
parties.317 
Recognizing a break from the early use of technical rules, Sun Oil Co. v. 
Burns318 utilized the “four corners” canon approach. The court, in trying to 
determine whether acreage was conveyed through the “Mother Hubbard” 
clause contained in the lease, applied the “four corners” canon. 
                                                                                                                 
case determining whether groundwater was included in a grant of minerals. See Fleming 
Found. v. Texaco, 337 S.W.2d 846, 850–51 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1960, writ ref’d 
n.r.e.). The definition of the term minerals cannot be determined by the use of the four 
corners canon unless there was an express reference to groundwater elsewhere in the deed. 
See id. 
 314. 133 Tex. 608, 613–14, 131 S.W.2d 89, 91–92 (1939); see also Citizens Nat’l Bank 
v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 150 S.W.2d 1003, 1006 (Tex.) (discussing well established rules of 
construction to be applied), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 656 (1941). 
 315. See 133 Tex. at 613–14, 131 S.W.2d at 91–92. The grantor urged that the specific 
description should control over the general description. The court rejected that argument and 
stated that “ ‘all parts of a deed shall be given effect if possible, . . . [t]he real intent must be 
gathered from the whole description, including the general, as well as the special.’ ” Id. at 
614, 131 S.W.2d at 92 (quoting Scheller v. Groesbeck, 231 S.W. 1092, 1093 (Tex. Comm’n 
App. 1921, judgm’t adopted) (emphasis omitted)). 
 316. 133 Tex. at 614, 131 S.W.2d at 92. 
 317. Id. 
 318. 125 Tex. 549, 84 S.W.2d 442 (1935); see also Rutherford v. Randal, 593 S.W.2d 
949, 953 (Tex. 1980) (limiting the determination of the grantor’s intent to the four corners of 
the deed); Smith v. Liddell, 367 S.W.2d 662, 666 (Tex. 1963) (construing the instrument to 
give effect to the parties’ intent by looking to the instrument alone); McMahon v. 
Christmann, 157 Tex. 403, 407–08, 303 S.W.2d 341, 344 (1957) (conflicting provisions 
regarding fractions did not render the lease ambiguous); SMK Energy Corp. v. Westchester 
Gas Co., 705 S.W.2d 174, 176 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (determining 
the parties’ intent by examining the lease as a whole). 
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[I]t is now well settled that all parts of the instrument will be 
given effect when possible, and the intention of the parties will 
be gathered from the whole without reference to matters of mere 
form, relative position of descriptions, technicalities or arbitrary 
rules. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . The intention of the instrument is to be confined, of course, 
to that which its terms reveal; but it should be considered in its 
entirety . . . .319 
Looking at the four corners of the instrument, the court concluded that the 
“Mother Hubbard” clause should be given effect to include non-specifically 
described acreage. 
In Watkins v. Slaughter,320 the “four corners” canon was the only canon 
used by the court to resolve the constructional problem of whether the 
grantor reserved a 1/16 mineral interest or a 1/16 royalty interest. The initial 
sentence of the granting clause clearly indicated that a mineral interest was 
reserved, but later language referred to the reserved interest as a royalty 
interest. The court stated that “[t]he whole of the material part of the deed 
must be considered in order to ascertain its meaning.”321 While the court 
was correct in looking at the entire granting clause, the court failed to 
clarify that the later language evinced an intent to convey a royalty interest 
rather than a stripped-down mineral estate. 
On the contrary, in Elick v. Champlin Petroleum Co.,322 the court used 
the “four corners” canon to find that the grantor had reserved a royalty and 
not a mineral interest. In Elick, the granting clause referred to a royalty 
interest, but later language reserved the executive power and the right to 
                                                                                                                 
 319. 125 Tex. at 552–53, 84 S.W.2d at 444 (quoting Cook v. Smith, 107 Tex. 119, 122, 
174 S.W. 1094, 1095 (1915)); see also Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Texas Pac. Coal & Oil 
Co., 340 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 1960, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (disregarding techni-
calities, the intent of the parties is obtained from the four corners of the deed). 
 320. 144 Tex. 179, 189 S.W.2d 699 (1945); see also Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Texas 
Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 340 S.W.2d 548, 553–54 (Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 1960, writ ref’d 
n.r.e.); Miller v. Speed, 259 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. Civ. App.—Eastland 1952, no writ) (finding 
the deed reservation unambiguous). 
 321. 144 Tex. at 182, 189 S.W.2d at 700. While the court was correct in looking at the 
entire granting clause, the result in Watkins is probably inconsistent with the modern view 
that a grantor can transfer a mineral estate stripped of many of its component parts. See, e.g., 
Altman v. Blake, 712 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. 1986). 
 322. 697 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
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bonus. The results in Watkins and Elick are hard to reconcile. One involved 
a grant and the other involved a reservation; however, neither court used the 
construe the instrument against the scrivener canon. In both situations, the 
initial part of a granting clause indicated one type of interest while the later 
language indicated another. 
The “four corners” canon can be used in cases when more than one 
instrument is involved, such as a situation when a prior contract for sale is 
incorporated by reference into the deed. By looking at all of the relevant 
language, the court of civil appeals, in City of Stamford v. King,323 found 
that the deed conveyed a fee simple absolute. In addition to the classic 
definition of the four corners canon, the Stamford court stated that “Each 
paragraph and clause of the contract must be construed with every other 
clause and paragraph therein.”324  
Another variation of the four corners canon suggests that only in rare 
cases are parts of a deed to be treated as surplusage. In Williams v. J. & C. 
Royalty Co.,325 the court determined whether a reservation in an existing 
lease was a royalty interest or both a royalty interest and a mineral interest 
if the lease terminated. The court, in reading the reservation clause, stated: 
We may not needlessly reject the wording placed in a written 
instrument by the parties thereto, nor delete a clause of a contract 
as surplusage unless judicially mandatory, but must ascertain the 
intention of the parties from the entire instrument by giving 
effect if possible to all the phrases and words therein 
contained.326 
The use of the canon allowed the court to look at the language of the entire 
reservation. The language indicated that after the initial reference to a 
royalty interest, the reservation of a mineral estate existed. 
The four corners canon has appeared in combination with the 
harmonizing canon in many recent cases. For example, in Luckel the 
supreme court stated: “The primary duty of a court, when construing such a 
                                                                                                                 
 323. 144 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App.—Eastland 1940, writ ref’d). 
 324. Id. at 927. For other cases applying this variation of the four corners canon, see 
Germany v. Turner 132 Tex. 491, 497, 123 S.W.2d 874, 877 (1939); Gibbs v. Barkley, 242 
S.W. 462, 464 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1922, holding approved); Bailey v. Mullens, 313 S.W.2d 
99, 102 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1958, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Tipps v. Bodine, 101 S.W.2d 
1076, 1078 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1936, writ ref’d). 
 325. 254 S.W.2d 178, 179 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1952, writ ref’d); see also 
Minchen v. Hirsch, 295 S.W.2d 529, 533 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1956, writ ref’d 
n.r.e.) (explaining the analysis and holding in Williams). 
 326. 254 S.W.2d at 179. 
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deed, is to ascertain the intent of the parties from all of the language in the 
deed by a fundamental rule of construction known as the ‘four corners’ 
rule.”327 The court followed this canon with four other canons, including 
two versions of the harmonizing canon and some variations of the four 
corners canon. It should not be surprising to note that Alford also cited the 
four corners canon although the results were quite different.328 It is now de 
rigueur for most courts to lead off their laundry list of canons with some 
reference to the four corners canon. 
The essence of the four corners canon was given in a lease case in which 
the court determined whether the royalty owner was entitled to payment for 
gasoline manufactured from production of casinghead gas.329 The court 
said: 
In determining the legal effect of a deed, whether as to grant, 
exception, reservation, consideration, or other feature, the 
inquiry is not to be determined alone from a single word, clause, 
or part but from every word, clause, and part that is pertinent. 
The relative positions of the different parts of the instrument are 
not necessarily controlling; the modern and sounder reason being 
to ignore the technical distinctions between the various parts of 
the deed, and to seek the grantor’s intention from them all 
without undue preference to any, for the plain intention of the 
grantor as disclosed by the deed as a whole controls the 
construction. These rules are elementary.330 
  
                                                                                                                 
 327. Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. 1991) (emphasis added). For other 
recent cases using the four corners canon, see Averyt v. Grande, Inc., 717 S.W.2d 891, 896 
(Tex. 1986) (Kilgarlin, J., dissenting on rehearing); Altman v. Blake, 712 S.W.2d 117, 118 
(Tex. 1986); Peveto v. Starkey, 645 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1982); Neel v. Alpar Resources, 
Inc., 797 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1990, no writ); Ray v. Truitt, 751 S.W.2d 
205, 207 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1988, no writ); Harlan v. Vetter, 732 S.W.2d 390, 392 (Tex. 
App.— Eastland 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Stag Sales Co. v. Flores, 697 S.W.2d 493, 495 
(Tex. App.— San Antonio 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Elick v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 697 
S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Mayfield v. de 
Benavides, 693 S.W.2d 500, 503 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
 328. Alford v. Krum, 671 S.W.2d 870, 872 (Tex. 1984). 
 329. See Reynolds v. McMan Oil & Gas Co., 11 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1928, 
holding approved). 
 330. Id. at 781. 
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VI. To Harmonize or Not To Harmonize; 
That is the Question 
As Alford, Luckel, and Snow illustrate, it is not always possible to give 
effect to all language in a deed without either preempting or ignoring other 
parts of a deed. The following section describes the basic harmonizing 
canon and its development from the earliest days of deed interpretation and 
the parallel development of exceptions to the harmonizing canon. Because 
both “harmonizing” and “anti-harmonizing” canons appear in the same 
case, it is only through the court’s result that practitioners can tell which 
canon the court applied. But as a general matter, courts take the position 
that they should initially attempt to harmonize the deed language within the 
four corners of the instrument. Only upon their inability to harmonize 
within the four corners, should the courts resort to anti-harmonizing canons. 
A. The Harmonizing Canon 
In Hancock v. Butler,331 the fountainhead of deed construction cases in 
Texas, the court announced a rule that required a court to harmonize all 
parts of a written instrument. However, the court also recognized that it 
may not be possible to harmonize under all circumstances. According to the 
court: 
The governing rule is, that every part of the instrument should be 
harmonized and given effect to, if it can be done. If that cannot 
be done, and it is found that the deed contains inherent conflict 
of intentions, then the main intention, the object of the grant 
being considered, shall prevail.332 
                                                                                                                 
 331. 21 Tex. 804, 806 (1858). 
 332. Id. at 806. Another early formulation of the harmonizing canon was given in 
Johnston v. McDonnell, 37 Tex. 595, 601 (1872). The court construed a written instrument 
to determine if it was a gift deed. The court said: 
In the construction of all instruments the intention of the parties must be carried 
out, when it can be done without doing violence to the plain import of the 
language used. And in arriving at the intent of the parties, the whole instrument 
must be consulted, and if, after a comparison of each clause with every other, 
one unambiguous, consistent, and legal conclusion is arrived at, that may be 
regarded as the intent and purpose of the parties, which must govern and 
control each clause when regarded separately. 
Id. at 601. In Johnston the court found the instrument to be a gift deed, but a deed that was 
conditional on the donee using the property as her homestead. Id. at 602. Because the donee 
was not living on the land in question, the court concluded she was not entitled to the 
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This basic conundrum has led to many of the problems we see today in the 
multiple fraction area. 
As with the four corners canon, the harmonizing canon was a break from 
many of the common-law rules that were intent defeating.333  Associated Oil 
Co. v. Hart334 illustrates this change from prior practice. In Hart, a grantor 
conveyed the surface estate, but reserved the minerals and a right of way 
easement. The court of civil appeals applied the common law repugnancy 
rule to invalidate the reservation of the minerals.335 The Commission of 
Appeals reversed, applying a combination four corners and harmonizing 
canon. The court said: 
In construing a deed, like any other written instrument, the 
primary and all-important consideration is the intention of the 
parties as gathered from the instrument. . . . Even where different 
parts of the instrument appear to be uncertain, ambiguous, or 
contradictory, yet, if possible, the court will harmonize the parts 
and construe the instrument in such [a] way that all parts may 
stand, and will never strike down any portion except [where] 
                                                                                                                 
interest. Id. at 602–03; see also Smith v. Westall, 76 Tex. 509, 511, 13 S.W. 540, 540 (1890) 
(citing the Hancock court’s use of the harmonizing canon).  
 333. See Herd, supra note 62, at 643–47 (describing the background of the harmonizing 
and four corners canons); see also Benskin v. Barksdale, 246 S.W. 360, 363 (Tex. Comm’n 
App. 1923, holding approved) (holding that a lease did not grant merely a quitclaim interest 
when the granting clause conveyed all the lessor’s right, title, and interest in the premises, 
but the habendum clause was to the lessee, “his heirs and assigns forever”); Cartwright v. 
Trueblood, 90 Tex. 535, 537–38, 39 S.W. 930, 931 (1897) (finding the phrase “one-half” in 
a deed should have been disregarded as merely words of description, thus conveying all the 
land in the deed); Risien v. Brown, 73 Tex. 135, 141, 10 S.W. 661, 662 (1889) (determining 
that a clause granting exclusive riparian rights was without meaning if the clause was 
interpreted to only convey that interest which would be coincidental with ownership); Smith 
v. Brown, 66 Tex. 543, 545, 1 S.W. 573, 574 (1886) (holding that a grant to a grantee as an 
agent for his minor children should have been construed as creating a trust for the use and 
benefit of the children, because to do otherwise would have rendered the language restricting 
the rights of the grantee void); Pugh v. Mays, 60 Tex. 191, 193 (1883) (finding that where 
deeds in an exchange of land transaction contained provisions for the right of re-entry if 
ousted from possession, and also a covenant of general warranty, grantee had the right to 
choose between re-entry or reliance on the warranty); Urquhart v. Burleson, 6 Tex. 502, 511 
(1851) (holding that both course and distance should have been disregarded when they were 
inconsistent with calls in a deed for natural or widely known artificial objects). 
 334. 277 S.W. 1043 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1925, holding approved). 
 335. 277 S.W. at 1043. 
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there is an irreconcilable conflict wherein one part of the 
instrument destroys in effect another part.336 
The court found the meaning of the reservation clear. The grantor did not 
intend to convey, and the grantee did not intend to receive, the mineral 
estate underlying the surface estate. Instead of applying the “repugnant to 
the grant” rule, the court harmonized both provisions and concluded that a 
deed can independently transfer the surface estate while reserving the 
mineral estate.337  
The Texas Supreme Court uses the harmonizing canon in a variety of 
contexts. The use of the canon, however, does not mean that a court’s 
decision can be predicted with any degree of certainty. The multiple 
fraction cases exemplify uncertainty because the supreme court cited the 
harmonizing canon in both Alford and Luckel.338 
Another example of inconsistent results is shown by comparing the court 
of civil appeals’ decision in Duhig and the Texas Supreme Court’s decision 
                                                                                                                 
 336. 277 S.W. at 1044; see also Cravens v. White, 73 Tex. 577, 579, 11 S.W. 543, 544 
(1889) (holding that an express exemption in a deed of a 120 acre parcel within a 190 acre 
tract was not so repugnant as to render the exception void). 
Another formulation of the canon is as follows: “The intention must be gathered primarily 
from a fair consideration of the whole instrument, and the language employed therein, and 
the construction given it should harmonize with the terms of the deed, including its scope, 
subject-matter, and purpose.” Fleming v. Ashcroft, 142 Tex. 41, 49, 175 S.W.2d 401, 406 
(1943); see also Anderson & Kerr Drilling Co. v. Bruhlmeyer, 134 Tex. 574, 583, 136 
S.W.2d 800, 805 (1940) (using the harmonizing canon to hold that the preposition “on” did 
not limit a mineral reservation to those minerals on the surface); Sun Oil Co. v. Burns, 125 
Tex. 549, 552, 84 S.W.2d 442, 444 (1935) (finding that a provision to lease described tracts, 
in addition to any and all other land in the applicable surveys, expanded the granting clause 
to include an adjoining tract); Pitts v. Camp County, 120 Tex. 549, 552, 39 S.W.2d 608, 616 
(1931) (holding that land granted for use as a courthouse and other public buildings, under 
condition that the county seat not be removed, did not revert upon the abandonment of the 
lot as a courthouse so long as the county seat remained within the territorial limits of the 
city). 
 337. 277 S.W. at 1045. The concept of severing the mineral estate by reservation or 
exception had been approved only recently when Hart was decided. See Humphreys-Mexia 
Co. v. Gammon, 113 Tex. 247, 255, 254 S.W. 296, 299 (1923); Stephens County v. Mid-
Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 113 Tex. 160, 170, 254 S.W. 290, 293 (1923). 
 338. See supra part III (complete discussion of how the harmonizing canon has been used 
in multiple fraction cases); see also Stag Sales Co. v. Flores, 697 S.W.2d 493, 495 (Tex. 
App.—San Antonio 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (using the harmonizing canon to hold that when 
there was an irreconcilable conflict between the granting clause and a future lease clause, the 
granting clause prevailed). 
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in Benge v. Scharbauer.339 In Duhig and Benge, the courts were concerned 
with the fractional amount of the mineral estate conveyed while outstanding 
mineral interests existed. The court of civil appeals, in Duhig, combined the 
“four corners’’ and “harmonizing” canons. But the court relied principally 
on the “construe against the grantor” canon in finding that the parties 
intended to transfer the fractional interest that remained after subtracting the 
expressly reserved fractional interest.340 In Duhig, the deed reserved a 1/2 
mineral interest. Consequently, the court interpreted the deed as intending 
to transfer a 1/2 mineral interest, notwithstanding the existence of an 
outstanding 1/2 mineral interest owned by a third party.341 
In Benge, a similar deed reserved a fractional mineral interest and 
specifically provided for the grantor to receive 3/8 of “all the bonuses, 
rentals and royalties.”342 The grantor previously conveyed a 1/4 mineral 
interest to third parties. The court applied the Duhig rule to the mineral 
interest conveyance. Thus, the grantee was deemed the owner of a 5/8 
mineral interest. However, the court then used the harmonizing canon to 
attempt to give effect to the specific language reserving a fractional share 
(3/8) of bonus, rentals and royalties.343 The Benge court did not find an 
                                                                                                                 
 339. 152 Tex. 447, 259 S.W.2d 166 (1953); see Peavy-Moore Lumber Co. v. Duhig, 119 
S.W.2d 688 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1938), aff’d on other grounds, 135 Tex. 503, 144 
S.W.2d 878 (1940); see also Burns v. Audas, 312 S.W.2d 417, 421 (Tex. Civ. App.—
Eastland 1958, no writ) (holding that although the granting clause taken alone indicated the 
grantors attempted to convey an undivided 3/4 mineral interest, the intention of the grantors, 
each owners of a 2/12 interest, was to convey merely a 1/12 interest). 
 340. 119 S.W.2d at 690. 
 341. Id. The supreme court agreed with the result, but did not use canons of construction 
to determine the intent of the parties. Instead, the supreme court relied on an estoppel by 
deed theory to adopt a rule of law that would apply even if it was intent-defeating. 135 Tex. 
at 507, 144 S.W.2d at 879–80. 
 342. 152 Tex. at 452, 259 S.W.2d at 168. 
 343. Id. at 451, 259 S.W.2d at 167. The court said: 
Even though different parts of the deed may appear to be contradictory and 
inconsistent with each other—if possible, the court must construe the language 
of the deed so as to give effect to all provisions thereof and will harmonize all 
provisions therein, and not strike down any part of the deed, unless there is an 
irreconcilable conflict wherein one part of the instrument destroys in effect 
another part thereof. 
Id.; see also Fleming v. Ashcroft, 142 Tex. 41, 49, 175 S.W.2d 401, 406 (1943) (finding that 
a fifteen year limitation in the deed was not repugnant to the use of the word “forever” in the 
habendum clause); Hester v. Weaver, 252 S.W.2d 214, 215 (Tex. Civ. App.—Eastland 1952, 
writ ref’d) (holding that a reservation of a 1/2 mineral interest was not void merely because 
it was not mentioned in the granting, habendum, or warranty clause). 
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irreconcilable conflict between the grantee receiving a 5/8 mineral estate 
and only a 3/8 share of the rents, royalties, and bonus. The court applied the 
general rule that the owner of a mineral interest is free to divide the interest 
into various component elements and either grant or reserve any or all of 
the elements in the same or different amounts.344 The court noted that, 
absent the specific clause, the grantor would only be entitled to 1/8 of the 
leasehold benefits.345 Choosing instead to harmonize, the Benge majority 
gave effect to the reference, notwithstanding the court’s application of the 
Duhig rule, to the same fractional reservation of the mineral estate. The 
decision, in effect, followed the Hoffman approach of creating multiple 
fractional interests in a single deed. As noted earlier, the likelihood that the 
parties to a single deed expected to create two different interests, especially 
as in Benge where the fractions were the same, is reasonably remote.346 
As the dissent pointed out, the real issue was whether the Duhig rule 
should apply to both the mineral interest and the separately mentioned 
component elements.347 If the practitioner follows the court of civil appeals 
intent-based analysis in Duhig, I believe the result in Benge would have 
been different. But because the Duhig rule, as adopted by the supreme 
court, is considered to be intent-defeating, the Benge court sought to avoid 
Duhig’s application. The court did so by engaging in a “legalistic” 
interpretation of the deed.348 Having avoided the application of the Duhig 
rule, the majority then concluded that the parties’ expressed intention was 
to have the grantor receive 3/8 of the economic benefits under the existing 
lease. The parties expressed that same intention to the mineral estate, but 
the intention-defeating application of the Duhig rule only affected the 
mineral estate reservation. Benge and Hoffman are really twins. Rather than 
finding a conflict, the courts created multiple grants to give effect to 
language that describes at least two different quantities of estates. 
The “harmonizing” canon has also been described as follows: “[a]ll 
provisions of the instrument will be given effect and construed in such way 
                                                                                                                 
 344. 152 Tex. at 451, 259 S.W.2d at 168. At the time Benge was decided, Schlittler v. 
Smith, 128 Tex. 628, 631, 101 S.W.2d 543, 544 (1937) was the leading case authorizing 
such a division. The rule in Schlittler was reaffirmed in Altman v. Blake, 712 S.W.2d 117, 
118–19 (Tex. 1986). 
 345. 152 Tex. at 453, 259 S.W.2d at 168. 
 346. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text. 
 347. See 152 Tex. at 456, 259 S.W.2d at 170 (Garwood, J., dissenting). 
 348. Id. Justice Garwood stated that “the proper approach to the instant case would seem 
to be, ‘[w]hat good reason do the respondent-grantors show to escape an otherwise ordinary 
equitable construction of their written instrument in a situation closely resembling that in the 
Duhig case?’ ” Id. 
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as to avoid inconsistencies and conflicts between them insofar as the 
language of the instrument, and the intention of the parties as disclosed 
thereby, will permit.”349 This formulation of the canon reflects how courts 
should proceed in interpreting a deed. Initially, the court should attempt to 
give effect to all provisions of the instrument. If, after a first reading, some 
provisions appear to conflict with others, an attempt should be made to 
construe those provisions to avoid any conflicts. This step should be taken 
in light of the intent of the parties as evidenced by the overall language 
contained in the instrument. Finally, the courts may use an anti-
harmonizing canon when doubt still exists as to the proper construction of 
the deed.350 
When the court tries to give effect to all parts of the deed, the court may 
harmonize the deed even though there may be no real conflict or 
inconsistency in the deed’s language. In Coastal States Crude Gathering 
Co. v. Cummings,351 the court applied the harmonizing canon to construe 
two easement deeds. The issue was whether the deed authorized the 
dominant owner to build a second pipeline and expand the use of the 
servient estate. The court had no difficulty finding such a right because the 
deed referred both to the right to operate and to remove pipelines. The deed 
also contained a provision requiring the payment of additional monies 
should more than one pipeline be laid.352 There was no conflict. The court 
was merely giving effect to the plain intent of the parties as expressed in 
several different provisions of the deed.353 
                                                                                                                 
 349. Bryan v. Thomas, 359 S.W.2d 131, 133 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1962), aff’d on 
other grounds, 365 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. 1963). It is interesting to note that the citation given 
for this quote is not to a deed case but to a Corpus Juris Secundum section on Contracts. 17 
C.J.S. Contract § 309; see also Neel v. Maurice, 223 S.W.2d 690, 693 (Tex. Civ. App.—El 
Paso 1941, no writ) (holding that every provision of a deed must be given effect, if possible). 
 350. This was the approach taken by the court in Bryan as it interpreted a deed that had 
conflicting language regarding the fractional share of the mineral estate that had been 
conveyed. The court found that a 1/12 rather than a 1/96 mineral estate was conveyed, 
applying the “construe against the scrivener” and “greatest estate” canons, rather than trying 
to give effect to the language suggesting that only a 1/96 mineral interest was conveyed. 359 
S.W.2d at 133–34; see generally infra part VI.B (complete discussion of when courts will 
find that the language cannot be harmonized). 
 351. 415 S.W.2d 240, 243 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1967, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
 352. While I state that the court had no difficulty interpreting the deed, the trial court 
found no right to use the easement for a second pipeline. Id. at 241. 
 353. Hancock v. Butler, 21 Tex. 804, 806 (1858) was cited to support the court’s 
application of the harmonizing rule. See also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Lovell, 392 S.W.2d 
748 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1965, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (holding that a court has a duty to 
construe a deed pursuant to the intentions of the parties as spelled out in the deed); Moore v. 
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Courts have used the harmonizing canon to give effect to a variation of a 
“Mother Hubbard” clause. In Holloway’s Unknown Heirs v. Whatley,354 a 
grantor conveyed three specifically described tracts of land in Liberty 
County. The deed contained the following clause: “If there is any other land 
owned by me in Liberty County, Texas, or any land, the title to which 
stands in my name, it is hereby conveyed, the intention of this instrument 
being to convey all land owned by me in said County.”355 The grantor 
reserved a 1/2 mineral interest in three tracts in Liberty County in a prior 
conveyance. The court applied the harmonizing canon to defeat the 
grantor’s claim that the specific descriptions in the deed restricted the 
general description which followed. If the language of the deed is 
“agreeable,” it should be given effect. Had the grantor wanted to reserve his 
mineral interest, he obviously knew how to include the appropriate 
language in a deed, having done so with the first transfer. Here the court 
properly gave meaning to the “Mother Hubbard” clause that clearly evinced 
an intent to transfer all the grantor’s interests in Liberty County.356 
There are some instances, however, when the harmonizing canon is cited 
and used with an anti-harmonizing canon. Such was the case in Fleming v. 
Ashcroft.357 The court interpreted a deed that created a fixed term royalty 
interest of 15 years, but which also made the deed subject to an existing 
lease that contained a standard habendum clause. The lease terminated, and 
the grantor re-leased to a third party. The supreme court used the 
harmonizing canon to find that the term royalty deed was a defeasible term 
deed, but only insofar as production was achieved under the lease in 
existence at the time of the conveyance.358 The court harmonized the fixed 
                                                                                                                 
Proctor, 234 S.W.2d 479, 483 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1950, no writ) (holding that when 
construing a written instrument, every part of the instrument should be harmonized and 
given effect to, if possible). 
 354. 133 Tex. 608, 610, 131 S.W.2d 89, 90 (1939); see also Smith v. Allison, 157 Tex. 
220, 227, 301 S.W.2d 608, 613 (Tex. 1956) (holding that a deed must be considered in its 
entirety to determine whether an ambiguity exists). 
 355. 133 Tex. at 610, 131 S.W.2d at 90 (emphasis omitted). 
 356. See also Bumpass v. Bond, 114 S.W.2d 1172, 1175 (Tex. 1938) (finding that after 
consideration of all parts of the deed, the intention of the parties to attach a lien to the entire 
interest in the land was clearly expressed); Scheller v. Groesbeck, 231 S.W. 1092, 1093 
(Tex. Comm’n App. 1921; judgm’t adopted) (stating that “all parts of a deed shall be given 
effect if possible, and where there is a particular description followed by a general 
description the latter shall yield, though where it is possible the real intent must be gathered 
from the whole description”). 
 357. 142 Tex. 41, 175 S.W.2d 401 (1943). 
 358. See id. at 49, 175 S.W.2d at 406. 
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term limit and the subject to language to create a “limited” defeasible term 
interest.359 It did not find an intent, however, to create a “general” 
defeasible term interest even though there was some language in the deed 
which suggested that result. In rejecting that language, the court stated the 
following about the “harmonizing” canon: “This rule (of construction) does 
not demand that every part of the deed shall be treated as of equal weight in 
the solution of every question that may arise.”360 Thus, the Fleming court 
ignored certain language that detracted from the clear intent of the parties as 
perceived by the court. While the court appropriately applied the “anti-
harmonizing” canon to the Fleming deed, this statement could be taken out 
of context. Potentially, courts could ignore certain deed language or apply 
an anti-harmonizing canon without making a substantial effort to 
harmonize. Nonetheless, courts must be given some flexibility when 
dealing with deed language that appears to detract from an otherwise clear 
intent expressed in the body of the instrument. 
In many situations, the harmonizing canon is cited even though the court 
applies an anti-harmonizing canon, or another canon or rule to interpret a 
deed. For example, in Averyt v. Grande, Inc.,361 the court cited the 
harmonizing canon and applied the Hooks/King rule as to the meaning of 
the words “lands described” or “lands conveyed.”362 Because the court used 
a rule, rather than a canon, there was no need to apply the harmonizing 
canon. The rule required the court to reach a definite result unless it opted 
to overturn the rule. 
The harmonizing canon is frequently cited along with the four corners 
canon.363 As a reflection of the “modern” approach, which attempts to 
                                                                                                                 
 359. See id. at 48, 175 S.W.2d at 405–06. 
 360. Id. at 49, 175 S.W.2d at 406. 
 361. 717 S.W.2d 891, 893 (Tex. 1986); see also Gex v. Texas Co., 337 S.W.2d 820, 824 
(Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1960, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (applying both the four corners and the 
greatest estate canons). 
 362. See infra part VIII (discussion of the Hooks/King rule). 
 363. See, e.g., Alford v. Krum, 671 S.W.2d 870, 872 (Tex. 1984); Cockrell v. Texas Gulf 
Sulphur Co., 157 Tex. 10, 17, 299 S.W.2d 672, 676 (1956); Woods v. Sims, 154 Tex. 59, 64, 
273 S.W.2d 617, 620-21 (1954); Watkins v. Slaughter, 144 Tex. 179, 182, 189 S.W.2d 699, 
700 (1945); Ogletree v. Abrams, 67 S.W.2d 227, 228 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1934, judgm’t 
adopted); Enserch Exploration, Inc. v. Wimmer, 718 S.W.2d 308, 310 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 
1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Smith v. Graham, 705 S.W.2d 705, 706 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 
1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Elick v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 697 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Lovell, 392 S.W.2d 
748, 759 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1965, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Gex v. Texas Co., 337 S.W.2d 
820, 824 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1960, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Bailey v. Mullens, 313 S.W.2d 
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avoid giving specified parts of a deed greater weight than other parts, it is 
quite appropriate. But the statement that a court is harmonizing, does not 
answer the more difficult questions that may arise in deed construction 
cases. Deeds may contain clauses that conflict with other clauses, or that 
muddy a court’s attempt to discern the intent of the parties. In those 
situations, the harmonizing canon should instruct the court to harmonize 
and give effect to every part of the deed, but if that is too difficult, then an 
appropriate anti-harmonizing canon may be used to determine the intent of 
the parties. 
B. The Anti-Harmonizing Canons 
1. The Condition Precedent - Irreconcilable Conflict or Repugnancy 
As noted in the harmonizing canon discussion, before a court applies an 
anti-harmonizing canon, it must first determine that the deed cannot be 
harmonized after a review of the four corners of the instrument. Once that 
finding is made, the court may choose from a long list of canons that will 
give controlling weight or preemptive authority to one part of the deed.364 
Such was the clear intent of the court in Hancock v. Butler,365 the case 
which first pronounced the harmonizing canon. The court stated: 
The governing rule is, that every part of the instrument should be 
harmonized and given effect to, if it can be done. If that cannot 
be done, and it is found that the deed contains inherent conflict 
of intentions, then the main intention, the object of the grant 
being considered, shall prevail.366  
Thus, as a condition precedent to the use of an anti-harmonizing canon the 
court should make every effort to harmonize. The legal standard for using 
an anti-harmonizing canon, however, has not been clearly articulated. 
                                                                                                                 
99, 102 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1958, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Arnold v. Ashbel Smith Land 
Co., 307 S.W.2d 818, 824–25 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston 1957, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Hester v. 
Weaver, 252 S.W.2d 214, 215 (Tex. Civ. App.—Eastland 1952, writ ref’d); Acklin v. Fuqua, 
193 S.W.2d 297, 299 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1946, writ ref’d n.r.e.); First Nat’l Bank of 
Snyder v. Evans, 169 S.W.2d 754, 756 (Tex. Civ. App.—Eastland 1943, writ ref’d). 
 364. For example, once the court decided to use an anti-harmonizing canon, it could 
choose from several, including the “granting clause prevails,” “the granting and habendum 
clause prevails over recitals,” or a more generic unequal weight clause that allows the court 
to make an ad hoc decision as to which clause prevails. See infra part VI.B.2. 
 365. 21 Tex. 804, 806 (1858). 
 366. Id. at 806. See generally Herd, supra note 62, at 640–43 (discussing a line of cases 
dealing with resolving irreconcilable conflicts in grants). 
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For example, two articulated standards are “irreconcilable conflict” and 
“necessary repugnance.” But what constitutes such a conflict or repugnance 
is the subject of substantial disagreement. The Alford/Luckel disparate 
treatment of the multiple fraction deed is illustrative of that difficulty. 
The Texas Supreme Court, in Benge v. Scharbauer,367 gave the 
following definition of when anti-harmonizing canons should be used: 
All parts of the instrument must be given effect if possible to do 
so without violating any legal principles. Even though different 
parts of the deed may appear to be contradictory and inconsistent 
with each other - if possible, the court must construe the 
language of the deed so as to give effect to all provisions thereof 
and will harmonize all provisions therein, and not strike down 
any part of the deed, unless there is an irreconcilable conflict 
wherein one part of the instrument destroys in effect another part 
thereof.368 
This approach makes it difficult for the court to find that a conflict exists. It 
places a heavy burden on those seeking to have the court place greater 
weight on one part of a deed than another. 
Any generalization concerning when courts find and do not find an 
irreconcilable conflict, is difficult to make. The supreme court has 
consistently used language, such as in Benge, to avoid applying anti-
harmonizing canons. For example, in Cockrell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,369 
the supreme court attempted to reconcile a deed that reserved royalty from a 
designated parcel. The existing lease covering the parcel contained an 
entirety clause so that the grantor received apportioned royalties prior to the 
conveyance. The deed was made subject to the existing lease. The grantee 
claimed that the grantor was not entitled to any royalty because production 
did not occur on the acreage that was conveyed. The court disagreed, giving 
effect to the deed’s subject-to clause. The court found that the subject-to 
clause incorporated the lease’s entirety clause into the royalty deed.370 
Consequently, the deed entitled the grantor to royalties on an apportioned 
                                                                                                                 
 367. 152 Tex. 447, 259 S.W.2d 166 (1953). 
 368. Id. at 451, 259 S.W.2d at 167, For other similar definitions, see Watkins v. 
Slaughter, 144 Tex. 179, 182, 189 S.W.2d 699, 700 (1945); Fleming v. Ashcroft, 142 Tex. 
41, 48–49, 175 S.W.2d 401, 405–06 (1943); Associated Oil Co. v. Hart, 277 S.W. 1043 
(Tex. Comm’n App. 1925, holding approved). 
 369. 157 Tex. 10, 15, 299 S.W.2d 672, 675, (1956). 
 370. Id. at 16, 299 S.W.2d at 676. 
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basis.371 While the Cockrell decision gave effect to, and harmonized, all the 
language in the deed, I believe that the dissent is correct in concluding that 
the overall intent of the parties, as expressed in the instrument, was to only 
reserve the non-apportioned royalty under the acreage described in the 
deed.372 Nonetheless, the Cockrell court construed the deed in a way that 
avoided a potential conflict by creating two grants. Apportioned royalties 
were reserved under the existing lease, but non-apportioned royalties were 
reserved under future leases. As with Hoffman and Benge, any 
interpretation that concludes that the parties intended multiple grants by 
reference to a boilerplate provision is somewhat suspect. Yet, the supreme 
court realized that conflicts can and do occur. In those cases, use of the 
appropriate anti-harmonizing canons will be necessary. 
2. The Specific Canons 
a) The “Unequal Weight” Canon 
One generic anti-harmonizing canon that courts have applied is the 
unequal weight canon. Once a court fails in its attempt to harmonize, it 
need not give equal weight to all parts of the deed. To which part of the 
deed the courts give greater weight depends on the individual deed 
language.373  
The origin of this canon again reflects the difficulties Texas courts have 
had in applying canons of construction. In Moore v. City of Waco,374 the 
issue was whether the grantor owned, by herself, either a life estate or a fee 
simple absolute, or whether she owned a fee simple absolute estate as a 
tenant in common with her children. The language between the habendum 
and granting clauses was inconsistent. Attempting to resolve the 
inconsistencies, the court cited the harmonizing canon and several anti-
harmonizing canons. The Moore court first applied the unequal weight 
canon and ignored the habendum clause.375 This canon application 
supported the court’s conclusion that a fee simple absolute estate was 
                                                                                                                 
 371. Id. at 19, 299 S.W.2d at 678. Justices Smith and Culver, in dissent, argued that the 
intent of the parties to the deed was clear: royalty was to be reserved for production from the 
described acreage and not from apportioned production under the lease. Id. at 21, 299 
S.W.2d at 680. 
 372. Id. at 23–24, 299 S.W.2d at 680 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
 373. As discussed infra part VI.B.2.(b–e), many courts use specific anti-harmonizing 
canons such as the “granting clause prevails” or “the habendum clause can be ignored” after 
they have cited the unequal weight canon. 
 374. 85 Tex. 206, 210, 20 S.W. 61, 63 (1892). 
 375. Id. at 211, 20 S.W. at 63. 
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conveyed. As a result, the court gave the granting clause effect at the 
expense of the habendum clause.376 
In Fleming v. Ashcroft,377 the Texas Supreme Court interpreted a royalty 
deed that contained several inconsistent phrases relating to the length of the 
interest granted. The supreme court stated: “This rule [harmonizing] (of 
construction) does not demand that every part of the deed shall be treated as 
of equal weight in the solution of every question that may arise.”378 
Because the court did not find an irreconcilable conflict between the 
various clauses, the unequal weight canon was not required to determine 
which language would have prevailed. 
Sometimes the courts use the unequal weight canon as a means of 
determining whether a conflict exists. In those cases, as part of its 
requirement to first harmonize, the court might eliminate the conflict by 
minimizing the impact of the clause that contains the inconsistent language. 
For example, in Acklin v. Fuqua,379 multiple fractions created 
inconsistencies and confusion regarding whether a mineral or royalty 
interest was transferred. The court used the canon to ignore the specific 
language that created the conflict.380 The grantees claimed that they 
received a 1/8 royalty interest, not a 1/8 mineral interest. The court used the 
“unequal weight” canon to discount language referring to “all the royalty” 
                                                                                                                 
 376. Id. The court’s inconsistent use of these canons was reflected in the following 
excerpt: 
The governing rule in the construction of written instruments is ‘that every part 
of the instrument should be harmonized and given effect to if it can be 
done. . . .’ But this rule does not demand that every part of the deed shall be 
treated as of equal weight in the solution of every question that may arise. ‘The 
habendum may be entirely rejected if repugnant to the other clauses of the 
conveyance.’ . . . ‘If, however, there is a clear repugnance between the nature 
of the estate granted and that limited in the habendum, the latter yields to the 
former; but, if they can be construed so as to stand together by limiting the 
estate . . . , the court always gives that construction in order to give effect to 
both.’ 
Id. Parts of this quote have been used in Coastal Crude Gathering Co. v. Cummings, 415 
S.W.2d 240 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1967, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Moore v. Proctor, 234 S.W.2d 
479 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1950, no writ). 
 377. 142 Tex. 41, 48, 175 S.W.2d 401, 405 (1943). 
 378. Id. at 49, 175 S.W.2d at 406. 
 379. 193 S.W.2d 297, 300 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1946, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
 380. Id. at 299. The granting clause conveyed “one-eighth of all the natural gas, oil, . . . 
being all the royalty in, on or under. . . .” There was also a subject-to clause that referred to 
an existing lease. Id. 
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and instead emphasized the language clearly granting a 1/8 mineral 
interest.381 
A minor variation of the unequal weight canon was expressed in the 
early case of Cartwright v. Trueblood.382 The court stated that “it is not 
permissible to give controlling effect to that which creates an ambiguity, 
and destroys the certainty which is expressed by other language, and thus 
overthrow the clear and explicit intention of the parties.”383 This canon is 
tautological. If the intent of the parties is clear and explicit, it is unlikely 
that conflicting language would be contained in the deed. It does, however, 
reflect the common sense approach that if a court can define the clear intent 
of the parties, the court should not deviate from the parties’ intent merely 
because provisions exist that conflict with the overall intent.384 
b) “Specific Clauses Prevail” Canons 
The following cases applied canons that gave preemptive weight to one 
or more clauses. Because each deed potentially has a different combination 
of clauses in conflict, I have placed them within this general subsection. 
However, even within this subsection, no general agreement exists that 
under all circumstances certain designated clauses always prevail over other 
designated clauses. The following two cases illustrate this inconsistency. 
First, in addition to applying the “specific clause” canon, the case of 
Germany v. Turner385 provides another good illustration of when an 
irreconcilable conflict or repugnancy exists. The issue in Germany was 
whether a deed conveyed the widow’s fractional interest or the entire 
interest of certain described realty.386 The court looked at the entire deed. 
The parties who claimed that a fractional interest was conveyed, argued that 
references in the deed to the widow as a “widow” and to “surviving 
children” evinced an intent to pass only that part of the realty the widow 
received as her share of the community property. In resolving the dispute in 
                                                                                                                 
 381. Id. at 300. 
 382. 90 Tex. 535, 39 S.W. 930 (1897). 
 383. Id. at 539, 39 S.W. at 932. This quote was cited in Alford v. Krum, 671 S.W.2d 870, 
873 (Tex. 1984). 
 384. Although not mentioned by name, this canon can be used to explain the result in 
Robison v. Murrell, 184 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1944, writ ref’d w.o.m.). 
See infra part VI.B.2.b (discussion of Robison). 
 385. 132 Tex. 491, 123 S.W.2d 874 (1939). 
 386. Id. at 495, 123 S.W.2d at 875–76. There were allegations that some of the children’s 
signatures had been forged. The court ultimately determined that a conveyance of the entire 
tract could be accomplished through the doctrines of equitable partition or after-acquired 
title. Id. at 498, 123 S.W.2d at 877. 
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favor of finding the instrument conveyed the widow’s entire interest, the 
court stated: 
While it is of course the duty of the Court to consider all parts of 
a deed, and if possible determine the intention of the grantors 
from a consideration of all its parts, giving effect to all parts if 
that can be done, yet it is not infrequent that a situation arises 
where it becomes necessary to resolve a conflict between certain 
portions of the deed.387 
This is an appropriate standard that should be used in interpretational issues 
before applying a canon which favors one clause of a deed over another. In 
Germany, the court applied a canon that gave controlling weight to the 
granting, habendum, and warranty clauses over the premises and recitals 
clauses. The court, however, suggested that rather than using the anti-
harmonizing canon, it merely read the premises clause as descriptio 
personae. In effect, the court treated the clause as surplusage. If treated as 
surplusage or merely repetitive of the names of the grantors, the language, 
in theory, is harmonized. In reality, if the language is treated as surplusage, 
it is being preempted by the other parts of the deed. 
Second, the Germany holding may be contrasted with Robison v. 
Murrell.388  In Robison, the granting and habendum clauses evinced an 
intent to transfer a fee simple absolute estate. Other recitals, however, 
indicated an intent to convey a life estate.389 Because of the difficulty in 
reconciling the conveyance of a life estate and a fee simple absolute, the 
court appeared to use the Germany anti-harmonizing canon. However, 
instead of holding that the granting and habendum clause prevailed, the 
Robison court treated the specific language of the recitals clause as more 
indicative of the parties’ intent.390 The Robison court tried to distinguish 
                                                                                                                 
 387. Id. at 497, 123 S.W.2d at 877. The court cited Kynerd v. Hulen, 5 F.2d 160 (5th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 560 (1925); Moore v. City of Waco, 85 Tex. 206, 20 S.W. 61 
(1892) and Burgess v. McCommas, 29 S.W. 382 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1910, writ ref’d) 
to support the irreconcilable conflict standard. This quote was later cited in Kokernot v. 
Caldwell, 231 S.W.2d 528, 531 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1950, writ ref’d). See also Gulf Oil 
Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 410 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1966, writ ref’d n.r.e.) 
(following the Germany approach). 
 388. 184 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1944, writ ref’d w.o.m.). Robison is 
discussed at length in Herd, supra note 62, at 643–45. 
 389. 184 S.W.2d at 530–31. 
 390. Id. at 531. 
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Germany by treating the “irreconcilable conflict” or “repugnancy” canon as 
an ancient rule of construction that courts no longer use.391 The court said: 
The trend for many years has been to get away from the 
strictness of the ancient rule as to repugnancy in deeds so 
that . . . it is now held that if clauses or parts of a deed appear to 
be conflicting or repugnant, the intention of the grantor will be 
gathered from the entire instrument, where that can be done, 
without regard to the relative values of the various conventional 
clauses.392 
What this appears to say is that a court must make every reasonable effort 
to harmonize, and if a court can find an overriding intent located in the 
deed, it is not to apply one of the anti-harmonizing canons. I agree with the 
conclusion that courts should apply anti-harmonizing canons only after 
determining that a true conflict exists, and that no singular clause should be 
given greater weight merely because the clause has a particular label. 
Nonetheless, a court hides its head in the sand if it denies that it is giving 
preemptive authority to one part of the deed when a true conflict exists. 
When such a conflict exists, the harmonizing canon becomes irrelevant. 
The court’s choice is then based on which language best reflects the intent 
of the parties. The Robison court should have stated that a reading of the 
entire instrument evinced a clear intent to create a life estate, not-
withstanding other language to the contrary. The court should have 
recognized that the instrument, by its own terms, destroyed the provisions 
of the deed which indicated that a fee simple absolute was to be 
conveyed.393 
The Robison court, in effect, did not harmonize, but instead gave greater 
weight to, what the court believed, was the clear intent of the parties.394 
                                                                                                                 
 391. Id. At one time the repugnancy canon was a rule of law, but certainly since the late 
nineteenth century most Texas courts have treated it as a canon which may or may not be 
applied. Id. 
 392. Id. 
 393. The court did express concern about destroying the expressed intent to create a life 
estate and defeating the intent of the grantor. Id. 
 394. In Herd, supra note 62, at 644–45 the author approves of the result in Robison as 
being more in tune with the harmonization canon. The court acknowledged the existence of 
the conflict between the life estate and fee simple absolute language. The court then chose 
the life estate option because it was more consistent with the overall tenor of the instrument. 
However, the court really did not harmonize, but actually looked at the four corners of the 
instrument. The court was really arguing that there was no irreconcilable conflict or 
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Substantially, the court rejected the second part of the anti-harmonizing 
canon used in Germany, the granting, habendum and warranty clauses 
prevail over general recitals. The resulting Robison decision is clearly 
inconsistent with Germany, but may be justified by the somewhat unique 
nature of the deed.395 Robison illustrates the uncertainty that arises by the 
court’s application of discretionary standards in determining whether or not 
to apply harmonizing or anti-harmonizing canons. 
In Waters v. Ellis,396 the court applied the “granting clause prevails” 
canon in a fairly unusual set of circumstances. Waters was the grantee of 
two separate deeds. Each deed conveyed a 1/4 mineral interest through the 
granting clauses. In each deed, however, an intention clause followed the 
granting clause and specified that the grantor owns a 3/4 mineral interest 
and the grantee owns a 1/4 mineral interest. The first deed had no conflict. 
But, in the second deed, the intention clause created an inconsistency with 
the second grant of a 1/4 mineral interest because the grantee would in toto 
own a 1/2 share.397 The court found a clear repugnance in the intention 
clause of the second deed because of the existence of the first deed. 
Consequently, the Waters court applied the “granting clause prevails” 
canon to give the grantee a 1/2 mineral interest.398 
Alford v. Krum399 and its progeny are the leading modern examples of 
courts finding an irreconcilable conflict between clauses, and then applying 
several anti-harmonizing canons to interpret the deed.400 In resolving the 
                                                                                                                 
repugnancy. Given the deed’s two clear signals, one to pass a fee simple absolute and one to 
pass a life estate, it would be disingenuous to claim that no true conflict existed. 
 395. A similar result to Robison was reached in Smith v. Smith, 305 S.W.2d 198, 200 
(Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 1957, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
 396. 158 Tex. 342, 347, 312 S.W.2d 231, 234 (1958). 
 397. Id. at 345–46, 312 S.W.2d at 233. The supreme court did not treat the second deed 
as a correction deed because on the record before it there was no evidence that the deed had 
such a limited purpose. Id. at 346, 312 S.W.2d at 233. The court of appeals applied the 
harmonizing canon and found that the clear import of both deeds was to leave the grantor 
with a 3/4 mineral interest. Ellis v. Waters, 308 S.W.2d 169, 173 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 
1957), rev’d, 158 Tex. 342, 312 S.W.2d 231 (1958). 
 398. See 158 Tex. 342, 312 S.W.2d 231; see also Germany v. Turner, 132 Tex. 491, 497, 
123 S.W.2d 874, 877 (1939) (ruling that references in a deed to individual interests did not 
affect the intentions of the parties expressed in the granting clause); Graham’s Estate v. 
Stewart, 15 S.W.2d 72, 76 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1929, writ ref’d) (construing a 
concluding clause in a deed as surety for rights that were not specifically given by the terms 
of the preceding clause). 
 399. 671 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1984); see supra part III (lengthy discussion of Alford). 
 400. Alford was cited as controlling in Hawkins v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 724 S.W.2d 
878, 886 (Tex. App.—Waco 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.) and Stag Sales Co. v. Flores, 697 
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conflict between the granting, subject-to, and future lease clauses, the 
Alford court concluded that harmonizing would not work. It determined that 
an irreconcilable conflict existed in the disparate fractions, thus making the 
deed “impossible to harmonize.”401 To resolve this conflict, the Alford court 
applied several different anti-harmonizing canons. 
The first anti-harmonizing canons used was fairly general: “The court 
must give effect to the ‘controlling language’ of the deed and not allow 
ambiguities to ‘destroy the key expression of intent’ included within the 
deed’s terms.”402 The controlling language canon merely instructs a court to 
determine which language prevails because the language cannot be 
harmonized. The canon itself, however, does not say what is the key 
expression of intent. As such, this canon should be discarded. However, the 
analytical process used in applying the anti-harmonizing canon should 
continue to be used. 
In Alford, the court selected the “granting clause prevails” canon over all 
other canons to resolve the conflict. The court said: 
The “controlling language” and the “key expression of intent” is 
to be found in the granting clause, as it defines the nature of the 
permanent mineral estate conveyed. . . . It logically follows that 
                                                                                                                 
S.W.2d 493, 494–95 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.). The Texas Supreme 
Court also applied the “granting clause prevails’’ canon used in Alford, in Veltmann v. 
Damon, 701 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. 1985). 
 401. 671 S.W.2d at 872. The court said: “We realize that irreconcilable conflicts do exist; 
therefore, when it is impossible to harmonize internally inconsistent expressions of intent, 
the court must give effect to the ‘controlling language’ of the deed.” Id.; see Herd, supra 
note 62, at 637–39 for a criticism of Alford. In Etter v. Texaco, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 702, 705 
(Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1963, writ ref’d n.r.e.), the court refused to give controlling effect to 
the title of the deed and found that the body of the deed conveyed a mineral estate, 
notwithstanding the use of a royalty deed form. 
 402. 671 S.W.2d at 872 (citing Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co. v. Masterson, 160 Tex. 548, 
553, 334 S.W.2d 436, 439 (1960)). Masterson involved a conflict in the description clause of 
a deed which stated that the grantor was conveying “all the unsold portion containing 186.4 
acres out of the 640 acres known as the Manuel Tigerino Survey.” 160 Tex. 551, 334 
S.W.2d at 438. The issue was whether minerals located within the Tigerino Survey, but 
outside of the 186.4 acres, were included in the conveyance. The Texas Supreme Court 
concluded that the phrase “all the unsold portion” controlled the acreage phrase. Id. at 552, 
334 S.W.2d at 439. The court also used the greatest estate canon to reach its conclusion. See 
infra part VII.D. 
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when there is an irreconcilable conflict between clauses of a 
deed, the granting clause prevails over all other provisions.403 
The Alford court chose the “granting clause prevails” canon over several 
alternatives.404 As noted by Tevis Herd, the court had four options: (1) treat 
the deed as ambiguous and admit extrinsic evidence; (2) reform the deed 
upon a showing of mutual mistake; (3) apply the Hoffman/Garrett multiple 
grant approach; or (4) apply the “construe against the grantor/scrivener” 
canon.405 The court itself mentioned a fifth option: apply the canon that 
ignores language that creates ambiguity.406 
This last canon was used to resolve a mineral/royalty issue in Acklin v. 
Fuqua.407 The court found that the language describing the conveyed 
interest as a mineral interest was clear and explicit and should not be 
affected by a later reference to the interest as a royalty interest.408 
  
                                                                                                                 
 403. 671 S.W.2d at 872. The court cited Lott v. Lott, 370 S.W.2d 463, 465 (Tex. 1963); 
Waters v. Ellis, 158 Tex. 342, 347, 312 S.W.2d 231, 234 (1958) and Kokernot v. Caldwell, 
231 S.W.2d 528, 531–32 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1950, writ ref’d) as applying the 
“granting clause prevails” canon. For other cases supporting this canon, see Kynerd v. 
Hulen, 5 F.2d 160 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 560 (1925); McBride v. Hutson, 157 
Tex. 632, 306 S.W.2d 888, 894 (Tex. 1957); Davis v. Andrews, 361 S.W.2d 419, 425 (Tex. 
Civ. App.— Dallas 1962, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Gibson v. Watson, 315 S.W.2d 48, 54, 56 (Tex. 
Civ. App.— Texarkana 1958, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Sebastian Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Ballenger, 297 
S.W.2d 238 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1956, no writ); Graham’s Estate v. Stewart, 15 
S.W.2d 72 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1929, writ ref’d). 
In Gibson, a classic multiple fraction issue was resolved, in part, by using the “granting 
clause prevails” canon. The granting clause indicated that a 1/32 mineral interest was 
conveyed. Later clauses indicated that 1/32 royalty in the existing lease and a 1/4 mineral 
estate in the possibility of reverter was conveyed. 315 S.W.2d at 50–51. The court applied 
numerous canons, but emphasized the “rule of favoring the granting clause at the expense of 
later clauses which contain repugnant language.” Id. at 56. 
 404. See 671 S.W.2d at 873–74. In Kokernot v. Caldwell, 231 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. Civ. 
App.—Dallas 1950, writ ref’d), the court also applied the “granting clause prevails” canon 
after determining that an irreconcilable conflict existed because the deed at different points 
referred to the conveyed interest as a term for years and as a life of the lease interest. The 
court found that because the purpose of the granting clause is to define the estate being 
conveyed, the language of that clause which limits the estate to a 20 year term for years must 
be given controlling authority over later language denoting a longer estate. 
 405. Herd, supra note 62, at 650–56. 
 406. 671 S.W.2d at 873. 
 407. 193 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1946, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
 408. Id. at 300. Several other canons were used in Acklin including the unequal weight 
canon, the “specific controls the general” canon and the harmonizing canon. 
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c) “General Versus Particular Language” Canon 
While this canon has its origin, and its greatest use, in tract description 
situations, courts have applied it to general lease and deed terms. The 
“general versus particular language” canon is also an example of a canon or 
canons, which in its various forms, can be used to support diametrically 
opposed positions. The Texas Supreme Court reflects this conundrum by 
stating in Gibson v. Watson: 
It is well settled law that ‘a general description may be looked to 
in aid of a particular description that is defective or doubtful, but 
will not control or override a particular description about which 
there can be no doubt.’ . . . ‘And, if a general and particular 
description are obviously intended to refer to the same land, and 
the two cannot be reconciled, the particular description is 
preferred to the more general.’409 
The first part of this canon states that if a particular description is not in 
doubt, then the particular description will prevail over a general description. 
But if the particular description is in doubt, the general description is 
relevant. The second part of the canon requires that courts give the 
particular description preference when both descriptions refer to the same 
land and are irreconcilable. This application creates the same difficulty as 
the harmonizing canon and the repugnant canon. The court gives no 
guidelines as to when the descriptions can or cannot be reconciled. 
Therefore, a court’s choice of when to give preference to the specific or 
particular description may be inconsistently applied depending upon the 
court’s threshold determination of what is reconcilable. 
The “general versus particular language” canon is another canon that has 
its origin in basic contract law. One of the earliest uses of the canon 
occurred in Cullers v. Platt.410 Cullers was a classic description case in 
which a specific grant used metes and bounds descriptions and a more 
general grant encompassed a much larger area. The grantee argued that the 
more general language controlled. The court rejected the use of the general 
canon and instead stated: “The rule is that where there is a repugnance 
between a general and a particular description in a deed the latter will 
                                                                                                                 
 409. 315 S.W.2d 48, 57 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1958, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
 410. 81 Tex. 258, 16 S.W. 1003 (1891). Some authorities have cited Cromwell v. 
Holliday, 34 Tex. 463 (1870) as the origin of this canon. Cromwell actually applied a 
different canon that allowed restrictive words in the latter part of a particular description to 
control the grant. 34 Tex. at 468. 
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control . . . , although, whenever it is possible, the real intent must be 
gathered from the whole description, including the general as well as the 
particular.”411 This statement requires a court to find a “repugnance” 
between the specific and the general terms before giving controlling weight 
to the specific clause. In addition, the court shall not easily find a repug-
nance, but must make every effort to ascertain the intent from the entire 
instrument. The Cullers court’s holding, however, makes short shrift of its 
statement that one must attempt a reconciliation of the general and the 
specific. When both a specific metes and bounds description and a general 
description of tracts exist, the metes and bounds description will control, 
and only the specifically described tracts will be conveyed.412  
Hoffman v. Magnolia Petroleum413 further expanded this canon to cover 
more than descriptions. In Hoffman, the court stated that the specific and 
restricted intent of the parties controlled over the general intent, but added 
that the court must attempt to have the entire instrument speak consistently 
as a whole.414 The Hoffman court determined that the grantor made two 
grants: therefore, the court attempted to reconcile the more specific 
language with the language of the subject-to clauses.415 
In many cases involving this canon, the specific language follows the 
general language. When the general language follows the specific language, 
should a different canon apply? In Holloway’s Unknown Heirs v. 
Whatley,416 Holloway owned a 1/2 mineral estate in three tracts in Liberty 
County. He then conveyed to Baldwin, using specific descriptions, several 
other parcels of land. However, on the end of the granting clause, Holloway 
added the following statement: “If there is any other land owned by me in 
Liberty County, Texas, or any land, the title to which stands in my name, it 
is hereby conveyed, the intention of this instrument being to convey all land 
owned by me in said County.”417 
                                                                                                                 
 411. 81 Tex. at 263–64, 16 S.W. at 1005. 
 412. See also Southern Pine Lumber Co. v. Hart, 161 Tex. 357, 364, 340 S.W.2d 775, 
781 (1960) (ruling that a person claiming title by limitation under his own deed is limited to 
the unambiguous language of that deed); Regan v. Hatch, 91 Tex. 616, 616, 45 S.W. 386, 
387 (1898) (treating the words “more or less” as a misdescription not affecting the grant). In 
Duke v. Calfee, 533 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1976), rev’d on other grounds, 
544 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. 1976), the court stated without citation, “It is settled law in this state 
that a particular description controls a general description.” 
 413. 273 S.W. 828 (Tex. 1925). 
 414. Id. at 830. 
 415. Id. 
 416. 133 Tex. 608, 131 S.W.2d 89 (1939). 
 417. Id. at 610, 131 S.W.2d at 90. 
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One of the grantor’s claims was that the canon giving controlling effect 
to the specific language should apply to defeat the general language 
contained at the end of the granting clause. The court noted the existence of 
the canon, but refused to apply it upon a reading of the entire instrument 
and a determination that both the general and specific language could be 
carried out.418 As a result, the Holloway court found that the mineral estates 
were conveyed under the “general intent” clause even though they were not 
within the boundaries of the tracts specifically conveyed earlier in the 
granting clause.419  
Sun Oil Co. v. Burns420 illustrates the difficulty in applying one or more 
variations of this canon. In Burns, an oil and gas lease contained a specific 
description of a 100 acre tract. A “Mother Hubbard” clause was also 
included in the lease. A 3.736 acre tract located adjacent to the specifically 
described tract was the subject-matter of the litigation. In resolving the 
issue of whether the 3.376 tract was included in the lease, the court applied 
several canons. The lessor argued that a “particular description which is 
clear and distinct will control or override general words of description 
added thereto.”421 Nevertheless, the court chose not to apply the canon 
without first finding that a conflict or repugnance existed between the 
general and particular descriptions.422 This condition precedent was a part 
of the canon since its initial use in Cullers. However, the court muddied the 
waters by stating that under certain circumstances a mirror-image canon 
existed. The court stated: “A general description will prevail over a 
particular description when it is apparent from the instrument that the 
parties intended that the general should control.”423  
                                                                                                                 
 418. See id. at 614, 131 S.W.2d at 92; see also Winters v. Slover, 151 Tex. 485, 489, 251 
S.W.2d 726, 728 (1952); Scheller v. Groesbeck, 231 S.W. 1092, 1093 (Tex. Comm’n App. 
1921, judgm’t adopted) for cases in which the court followed the canon that a general 
description will not be disregarded when it can be harmonized. 
Another exception to the canon that “the particular description prevails” occurs when the 
court determines that only one of the descriptions is legally adequate. Thus, in Sharp v. 
Fowler, 151 Tex. 490, 494, 252 S.W.2d 153, 155 (1952), the court found that if only one of 
the descriptions is adequate, it obviously prevails and there is no need to resort to any of the 
canons relating to the reconciliation of competing descriptions. 
 419. 273 S.W. at 830. 
 420. 125 Tex. 549, 84 S.W.2d 442 (1935). 
 421. Id. at 555, 84 S.W.2d at 445. For cases applying this general rule, see Sanger v. 
Roberts, 92 Tex. 312, 316, 48 S.W. 1, 2 (1898); Tucker v. Angelina County Lumber Co., 
216 S.W. 149, 150 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1919, judgm’t adopted); McFaddin v. Johnson, 180 
S.W. 306, 308 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1915, no writ). 
 422. 125 Tex. at 557, 84 S.W.2d at 447. 
 423. Id. at 555–56, 84 S.W.2d at 446. 
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Instead of stating this opposite canon, the court should have relied on its 
finding that no conflict existed. Furthermore, the court should have 
attempted to reconcile potentially conflicting language before applying the 
“specific controls the general” canon. However, the court’s final judgment 
is undoubtedly correct. The reason for a lease to contain a “Mother 
Hubbard” clause is to cover small parcels of land that may be owned by the 
lessor, but which are somehow left out of the description of the lands to be 
leased. No repugnancy or conflict exists between a “Mother Hubbard” 
clause and a specific description of other lands. The clauses serve different 
purposes that evince a clear intent to cover lands that are not specifically 
enumerated within the terms of the instrument. 
Thomas v. Texas Osage Co-Op Royalty Pool, Inc.424 clarified the 
distinction the Burns opinion sought to make between situations in which 
the specific controls and situations in which the general controls. In 
Thomas, the court interpreted two deeds. Each deed purported to transfer a 
1/2 undivided mineral estate. The first deed purported to transfer the 
minerals under approximately 276-1/2 acres while the second deed 
purported to transfer the minerals under a 83-1/2 acre tract. Both deeds 
contained a clause which stated that “the conveyance is to cover all lands 
now owned by the grantors in the above stipulated surveys whether herein 
properly described or not and containing [276-1/2 or 83-1/2] acres of land 
more or less.”425 The first grantee claimed the mineral estates under both 
tracts by virtue of this general clause. 
The court found Burns and its interpretation of the leasehold “Mother 
Hubbard” clause inapplicable to these deeds. The court applied the canon 
that when a general and particular description refer to the same land, which 
cannot be reconciled, the particular description prevails.426 The court stated 
the rule as follows: 
[A] particular description in a deed does not override a general 
description of the land where it appears that the property covered 
by the words of particular description is not the whole of the 
property intended to be conveyed and that the words of general 
description are intended to have an enlarging effect.427 
                                                                                                                 
 424. 248 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Civ. App.—Eastland 1952, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
 425. Id. at 202. Both of the deeds covered lands in the same survey. 
 426. Id. at 204. 
 427. Id. 
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Thus, in the leasehold “Mother Hubbard” clause, the parties clearly 
intended to convey all of the mineral estate owned by the lessor. However, 
in Thomas, the court read the grant as intending to convey only the acreage 
that was specifically described in the metes and bounds descriptions given 
in the respective deeds.428  
The difficulty in applying this canon to the “Mother Hubbard” clause 
situation is shown in Smith v. Allison.429 The deed particularly described an 
undivided 1/2 mineral interest underlying the southeast 1/4 and the 
northwest 1/4 of Section 124. The grantor also owned a 1/4 mineral interest 
in the northeast 1/4 of Section 124 as well as other mineral interests in 
adjacent sections. The grantee argued that the “Mother Hubbard” clause in 
the deed acted as a conveyance of the minerals underlying the northeast 1/4. 
The supreme court found that the “Mother Hubbard” clause was 
ambiguous because it could be interpreted to include the surface estates, 
which were otherwise not included in the specific description, as well as the 
mineral estates located in the adjacent sections.430 The court found a 
“material inconsistency” between the specific description and the “Mother 
Hubbard” clause. Thus, parol evidence was admissible to ascertain the 
intent of the parties.431 
The court struck a proper balance between the use of canons to decide 
cases and the use of common sense and reason. While citing several canons, 
including the canon that the objective of the court is to ascertain the intent 
of the parties, the Smith court looked to the purpose of these standard 
clauses and interpreted the clauses in a manner consistent with that 
purpose.432 The purpose of the clauses is to prevent narrow strips of land 
                                                                                                                 
 428. Id. at 204–05. The court also treated the deeds as ambiguous and admitted extrinsic 
evidence, including the subsequent actions of the parties, to confirm its interpretation that 
the parties only sought to deal with description errors and not to enlarge the grant beyond the 
tracts that were specifically described. Id. at 205; see also Gulf Prod. Co. v. Spear, 125 Tex. 
530, 84 S.W.2d 452 (1935) (holding that a lease which clearly shows from its language that 
it was the lessor’s intention to lease all his land in a survey, included excess land that the 
lessor did not know was in the tract belonging to him). 
 429. 157 Tex. 220, 301 S.W.2d 608 (1956). 
 430. Id. at 225, 301 S.W.2d at 612. 
 431. Id. In the court’s first opinion, the majority said that the purpose of admitting parol 
evidence was to ascertain the grantor’s intent. On its motion for rehearing, the majority 
opinion said its primary objective was to ascertain the intent of both parties to the deed. Id. 
at 232, 301 S.W.2d at 617. 
 432. Id. at 229, 301 S.W.2d at 614. The court looked at the history of “Mother Hubbard” 
clauses, which had their start in oil and gas leases, but gradually moved into some standard 
deed forms. The court identified that the primary objectives of these clauses was to pick up 
small strips of land. The grantor or lessor may have owned this land by virtue of the doctrine 
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from remaining unleased or unconveyed, when it is clear that the parties 
intended to transfer the acreage owned. The Smith decision coincides with 
the public policy goal of discouraging ownership of narrow strips of land 
when there is no clear intent.433 The majority thus limited the application of 
the “Mother Hubbard” clause to the conveyance of narrow strips of 
adjacent land that were mistakenly omitted, or obtained by limitations title, 
and which were supplemental to the description of the specific tract or 
tracts. Thus, without having to resort to the specific controls canon, the 
court reached a result consistent with the language and the purpose of the 
“boiler-plate” clause.434 
d) “Non-Printed Prevails Over Printed” Canon 
One of the first uses of the “non-printed prevails over printed” anti-
harmonizing canon appeared in the early oil and gas lease case of 
Producers Oil Co. v. Snyder.435 The issue was whether the lease treated the 
nineteen quarter sections covered as an entirety or as the equivalent of 
nineteen separate leases. The printed form lease had numerous written and 
typewritten additions. The printed matter suggested that the leasehold 
acreage was to be treated as an entirety. The added material suggested that 
                                                                                                                 
of adverse possession, or was unaware or mistaken as to their lack of ownership. 157 Tex. at 
229–30, 301 S.W.2d at 614–15. See generally Sun Oil Co. v. Bennett, 125 Tex. 540, 543, 84 
S.W.2d 447, 449 (1935) (holding that when the language of an oil and gas lease 
unmistakably shows the lessor’s intention to include the land in controversy, the court 
should include the land in the lease); Sun Oil Co. v. Burns, 125 Tex. 549, 552, 84 S.W.2d 
442, 444 (1935) (holding that in the construction of a deed, the ultimate purpose is to 
ascertain the intention of the parties, and that intention should be procured from the whole 
instrument). 
 433. See State v. Arnim, 173 S.W.2d 503, 508 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1943, writ 
ref’d w.o.m.). 
 434. The Smith treatment of “Mother Hubbard” clauses was applied to leases and 
accepted as the general rule in Jones v. Colle, 727 S.W.2d 262, 263 (Tex. 1987). For further 
analysis of “Mother Hubbard” clauses, see Bruce Kramer, The “Mother Hubbard” or 
“Cover All” Clauses in Mineral Deeds and Leases, 13 EASTERN MIN. L. INST. 12-1 (1992). 
 435. 190 S.W. 514, 515–16 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1916, no writ). There are cases 
in which the parties incorporate this canon into the deed or lease. In those cases, the court 
does not apply the canon, but merely applies the express language contained in the 
instrument. See, e.g., SMK Energy Corp. v. Westchester Gas Co., 705 S.W.2d 174, 176 
(Tex. App.— Texarkana 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Situations also arise in which parties have 
crossed out parts of the printed form. The crossed out material should not be considered by 
the court in interpreting the deed. See Mineral Investing Corp. v. Bishop Cattle Co., 49 
S.W.2d 532, 533 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1932), aff’d on other grounds, 124 Tex. 
387, 78 S.W.2d 174 (1935). 
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each quarter section was to be treated separately. The court stated the canon 
as follows: 
It is a well-recognized rule of construction that where a part of a 
contract is written, or typewritten, and part is printed, and the 
written and printed parts are apparently inconsistent, or there is 
reasonable doubt as to the sense and the meaning of the whole, 
the words in writing will control the construction of the 
contract.436 
The canon should not be used unless the court makes a determination that 
there is an irreconcilable conflict, or a repugnancy between the typewritten 
and printed material. 
The Snyder court further provided the rationale for the canon’s use.437 
The court’s decision, based on common sense and practical experience, 
concluded that the parties may not always read and understand what is 
contained in the printed form. Additionally, each party may have a different 
understanding of the meaning of the printed language. Yet with handwritten 
or typewritten additions, both parties immediately become aware of the 
specific language and usually have discussed the meaning of the language 
before it was included in the instrument. As the court noted, “the printed 
form is intended for general use without reference to particular objects and 
aims.”438 
While the Snyder court presented a clear and readily understandable 
canon, the canon itself was not used to resolve the textual inconsistency. 
The trial court found that the instrument was ambiguous, and subsequently 
admitted parol evidence to explain the ambiguity.439 The appellate court did 
not disturb the legal finding of ambiguity, although it might have relied on 
the canon rather than parol evidence to reach its conclusion.440  
On the other hand, in McMahon v. Christmann,441 the court applied the 
same canon used in Snyder and refused to admit extrinsic evidence. 
McMahon involved a lease that contained a printed form proportionate 
reduction clause and a typewritten rider which provided that the lessor 
would retain, without reduction, an additional 1/32 of 8/8 overriding 
                                                                                                                 
 436. 190 S.W. at 515. This canon originated with contract interpretation cases as 
evidenced by the headnote that accompanies the canon statement. 
 437. See id. at 515–16. 
 438. Id. at 516. 
 439. Id. 
 440. Id. 
 441. 157 Tex. 403, 407–08, 303 S.W.2d 341, 344–45 (1957). 
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royalty. The lessor owned only a 1/6 mineral interest. The lessee claimed 
that the lessor was entitled to a payment consisting of 1/6 of 1/8 base 
royalty plus a 1/32 of 1/6 overriding royalty. The lessor contended that the 
overriding royalty was a full 1/32 interest. 
The court substantially relied on the canon that “typewritten matter in a 
contract [is to] be given effect over printed matter.”442 Stating that the rule 
is peculiarly applicable to the facts, the court concluded that the 
proportionate reduction clause was to be given effect on the leasehold 
royalty.443 However, the typewritten rider’s inclusion of the term “without 
reduction” would insulate the overriding royalty from a proportionate 
reduction.444 Furthermore, as long as the total amount of reserved interest 
did not exceed the total amount of mineral estate owned by the lessor, the 
parties were free to enter into whatever arrangements they agreed to 
regarding the payment of royalty. In McMahon, the lessor who owned a 
16/96 interest was found to have retained a 5/96 royalty, an effective 
royalty rate of 30 percent.445 
In Newport Oil Co. v. Lamb,446 the grantee sought to apply the canon to a 
situation similar to that in McMahon. Newport had leased its 1/8 interest to 
                                                                                                                 
 442. 157 Tex. at 407, 303 S.W.2d at 344. The court cited Richardson v. Richardson, 270 
S.W.2d 307, 311 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1954, writ ref’d) and J.K. Hughes Oil Co. v. 
Mayflower Inv. Co., 193 S.W.2d 971, 973 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1946, writ ref’d). 
The Hughes Oil decision related to a mineral deed with inconsistently named parties. The 
court stated that “[t]he written and printed parts of a deed are equally binding, but if they are 
inconsistent, the former will control the latter.” 193 S.W.2d at 973 (quoting 26 C.J.S. Deeds 
§ 85). For other cases citing this canon see Southland Royalty Co. v. Pan Am. Petroleum 
Corp., 378 S.W.2d 50, 57 (Tex. 1964); Black v. Shell Oil Co., 397 S.W.2d 877, 886 (Tex. 
Civ. App.—Texarkana 1965, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
 443. 157 Tex. at 407, 303 S.W.2d at 344. 
 444. Id. at 408, 303 S.W.2d at 344; see also Finder v. Nyegaard, 367 S.W.2d 217, 218–
19 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1963, writ ref’d n.r.e) (refusing to apply the canon to the 
typewritten rider phrase; “notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the foregoing lease,” 
so as to nullify the printed proportionate clause as it applied to an overriding royalty 
provision). 
Although the canon was not mentioned, the Texas Supreme Court applied similar 
reasoning in Gibson v. Turner, 156 Tex. 289, 292–93, 294 S.W.2d 781, 785–86 (1956) when 
the parties struck the proportionate reduction clause from the printed form lease. 
 445. 157 Tex. at 408, 303 S.W.2d at 345; see also Shell Oil Co. v. Stansbury, 401 
S.W.2d 623, 632 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1966, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (canon is cited, but 
does not appear critical to the court’s decision); Kidd v. Hickey, 237 S.W.2d 389, 396 (Tex. 
Civ. App.— El Paso 1950, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (canon used to assist in the interpretation of a 
Texas Relinquishment Act lease). 
 446. 352 S.W.2d 861, 862 (Tex. Civ. App.—Eastland 1962, no writ). 
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the owner of the remaining 7/8. The lease contained a printed proportionate 
reduction clause. The parties, however, added a typewritten overriding 
royalty clause reserving a 1/8 of 7/8 interest. Newport claimed that the 
canon and McMahon supported its position that the override was not to be 
reduced. Nevertheless, the court did not apply the canon. The Lamb court 
found no conflict between the overriding royalty clause and the 
proportionate reduction clause.447 Because the parties had not included the 
term “without reduction,” the overriding royalty clause was part of the lease 
and was not inconsistent. Therefore, the court determined that the canon 
should not apply.448 Lamb harmonized the language in the deed. The canon 
could not apply because Newport had in effect reserved its entire interest 
that it had leased. If one adds up the proportionately reduced lease royalty 
of 1/64 with the unreduced overriding royalty of 7/64, the lessor had not 
conveyed any interest to the lessee. In effect, the lessee agreed to pay a 100 
percent royalty interest for the 1/8 interest owned by Newport. Canons of 
construction should never be used to reach absurd results. The court 
properly refused to apply the canon in Lamb. 
One of the first cases to use this canon in the context of interpreting a 
mineral deed was J.K. Hughes Oil Co. v. Mayflower Investment Co.449 In 
Hughes Oil, a printed form deed of trust misidentified the grantor/creditor 
of a mineral interest. In one part of the trust deed, however, the parties had 
stricken the erroneous name and typed in the proper party. In concluding 
that the deed sufficiently identified the proper parties, the court applied the 
typewritten prevails canon because it found an inconsistency between the 
printed form’s misidentification and the typewritten proper identification.450 
The “subject-to” clause and the multiple fraction problem have caused its 
share of grief for lawyers. It has also spawned many cases where courts 
have used different canons to reach inconsistent results.451 In Gibson v. 
Watson452 the “typewritten prevails” canon was used to reach a result that, 
on its face, was inconsistent with results reached in Garrett v. Dils.453 The 
granting clause conveyed a 1/32 mineral interest. The subject-to clause 
provided for the conveyance of 1/4 of the royalties. The future lease clause 
conveyed a 1/4 mineral interest. In the blank space of the subject-to clause, 
                                                                                                                 
 447. See id. at 862. 
 448. See id. 
 449. 193 S.W.2d 971, 973 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1946, writ ref’d). 
 450. Id. at 973. 
 451. See supra part III (discussion of the use of canons in multiple fraction cases). 
 452. 315 S.W.2d 48 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1958, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
 453. 157 Tex. 92, 299 S.W.2d 904 (1957). 
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“Not leased” was written. The trial court admitted extrinsic evidence to 
show that the land was under lease. But the court of civil appeals reversed 
by applying the canon and stating that the deed was not ambiguous.454 
Consequently, the court reasoned that both the subject-to and future lease 
clauses should be ignored. This eliminated all references to the conveyed 
interest being 1/4 of the royalty.455 Perhaps the court made too much of the 
canon here since it would have been just as easy for the parties to have 
eliminated the entire subject-to clause if they so intended. Treating the 
words “not leased” as negating the provisions of the subject-to and future 
interest clauses overextended the usual logical basis for applying the 
canon.456 
In another inappropriate use of the canon, the court in Minchen v. 
Hirsch457 construed a royalty deed in which a “perpetual one-sixteenth 
(1/16) fee mineral royalty/out of our interest therein” was conveyed to the 
grantee.458  The term “out” was handwritten. The grantor owned only a 7/96 
interest. In earlier parts of the deed, the interest was described as a 1/16 of a 
1/4 interest, or a 1/64 royalty. The grantee claimed that the grantor 
conveyed a full 1/16 royalty out of his 7/96 mineral interest. The grantor 
claimed that he conveyed only a 1/64 royalty out of his 7/96 interest. The 
court found that the “typewritten prevails” canon, when applied to the term 
“out,” favors a finding that the 7/96 is the source of the grant and is not to 
                                                                                                                 
 454. 315 S.W.2d at 52. The minerals had been leased, but the lease was not 
acknowledged until after the deed had been executed. 
 455. Id. at 55. 
 456. See 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 157, § 340.2 n.11.1 (other criticisms of 
Gibson v. Watson); see also Hasty v. McKnight, 460 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. Civ. App.—
Texarkana 1970, writ ref’d n.r.e.). The Hasty court, in another multiple fraction clause case, 
did not actually cite the canon, however, it is clear that the court favored the handwritten 
intention clause over inconsistent provisions of the granting clause. See id. at 953. The 
granting clause ostensibly gave a 1/2 mineral interest, while a future lease clause reserved all 
of the executive power and the right to receive bonus to the grantor. The court, wishing to 
impart meaning to the intention clause, found that the parties conveyed a perpetual 1/2 of 
royalty interest. Id. The result seems to be at odds, not only with the clear language of the 
granting, subject-to, and future lease clauses, but also with the modern view that a mineral 
estate can be stripped of many of its constituent elements and still be considered a mineral 
estate. See Altman v. Blake, 712 S.W.2d 117, 118–19 (Tex. 1986). 
 457. 295 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1956, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Minchen was 
cited in Black v. Shell Oil Co., 397 S.W.2d 877, 886 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana, 1965, 
writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
 458. 295 S.W.2d at 532. This provision was in the intention clause. Neither the granting 
nor the habendum clauses included the word “out.” 
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be used as a reducing fraction.459 Practitioners might think that common 
sense would lead to a contrary result. The owner of a small fractional 
mineral interest transferred the equivalent of a 90 percent royalty interest. It 
is unlikely that the 7/96 mineral interest would be leased given the 
outstanding royalty of 6/96. The Minchen court also applied the canon that 
“intent prevails over technical rules of construction.”460 Yet, the court 
applied a canon leading to the creation of a 90 percent royalty interest.461 
The canon that gives greater weight to inserted matter over inconsistent 
printed matter is grounded in common sense and logic. By and large, the 
canon has been used widely in cases in which it is appropriate. However, in 
certain circumstances the courts have utilized the canon to interpret 
instruments in a way that the parties could never have intended. 
Nevertheless, the canon’s continued use should be encouraged because of 
the increasing dependence on printed forms.462 
e) “Earlier Provisions Prevail Over Later Provisions” Canon 
Courts have stated this infrequently cited canon as follows: “Wherever 
the first part of a deed is definite and certain and irreconcilable with later 
parts, the first part must prevail.”463 
One reason why this canon never caught on is reflected in the early case, 
Wallace v. Crow.464 The Wallace court treated this canon as a “well-known 
rule.” However, the court did not apply the canon because it chose to apply 
the harmonizing canon.465 Even when an anti-harmonizing canon is used 
the fact that one term or phrase occurs earlier should not be accorded any 
weight by the courts. Given the conflict between the harmonizing canon 
and the “greatest weight to the earliest provision” canons, the courts have 
                                                                                                                 
 459. Id. at 533. 
 460. Id. 
 461. See 1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 157, § 319 n.2 (further criticism of 
Minchen). 
 462. In Friedrich v. Amoco Prod. Co., 698 S.W.2d 748, 751 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 
1985, writ ref’d, n.r.e.), the court cited the canon, but did not apply the canon under the 
circumstances. The issue was whether the typewritten Pugh clause added to a “printed form 
lease” covered both horizontal and vertical severances. Because the issue was internal to all 
of the typewritten material, the Fredrich court held that no inconsistency existed between the 
typewritten material and the printed material. Id. at 754. While the canon was noted, it did 
not affect the court’s interpretation of the Pugh clause. 
 463. Benskin v. Barksdale, 246 S.W. 360, 363 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1923, holding 
approved). 
 464. 1 S.W. 372 (Tex. 1886). 
 465. Id. at 374. 
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justifiably refrained from using this canon, and in no case has this canon 
appeared important in the court’s ultimate resolution of an interpretational 
issue.466  
The “earlier provisions prevail” canon seemingly would apply to the 
“subject to” cases involving different fractions or mineral/royalty 
mischaracterizations. Yet, the canon appears to have been cited in only one 
such case, Kokernot v. Caldwell.467 In Kokernot, the granting clause 
conveyed a fractional mineral interest for a twenty-year fixed term. The 
mineral estate was previously leased, and the deed contained a “subject-to” 
clause. The grantee argued that as long as the lease was alive, the conveyed 
interest continued because the interest was made subject to the existing 
lease. Finding the granting clause provision limited the interest to twenty 
years and the subject-to clause apparently created a potentially longer-lived 
interest, the court invoked the “earlier clause prevails” canon to support its 
conclusion that the interest lasted twenty years.468 Under these 
circumstances, I concur in the court’s use of the canon. While the typical 
subject-to litigation involves disparate fractions or confusion as to minerals 
or royalties, this case involved a clear statement that the parties intended to 
transfer a term for years. Kokernot is another example of why subject-to 
clauses should probably be eliminated from most form deeds. The clauses 
are no longer necessary to convey the economic benefits of the lease, or to 
prevent the grantee from claiming a breach of warranty. 
VII. “Party” Canons 
The following canons are based upon a party’s status in relation to the 
written instrument. The canons, however, can be redundant when, for 
example, the lessee is the scrivener of the instrument. The courts could 
apply either the “construe against the scrivener” canon and the “construe 
against the lessee” canon. The Texas Supreme Court identified some of the 
                                                                                                                 
 466. See also Witt v. Harlan, 66 Tex. 660, 662, 2 S.W. 41, 42 (1886) (applying the 
“construe the entire instrument” canon with the “earlier clause controls” canon to interpret a 
deed). But cf. Cromwell v. Holliday, 34 Tex. 463, 468 (1870) (holding that restrictive 
language in the latter part of the deed controlled over the general language in the earlier part 
of the deed). 
 467. 231 S.W.2d 528, 532 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1950, writ ref’d). 
 468. Id. at 532. The court also supported its decision with the canon that one cannot give 
controlling effect to language in a deed that creates an ambiguity by destroying the 
previously written plain and clear language. Id. at 532 (quoting Cartwright v. Trueblood, 90 
Tex. 535, 39 S.W. 930 (1897)). 
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reasons for these types of canons in the context of rejecting the application 
of the Duhig rule to an oil and gas lease. The supreme court said: 
We know as a matter of common knowledge and experience that 
deeds are usually prepared by the grantor or by a scrivener of his 
choice under his direction. . . . If through carelessness or 
otherwise he executes a deed which purports to convey and 
which warrants title to an interest in property greater than he 
owns there is some moral justification for taking from him as 
much of the interest which he does own. . . . We also know as a 
matter of common knowledge and experience that mineral leases 
are usually prepared, or standard forms completed, by the 
lessee. . . . [The lessee] prepares and insists upon a lease which 
purports to convey the entire fee. . . . It is unthinkable and 
contrary to all modern experience . . . to suppose that one 
owning an interest in the mineral fee would lease that interest . . . 
with no intention of receiving any of the returns from 
production. . . .469 
A. “Construe Against the Scrivener” Canon 
The “construe against the scrivener” canon of construction has its roots 
in basic contract law.470 The canon is an allocation of the burden of 
uncertainty caused by the use of inapt language in a written instrument. To 
the extent the court can identify a party who has either drafted an 
instrument or has provided the particular form used, the canon requires that 
the uncertainty be resolved against that party. 
McBride v. Hutson471 is an excellent example of why the canon to 
construe “against the scrivener” should be used as opposed to the canons 
that “construe against lessees” or “grantors.” Coleman was the common 
source of the mineral estates claimed by the parties. McBride received a 1/3 
mineral estate upon the rendering of legal services to Coleman. The deed 
contained an unusual provision that, according to Hutson, made the mineral 
interest defeasible upon the execution of a five year primary term lease. A 
second issue was whether McBride received a 1/3 of 7/8 or 1/3 of 8/8 
interest. Both the trial court and the court of appeals concluded that a 
defeasible interest in 1/3 of 7/8 was conveyed. 
                                                                                                                 
 469. McMahon v. Christmann, 157 Tex. 403, 410, 303 S.W.2d 341, 346 (1957). 
 470. See cases cited in 14 TEX. JUR. 3d Contracts § 189 (1981). 
 471. 157 Tex. 632, 306 S.W.2d 888 (1957). 
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If the “normal” canon of “construing against the grantor” or “in favor of 
the grantee” was applied, the court would have found that a full 1/3 mineral 
estate had been conveyed. Instead, the court applied the more appropriate 
canon that the instrument be construed against the party who drafted the 
deed. The court stated: “Despite the general rule of construction favoring 
grantees, the grantors should be favored in this instance, where the 
instrument was obviously drawn by the grantees, who not only were 
lawyers but were actually representing the grantors in respect of the general 
subject matter.”472 Because the language describing the quantum of estate 
passed was unclear and capable of two reasonable constructions, the court 
used this canon to decide that the smaller of the interests actually passed. 
Thus, in this situation, the use of the canon was both outcome determinative 
and properly applied because the language created substantial doubt as to 
the intention of the parties. 
The contractual basis for the “construe against the scrivener” canon was 
shown in Investors Utility Corp. v. Challacombe.473  In Challacombe, the 
parties entered into an option contract. The mineral owners agreed to lease 
to Investors, if Investors, within specified time frames, hired a geologist to 
survey the tract, filed a report showing the probability of finding oil, and 
commenced the drilling of a well. In resolving the issue of whether the time 
limits were dependent or independent covenants, and consequently whether 
the option contract had terminated, the court identified Investors as the 
scrivener. Therefore, the Challacombe court applied the canon that the 
instrument is to be construed most strongly against the party preparing it.474 
Because the contract did not clearly state whether the time covenants were 
dependent or independent, the court used the canon to interpret the 
covenants as dependent.475 Upon the breach of a dependent covenant, the 
                                                                                                                 
 472. Id. at 891–92. 
 473. 39 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1931, no writ); see also United N. & S. Oil 
Co. v. Tiller, 283 S.W. 676 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1926, writ ref’d). The Tiller court, in 
interpreting an assignment contract for a lease, said: “[I]t is admitted by appellant that the 
contract which it seeks to specifically enforce was drawn by its own attorney in its own 
office and for its own benefit. Under such circumstances . . . , the contract should be strictly 
construed against appellant. Id. at 678. Challacombe was also followed in a contract for 
mineral deed situation. See Campbell v. Barber, 272 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort 
Worth 1954, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
 474. 39 S.W.2d at 179; see Phillips v. Western Union Tel. Co., 69 S.W. 63 (1902) (an 
earlier application of this canon in a contracts case). 
 475. See 39 S.W.2d at 179. 
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contractual obligations terminated. Therefore, the promise by the mineral 
owner to execute a lease was unenforceable.476  
In Hinson v. Noble,477 the court required that the language be deemed 
ambiguous before applying the “construe against the scrivener” canon, or 
any other canon. However, when the instrument is ambiguous: “[I]t will be 
construed most strongly against the party who drew or wrote it, and was 
responsible for the language used, especially where it provides for 
exemptions from liability in his favor.”478 
At issue in Hinson was the effective base date that triggered a time 
period by which the lessee had to elect to participate in the drilling of a 
second well. The court applied the ‘‘construe against the scrivener” canon, 
as well as several others, and found that the scrivener’s interpretation would 
not apply because the scrivener could have more clearly stated that the final 
acknowledgement date was the critical date.479 Again, the use of the canon 
was very appropriate because the scrivener was the party who could have 
designated the later date as the date against which the time limit would run. 
This same theme was also used in Gulf Production Co. v. Taylor480 to 
defeat a lessor’s claim that he was entitled to recover as royalty 1/8 of the 
market value of the casinghead gas produced under the lease. The lease 
expressly stated that on casinghead gas, the royalty was limited to four 
cents per MCF. Shortly after the lease was executed, the value of 
casinghead gas increased substantially because it could be converted into 
gasoline. In rejecting the claim that the royalty clause was to be “construed 
against the scrivener/lessee,” the court said: “We are of opinion that the 
provisions of the lease . . . are so plain and certain as not to require any 
                                                                                                                 
 476. See id. In Texas Co. v. Parks, 247 S.W.2d 179, 185 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 
1952, writ ref’d n.r.e.), the court would have applied the canon, but the record did not show 
who prepared the instrument or furnished the printed form. In Parks, the issue was whether 
the proportionate reduction clause would apply to the delay rental obligation. The court 
found that because the delay rental clause referred to “said lands,” the obligation was not to 
be reduced even though the lessor owned only a 1/2 mineral interest. Id. at 183. The Parks 
court also suggested another reason for applying the “construe against the scrivener” canon 
rather than one that designates a particular party. In traditional landlord/tenant situations, the 
canon used was “construe against the lessor,” because the lessor was also the grantor. Id. at 
185. However, in most landlord/tenant situations, the landlord is the scrivener of the lease. 
This canon was appropriately discarded in the oil and gas lease case because in most 
situations it is the lessee, not the lessor, who is the scrivener of the instrument. 
 477. 122 S.W.2d 1082, 1087 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1938, no writ). 
 478.  Id. at 1087 (quoting 10 TEX. JUR. Contracts § 162). 
 479.  See id. 
 480.  28 S.W.2d 914, 915 (Tex. Civ. App.—Eastland 1930, writ dism’d w.o.j.). 
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resort to the rule of strict construction against the lessee and in favor of the 
lessor. . . .”481 
B. “Construe Against the Lessee” Canon 
From an early date, Texas courts realized that the oil and gas lessee was 
usually the provider of the lease form, or the scrivener of the lease. Thus, in 
Emery v. League,482 the court differentiated the usual rule for leases, which 
is to construe against the lessor, and applied the rule that oil and gas leases 
were to be “construed most favorably for the lessor.”483 In Emery the court 
interpreted an early oil and gas lease as a type of option contract, whereby 
the lessee was obligated to faithfully perform the express developmental 
covenants within the designated time frame or lose his opportunity to 
become a lessee.484 
This canon has also been used to overcome a more general equitable 
maxim that “equity abhors forfeitures.” Again, in early lease forms, notice 
and cure provisions were often included. In Stephenson v. Calliham,485 the 
lessee ceased operations in the secondary term. The lessor filed suit seeking 
a decree of cancellation without providing the necessary sixty-day notice. 
While noting that “equity abhors forfeitures,” the court relied on the 
“construe in favor of the lessor” canon to support its view that upon the 
cessation of drilling operations in the secondary term, the lease 
automatically terminated under its express terms.486  
                                                                                                                 
 481.  Id. at 916. 
 482.  72 S.W. 603, 31 Tex. Civ. App. 474 (1903, writ ref’d). 
 483.  Id. at 607, 31 Tex. Civ. App. at 480. The Texas Supreme Court continued to treat 
and oil and gas leases differently, insofar as this canon is concerned. See Sirtex Oil Inc. v. 
Erigan, 403 S.W.2d 784, 788 n.2 (Tex. 1966). 
 484. 72 S.W. at 606, 31 Tex. Civ. App. at 479. 
 485. 289 S.W. 158 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1926, no writ). Four years later, in 
Gulf Prod. Co. v. Taylor, 28 S.W.2d 914, 916 (Tex. Civ. App.—Eastland 1930, writ dism’d 
w.o.j.), the court found that the “construe against the lessee” canon was not applicable 
because the language of the lease was plain and unambiguous and suggested that the canon’s 
general acceptance was still an open question. 
 486. 289 S.W. at 159. This view was followed in Frick-Reid Supply Corp. v. Meers, 52 
S.W.2d 115, 119 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1932, no writ). In an earlier case, Masterson v. 
Amarillo Oil, 253 S.W. 908, 914–15 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1923, writ dism’d w.o.j.), 
the court decided that even though the lease terms were to be construed “most strongly 
against the lessee,” a termination of the estate would not be issued because the lessor was 
estopped by his actions in accepting royalties and allowing development to continue from 
terminating the lease. 
For other early cases applying this canon, see Grubstake Inv. Ass’n v. Coyle, 269 S.W. 
854, 855 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1925, writ dism’d w.o.j.); Stephenson v. Stitz, 255 
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A proper use of this canon was additionally made in Zeppa v. Houston 
Oil Co. of Texas.487 At dispute was a small tract of land that was included in 
the description of two oil and gas leases. After carefully reading the 
respective descriptions, the court found that both of the interpretations 
proposed by the respective parties were reasonable.488 Therefore, in 
resolving the dispute, the court concluded that “it appears to be the settled 
rule in this state that of two or more equally reasonable constructions of 
which an oil and gas lease is susceptible the one more favorable to the 
lessor will be allowed to prevail.”489 The court supported this result with 
several other canons and the use of extrinsic evidence of post-lease 
behaviour. Having found two reasonable interpretations, the language was 
ambiguous. Therefore, extrinsic evidence was admissible. 
In Colby v. Sun Oil Co.,490 however, the court rejected the application of 
this canon in the interpretation of a dry hole clause. The lessee drilled a dry 
hole that was capped within one month of the beginning of the last year of 
the primary term. The dry hole clause provided that, upon the drilling of a 
dry hole during the primary term, the lease would not terminate ‘‘on or 
before any rental paying date next ensuing after the expiration of three 
months from the date of completion of dry hole” if lessee commenced 
additional drilling or re-working operations or commenced or resumed the 
payment or tender of rentals.491 On the anniversary date, the lessee failed to 
make any delay rental payment, and no drilling or re-working operations 
began within three months of either the completion of the dry hole or the 
anniversary date. The lessee did, however, commence the drilling of a new 
well prior to the end of the primary term. 
                                                                                                                 
S.W. 812, 813 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1923, writ dism’d w.o.j.); Moore v. West, 239 
S.W. 710, 714 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1922, writ dism’d w.o.j.); Bailey v. Williams, 
223 S.W. 311, 313 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1920, no writ). 
 487. 113 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1938, writ ref’d). 
 488. Id. at 615. 
 489. Id. The court only cited 31 Tex. Jur. 613 for that proposition. In Schwartz v. Prairie 
Producing Co., Inc., 727 S.W.2d 289, 293 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref’d 
n.r.e.), the court used the canon to choose an interpretation of a royalty clause that favored 
the lessor. The canon was used to deflect some earlier case law which found that under 
certain circumstances a gas well could be considered a mine for purposes of calculating 
royalty. Id. 
 490. 288 S.W.2d 221, 225 (Tex. Civ. App.—Galveston 1956, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
 491. Id. at 223. 
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In rejecting the application of the canon, the Colby court took a 
diametrically opposed position to Stephenson.492 The court refused to 
extend the canon to reach situations involving the “construction of special 
limitations or forfeiture provisions.”493 Yet, an unless lease, and its delay 
rental features, including dry hole clauses, created a fee simple 
determinable estate that automatically terminated. Consequently, a 
forfeiture was not involved. Colby clearly interpreted the dry hole clause as 
not creating a limitation that would automatically terminate the lessee’s 
interest. Furthermore, the court applied the general equitable maxim that 
“equity abhors forfeitures” to interpret the lease as not requiring either a 
payment or new operations if the dry hole was completed within three 
months of the last anniversary date in the primary term. 
C. “Construe Against the Grantor” Canon (sometimes referred to as 
“construe in favor of the grantee” canon) 
One of the earliest uses of the “construe against the grantor” canon 
occurred in Curdy v. Stafford.494 Curdy was a deed description case in 
which the court interpreted a deed executed as a substitute for a prior deed. 
The court stated: “The language of a deed is the language of the grantor, 
and, if there be a doubt as to its construction, it should be resolved against 
him.”495 
When the deed is drafted by the grantor, which is the usual case, 
constructional problems caused by inadequate drafting should not inure to 
                                                                                                                 
 492. Id. at 225. Stephenson applied the canon even when it meant that the lease had 
terminated. 
 493. Id. For other cases following the Colby rationale relating to the forfeiture issue and 
the non-applicability of the “construe against the lessee” canon, see York v. McBee, 308 
S.W.2d 951, 956 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1957, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Bouldin v. Gulf Prod. Co., 
5 S.W.2d 1019 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1928, writ dism’d w.o.j.). 
 494. 88 Tex. 120, 30 S.W. 551 (1895); see also City of Stamford v. King, 144 S.W.2d 
923, 926 (Tex. Civ. App.—Eastland 1940, writ ref’d) (finding that a deed conveyed a fee 
simple absolute rather than a fee simple determinable or an incorporeal hereditament). This 
canon can take many different forms. See generally Herd, supra note 62, at 653–54 
(discussing different forms of the canon). 
The “construe against the grantor” canon is another canon that was developed in the 
contract arena and borrowed by the courts to apply in deed construction cases. The canon 
was often stated to resolve contract construction cases in which there were two reasonable 
constructions of the contract. See 3 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 559 (1960 & Supp. 
1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1979). 
 495. 88 Tex. at 123, 30 S.W. at 552. The court also applied the “construe to validate” 
canon to find that the second deed’s description was adequate to pass title. Id.; see supra part 
IV.D. 
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the grantor’s benefit. The Curdy court used the term “doubt” to describe the 
condition precedent to the use of this canon. In later cases, the courts have 
unfortunately substituted the term “ambiguous,” which might suggest that 
the canon would apply only when the court made a determination of legal 
ambiguity, to allow the admission of extrinsic evidence.496 
One prominent example of this change in language is Hoffman v. 
Magnolia Petroleum Co.497 In Hoffman, the Commission of Appeals stated: 
“This deed, if its intention be ambiguous, is to be construed against grantors 
rather than against grantee.”498  
                                                                                                                 
 496. In Cartwright v. Trueblood, 90 Tex. 535, 39 S.W. 930 (1897), the court changed the 
term doubtful to ambiguous when it said: “If the language cannot be harmonized, from 
which an ambiguity arises in the deed so that it is susceptible of two constructions, that 
interpretation will be adopted which is most favorable to the grantee.” Id. at 538, 39 S.W. at 
931; see also Citizens Nat’l Bank in Abilene v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 136 Tex. 333, 338–39, 
150 S.W.2d 1003, 1006–07 (considering the contract as a whole and construing it in favor of 
the grantee), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 656 (1941); Heirs & Unknown Heirs of Barrow v. 
Champion Paper & Fibre Co., 327 S.W.2d 338, 364 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1959, writ 
ref’d n.r.e.) (holding that the use of the “construe against the grantor” canon was not 
sufficient to make a contract for sale valid when the description contained in the written 
instrument was insufficient to locate the parcel on the ground; Murphy v. Jamison, 117 
S.W.2d 127, 132 (Tex. Civ. App.— Beaumont 1938, writ ref’d) (using general rules of 
construction to resolve ambiguity in the deed in favor of the grantee); Crawford v. Spruill, 
187 S.W. 361, 364 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1916, writ ref’d) (holding that the 
construction most unfavorable to the grantor will be adopted when the intention is doubtful). 
 497. 273 S.W. 828 (Tex. 1925); see Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Harrison, 146 Tex. 216, 
224, 205 S.W.2d 355, 360 (1947) (citing Hoffman in dealing with a deed that made reference 
to an earlier mineral deed); see also King v. First Nat’l Bank of Wichita Falls, 144 Tex. 583, 
586–87, 192 S.W.2d 260, 262–63 (1946) (finding that the intention of the parties concerning 
a reservation in a deed was clearly expressed, therefore, construing the deed in favor of the 
grantor). 
 498. 273 S.W. at 829. The two opinions in Richardson v. Hart, 183 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. 
Civ. App.—Texarkana 1944), aff’d as reformed, 143 Tex. 392, 185 S.W.2d 563 (1945) 
illustrate the two different approaches that may apply if one requires the court to find the 
document ambiguous before applying the “construe against the grantor” canon. The court of 
civil appeals found the deed ambiguous because a conflict existed between the subject-to 
and future lease clauses. 183 S.W.2d at 235. The court then used the canon, as well as the 
conduct of the parties, to find that the future lease clause fraction controlled. Id. at 236. The 
supreme court, on the other hand, treated the deed as unambiguous and, without the use of 
any canons, found that Hoffman applied to create two different fractional grants. 143 Tex. at 
396, 185 S.W.2d at 564. The Richardson court affirmed the judgment because the original 
lease had expired; therefore, the fraction in the future lease clause was the fractional mineral 
interest reserved by the grantor. Id. at 396, 185 S.W.2d at 565; see also First Nat’l Bank in 
Dallas v. Kinabrew, 589 S.W.2d 137, 149 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tyler 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.) 
(holding that when the terms of the instrument are unambiguous, the question is merely one 
of law); Chestnut v. Casner, 42 S.W.2d 175, 178 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1931, writ ref’d) 
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To further confuse the proper application of this canon, the court in West 
v. Hermann,499 while interpreting a deed, argued that the “construe against 
the grantor” canon should not be used when the language is ambiguous. 
The court stated: “The rule that a deed must be construed most strongly 
against the grantor can have no application when its terms are ambiguous, 
and there is allegation that the parties to the contract used the language in a 
permissible but special sense.”500 In this case, the term “estate” caused the 
difficulty. Complicating the issue was the allegation that a bona fide 
purchaser was involved. The court’s findings were supportable without the 
court’s obfuscatory statements about the canon. If the language of the deed 
is clear, and specialized terms are used, no canons of construction are 
necessary. The “construe against the grantor” canon should only be 
employed when the language cannot be harmonized. The canon should 
never be used when the language is clear.501 
This restriction on the use of the “construe against the grantor” canon 
was expressed quite clearly in Arnold v. Ashbel Smith Land Co.502 The issue 
was whether a deed reserved a 1/4 royalty or a 1/4 of royalty. A blind 
application of the “construe against the grantor” canon would lead to a 
conclusion that a 1/4 of royalty was reserved. The court instead found that a 
1/4 royalty interest was reserved and made the following statement about 
the use of the “construe against the grantor” canon: 
The rule of strict construction against the grantor is resorted to 
only to resolve ambiguity and as an aid by legal presumption to 
arriving at intent. It is not applicable in the absence of ambiguity, 
                                                                                                                 
(declining to apply any rules of construction when the “intention [of the parties] appears 
from the language of the deed”). 
While the Hoffman court had changed the term doubtful to ambiguous, the Texas 
Supreme Court, in Bumpass v. Bond, 131 Tex. 266, 271, 114 S.W.2d 1172, 1174 (1938), 
continued to use the original language in Curdy when it applied the canon. The court applied 
the canon to determine if an entire or a fractional share of a mineral interest was conveyed to 
the grantee. 
 499. 104 S.W. 428, 431, 47 Tex. Civ. App. 131 (1907, no writ). 
 500. Id. at 431–32, 47 Tex. Civ. App. at 139. 
 501. For example, in Gex v. Texas Co., 337 S.W.2d 820, 822–23 (Tex. Civ. App.—
Amarillo 1960, writ ref’d n.r.e.), a modification of a mineral deed increased the grantor’s 
royalty interest in exchange for the grantor giving the grantee the right to communitize the 
grantor’s reserved interest. While noting the existence of the “construe against the grantor” 
canon, the court found that the modification deed clearly made the increased royalty 
dependent on the communitization of the grantor’s interest. Id. at 827. Because no 
communitization occurred, no increase in royalty payments was due. Id. 
 502. 307 S.W.2d 818, 824 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston 1957, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
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and even in its presence is never used as a hypercritical and 
overly literal tool to override the manifest object and purpose of 
the language of writings. The rule is but a canon of construction 
and is subordinate to the requirement that every part of a deed 
should be harmonized and given effect where possible so as to 
effectuate the intention of the parties.503 
Other than the confusion with the use of the term “ambiguous,” the 
Houston court was right on point in dealing with the problems of relying on 
canons to replace rational thought when reading a written instrument. The 
Arnold court also clearly subordinated the use of the “construe against the 
grantor’’ canon to the “harmonizing” canon. This prioritization, while 
probably appropriate, has not received widespread judicial support.504 
In some cases, the courts described the canon so that the construction 
“most favorable to the grantee” was to be given to the language.505 For 
example, in a deed that contained conflicting signals as to whether the 
grantee was to receive 1/2 of the 1/8 royalty for the life of an existing lease 
or a perpetual 1/16 royalty, the court found that the “general rule . . . 
requires that the deed be construed in the light most favorable to the 
grantee.”506 
                                                                                                                 
 503. Id. at 824 (citing Alexander Schroeder Lumber Co. v. Corona, 288 S.W.2d 829, 833 
(Tex. Civ. App.—Galveston 1956, writ ref’d n.r.e.)); see also Citizens Nat’l Bank in Abilene 
v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 136 Tex. 333, 338, 150 S.W.2d 1003, 1006 (stating that “it is the 
intention and purpose of the contracting parties, as disclosed by the instrument, which 
should control”), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 656 (1941). 
 504. In addition to the cases cited supra note 503, this prioritization is only evident in 
Hedick v. Lone Star Steel Co., 277 S.W.2d 925, 928–29 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1955, 
writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
 505. See Tenneco Oil Co. v. Alvord, 416 S.W.2d 385, 389 (Tex. 1967) (following the 
“construe in favor of the grantee” canon in interpreting a release of certain leasehold 
interests); Right of Way Oil Co. v. Glayds City Oil, Gas & Mfg. Co., 106 Tex. 94, 103, 157 
S.W. 737, 739 (1913) (deciding whether a possessory or non-possessory interest was 
conveyed by the grantor); see also Settegast v. Foley Bros, 114 Tex. 452, 455, 270 S.W. 
1014, 1016 (1925) (using the “construe in favor of grantee” canon to construe restrictive 
clauses in favor of free and unrestricted use of the leasehold); Collier v. Callaway, 140 
S.W.2d 910, 913 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1940, writ ref’d) (applying the “construe in 
favor of grantee” canon to reservations in oil and gas deed). 
 506. McGuire v. Bruce, 332 S.W.2d 110, 111–12 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1959, writ 
ref’d). McGuire cited the following cases to support the use of the “construe in favor of the 
grantee” canon: Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Harrison, 146 Tex. 216, 205 S.W.2d 355 (1947); 
Hoffman v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 273 S.W. 828 (Tex. 1925); Cartwright v. Trueblood, 
90 Tex. 535, 39 S.W. 930 (1897). 
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This canon is often used with the greatest estate canon. For example, in 
Young v. Rudd,507 the issue was whether the language was sufficient to 
convey an interest in land. The court found that the use of the word “give” 
evinced sufficient intent to have the described interest pass to the grantee. 
The Young court noted first that if the language of a deed is doubtful, the 
court will read the deed to pass the greatest estate. The court then followed 
with the “construe against the grantor” canon to justify its holding that an 
instrument giving “ten percent of all future payments of rentals or 
royalties . . . on any of said land” transferred a 10 percent royalty interest.508 
The use of the greatest estate and “construe against the grantor’’ canons 
created confusion for the courts where the grantors reserved or excepted 
mineral interests by referring to non-existent or “phantom” prior 
reservations. In Pich v. Lankford,509 the grantees argued that, under the 
greatest estates and “construe against the grantor” canons, they were 
entitled to receive a fractional share of the mineral estate. The deeds 
referred to reserving all of the minerals because the minerals did “not 
belong to the grantors herein.” The prior reservations were actually royalty 
instead of mineral interests. Therefore, the grantors did own part of the 
mineral estate. The supreme court rejected the use of these two canons and 
concluded, without the use of any canon, that the language of the 
                                                                                                                 
 507. 226 S.W.2d 469, 472 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1950, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
 508. Id. at 470. For other cases using both the greatest estate and “construe against the 
grantor” canon, see Hoffman v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 273 S.W. 828, 829 (Tex. 1925); 
Fleming Found, v. Texaco, Inc., 337 S.W.2d 846, 851 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1960, writ 
ref’d n.r.e.); Allen v. Creighton, 131 S.W.2d 47, 50 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1939, writ 
ref’d); Clemmens v. Kennedy, 68 S.W.2d 321, 323 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1934, writ 
ref’d). 
An analogous situation arises when the deed is unclear as to whether the interest being 
conveyed is corporeal or incorporeal. A number of early decisions used the “construe against 
the grantor” and greatest estate canons to find that deeds from individuals to railroad 
companies conveyed a corporeal interest rather than an incorporeal easement. See, e.g., 
Stevens v. Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry., 212 S.W. 639, 643 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1919, judgm’t 
adopted). But see Lockwood v. Ohio River Ry., 103 F. 243 (4th Cir. 1900) (granting only an 
easement), cert. denied, 180 U.S. 637 (1901). 
These two canons were also used in early cases to find that an instrument was an effective 
deed conveying a property interest, rather than a mere quitclaim or other instrument. See, 
e.g., Roswurm v. Sinclair Prairie Oil Co., 181 S.W.2d 736, 743–44 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort 
Worth 1944, writ ref’d w.o.m.); Hunt v. Evans, 233 S.W. 854, 857 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 
1921, writ ref’d); see also Right of Way Oil Co. v. Gladys City Oil, Gas & Mfg. Co., 106 
Tex. 94, 103, 157 S.W. 737, 739 (1913) (using “construe against the grantor” canon to hold 
that only an easement was granted). 
 509. 157 Tex. 335, 339, 302 S.W.2d 645, 648 (1957). 
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reservation clause clearly showed an intent to reserve a 3/4 mineral interest, 
even if the grantors did own it at the time of the conveyance.510 
Notwithstanding the Pich decision, the combination of greatest estate 
and “construe against the grantor” canons was used in Ladd v. DuBose511 to 
deal with a mineral deed that referred to an erroneous prior reservation of a 
1/4 mineral interest. The grantor reserved an additional 1/4 mineral interest 
and the intention clause referred to the conveyed interest as a 1/2 mineral 
interest. The court used these two canons to support its conclusion that, 
notwithstanding the reference to a 1/2 mineral interest being granted, the 
deed actually conveyed a 3/4 mineral interest.512 The Ladd court 
distinguished Pich because of the different language in the reservations. 
While the clauses are different, they both have the same effect of referring 
to prior reserved interests, not then owned by the grantor. It is hard to 
reconcile the use of the two canons in Ladd with the Pich court’s rejection 
of the canons’ use. 
In a recent case, Large v. T. Mayfield, Inc.,513 the court of appeals 
seemed to follow the Pich rejection of the “construe against the grantor” 
canon. The grantors conveyed a tract of land described as being ‘‘all the 
Surface Rights . . . (The Mineral Rights thereunder being reserved and now 
owned by. . . .)” to the Veterans Land Board. The grantor previously 
conveyed royalty, not mineral interests. Following Ladd and applying the 
“construe against the grantor” and greatest estate canons the result favors 
the grantee. The Large court, however, mentioned the greatest estate canon, 
but relied on the four corners canon to limit the grant to the surface, even 
though there were no previously conveyed mineral estates.514 
                                                                                                                 
 510. Id. at 340, 302 S.W.2d at 650. 
 511. 344 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1961, no writ). 
 512. Id. The court’s major emphasis was on the need for the grantor to clearly state any 
reservation. The court said: “A reservation of minerals, to be effective, must be by clear 
language. Courts do not favor reservations by implication.” Id. at 479 (citing Sharp v. 
Fowler, 151 Tex. 490, 494, 252 S.W.2d 153, 154 (1952)). This position is clearly in accord 
with the greatest estate and “construe against the grantor” canons. See also Chestnut v. 
Casner, 42 S.W.2d 175, 178 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1931, writ ref’d) (finding that when 
confronted by an ambiguity in a deed capable of two constructions, a court will adopt the 
one most favorable to the grantee). But cf. Mathews v. Myers, 42 S.W.2d 1099, 1101 (Tex. 
Civ. App.—Austin 1931, no writ) (finding, without the use of the twin canons, that when a 
“phantom” reservation was mentioned in the deed, the grantor, not the grantee, owned the 
fractional interests). 
 513. 646 S.W.2d 292, 294 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
 514. Id. at 294. 
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In Miller v. Melde,515 a recent phantom reservation case, the court 
distinguished Pich. Miller, who owned the entire surface and minerals 
conveyed to Bergstrom, reserving a fifteen year term for years in 1/2 of the 
minerals and referring erroneously to a prior like reservation. Bergstrom 
then conveyed to Melde and reserved a similar term for years and an 
additional 1/4 of royalty interest. The intention clause provided that the 
grantee was to receive a 1/2 interest in the minerals and a 1/4 of royalty 
interest. No mention was made of the reversion following the end of the 
term for years.516 Relying on the greatest estate canon, the court found that 
Melde received all of the mineral interest and 3/4 of the royalty interest, 
notwithstanding the intention clause’s reference to a grant of a 1/2 mineral 
interest.517 The court distinguished Pich based on the language referring to 
the phantom interest. In Pich, the phantom interest was saved and excepted 
in the deed. In Miller, the grant was made subject-to the phantom interest. 
In Miller, the grantor purported to transfer the entire interest, while in Pich 
the grantor did not so purport. As Professor Ed Horner correctly stated: 
“This is another apt illustration that in a conveyance it is not so much what 
you write, but how it is written.”518 
In Farmers Canal Co. v. Potthast,519 the tendency to mix and match 
canons was evident as the court attempted to resolve a multiple fraction 
problem. The issue was whether a deed conveyed a 1/4 of royalty interest or 
a fixed 1/4 of 1/8 royalty interest. The granting clause language evinced an 
intent to give a 1/4 of royalty, but following clauses evinced an intent to 
convey a 1/4 of 1/8 royalty. The court cited at least seven different canons, 
                                                                                                                 
 515. 730 S.W.2d 12, 13 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1987, no writ). 
 516. Id. at 12. In a case involving what happens to the possibility of reverter following a 
defeasible term royalty interest, the court in Monroe v. Scott, 707 S.W.2d 132, 134 (Tex. 
App.—Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.), concluded that it was conveyed in a partition 
deed that did not specifically reserve or except that interest. The court cited the greatest 
estate canon in support of the holding. The deed expressly reserved the defeasible term 
royalty interest. The grant of an interest subject-to a defeasible term interest transfers the 
possibility of reverter to the grantee. See also Bagby v. Bredthauer, 627 S.W.2d 190, 197 
(Tex. App.— Austin 1981, no writ) (including the possibility of reverter in any conveyance 
that does not expressly exclude or except it). 
 517. 730 S.W.2d at 13. 
 518. Discussion Notes, 96 Oil & Gas Rep. 156, 157 (Matthew Bender 1988). For a case 
which found that the term “save and except” was not sufficient to reserve an interest, see 
Moore v. Rotello, 719 S.W.2d 372, 376 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref’d 
n.r.e.). 
 519. 587 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Civ. App.—Corpus Christi 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
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but in one sentence, the Potthast court combined the “construe against the 
grantor” clause with three other canons. The court said: 
It is also well settled that should there be any doubt in 
ascertaining the intention of the parties as their intention is 
expressed in the deed in its entirety, that doubt, after considering 
the deed from its four corners, should be resolved against the 
grantors, whose language it is, and the deed must be construed 
most favorably to the grantee, as conveying to him the largest 
estate permissible within the language of the deed.520 
Without much explanation as to which of the cited canons was to be 
controlling, the court gave controlling weight to the granting clause and 
found the deed conveyed a 1/4 of royalty interest.521 The Potthast result is 
certainly consistent with the “construe against the grantor” canon, but it is 
also consistent with the “repugnant to the grant” canon that was later 
adopted in Alford.522 
The “construe against the grantor” canon has a checkered history in cases 
involving multiple fraction issues.523 As discussed above, the canon was 
used in Hoffman. For example, both the “construe against the grantor” and 
greatest estate canons were used in Garrett v. Dils Co.524 to support the 
conclusion that a larger fractional mineral estate was transferred to the 
grantee.525 
Yet, in Davis v. Andrews,526 the same two canons were used to give 
greater weight to the granting clause because of a conflict between the 
granting and warranty clauses. The language in the granting clause did not 
                                                                                                                 
 520. Id. at 808. 
 521. Id. at 808–09. 
 522. For other cases combining the “construe against the grantor” and “repugnant to the 
grant” canons, see Lott v. Lott, 370 S.W.2d 463, 465 (Tex. 1963); Waters v. Ellis, 158 Tex. 
342, 347, 312 S.W.2d 231, 234 (1958); Mercer v. Bludworth, 715 S.W.2d 693, 701 (Tex. 
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
 523. See generally supra part III (discussing the use of canons in multiple fraction cases). 
 524. 157 Tex. 92, 95, 299 S.W.2d 904, 906 (1957); see also Gibson v. Watson, 315 
S.W.2d 48, 53, 56 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1958, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (citing the “construe 
against the grantor” canon but disagreeing with Garrett and agreeing with Alford in dealing 
with a multiple grant deed). 
 525. The Texas Supreme Court said: “[S]hould there be any doubt as to the proper 
construction of the deed, that doubt should be resolved against the grantors, whose language 
it is, and be held to convey the greatest estate permissible under its language.” 157 Tex. at 
95, 299 S.W.2d at 906. A conflict between the granting and future lease clauses created the 
differing fractional mineral estates. 
 526. 361 S.W.2d 419, 425 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1962, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
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limit the extent of the conveyed estate, yet, the warranty limited the estate 
to a twenty-year term for years. The court gave precedence to the granting 
clause, relying primarily on the “construe against the grantor” and greatest 
estate canons.527 The result is consistent with the canons, but not the two 
grant theory that underlies the majority opinion in Garrett.528 
The underlying rationale for this canon is that the scrivener, who is 
usually the grantor, should be responsible for the lack of clarity in the use 
of the language. As noted earlier, that is why I prefer the use of the 
“construe against the scrivener” canon.529 In cases where the grantee is the 
scrivener, or both parties are equally responsible for the drafting of the 
instrument, this canon should not apply.530 Unfortunately, in several Texas 
cases, the courts acknowledged that the grantee was the scrivener, but 
nonetheless, construed the instrument against the grantor.531 Allen v. 
Creighton532 is sometimes cited for the proposition that courts construe in 
favor of the grantee in all cases. While it was clear that the grantee’s father-
in-law, who was an attorney, drafted the instrument, the facts suggested that 
the grantor was the attorney’s client. Although a familial relationship 
existed between the scrivener and the grantee, the scrivener was the 
attorney for the grantor.533 Thus, even with a potential conflict of interest, 
Allen did not support the general proposition that where the scrivener is 
                                                                                                                 
 527. Id. at 423. Davis is one of those cases in which the court cites too many canons, 
most of which are unnecessary to support the court’s conclusion. At one point, the court lists 
four different variations of the “construe against the grantor” and greatest estate canons. See 
id. at 423; see infra note 538. 
 528. The “construe against the grantor” canon was used in the court of appeals decision 
in Alford, but was not mentioned in the supreme court decision. Krum v. Alford, 653 S.W.2d 
464, 465–66 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1982), rev’d, 671 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1984). 
Likewise, the court of appeals decision in Luckel used the canon, but it was not mentioned in 
the supreme court decision. Luckel v. White, 792 S.W.2d 485, 488 (Tex. App.—Houston 
[14th Dist.] 1990), rev’d, 819 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. 1991). 
 529. See supra text accompanying note 471. 
 530. See, e.g., McBride v. Hutson, 157 Tex. 632, 637, 306 S.W.2d 888, 891 (1957). 
 531. See, e.g., McGuire v. Bruce, 332 S.W.2d 110, 113 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 
1959, writ ref’d). In McGuire, the court said: “And the cases are legion in which it has been 
unqualifiedly said that the language of a deed is to be construed in the light most favorable to 
the grantee.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 532. 131 S.W.2d 47 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1939, writ ref’d). 
 533. Id. at 49. There were some allegations of fraud and failure of consideration because 
the royalty deed was allegedly in exchange for the father-in-law’s provision of legal services 
for the grantor. Id. 
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known to be the grantee, the “construe against the grantor” canon 
applies.534 
In Clemmens v. Kennedy,535 an attorney for the grantee was the scrivener 
of a deed. The grantor owned only a 1/2 mineral interest.  The granting 
clause of the deed conveyed a 1/2 mineral interest. The grantor argued that 
he intended to transfer a 1/4 interest or 1/2 of his 1/2 interest to pay off a 
note to the grantee.536 While not necessarily supporting the result, the 
Clemmens court cited the “construe against the grantor” canon to find that a 
full 1/2 mineral interest was conveyed.537 
D. Greatest Estate Canon 
As noted in the previous subsection, many courts apply the “construe 
against the grantor” canon and the greatest estate canon.538 The canons 
                                                                                                                 
 534. See id. at 50. The dispute in Alien was whether a deed conveyed a 1/64 royalty or a 
1/64 of 1/8 royalty. The granting clause clearly described the conveyed interest as 1/8 of 1/8 
while the subject-to clause described the interest as “one-eighth (1/8) of the 1/8 of each, any 
and all other royalties.” The court used only the greatest estate and “construe in favor of the 
grantee” canons to support its conclusion that the language of the granting clause should 
prevail. Id. at 49–50; see also Arnold v. Ashbel Smith Land Co., 307 S.W.2d 818, 824 (Tex. 
Civ. App.—Houston 1957, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (stating that nothing was in the record to show 
that the trial court did not use the “construe in favor of the grantee” or greatest estate canon). 
 535. 68 S.W.2d 321, 322 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1934, writ ref’d). 
 536. Id. at 322–23. The grantor also sought reformation of the deed to reflect a 1/2 of 1/2 
transfer. The court found that mutual mistake was not proven by the grantor. Id. at 323–24. 
 537. Id. at 323. In McGuire v. Bruce, 332 S.W.2d 110, 113 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 
1959, writ ref’d) the court “assumes” that the grantee’s attorney in Hoffman was probably 
the scrivener of the deed. In Hoffman v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 273 S.W. 828, 829 (Tex. 
Comm’n App. 1925, holding approved), the Texas Commission of Appeals did not 
recognize that fact in its opinion, but clearly used the “construe against the grantor” canon. 
McGuire is also supportive of the “construe against the grantor” canon, even when it is 
alleged that the grantee is the scrivener. 322 S.W.2d at 112–13. 
 538. In Davis v. Andrews, 361 S.W.2d 419, 423 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1962, writ 
ref’d n.r.e.) the court listed four different iterations of the “construe against the grantor” 
canon. They were: 
 (1) A deed will be construed to convey upon the grantee the greatest estate 
that the terms of the instrument will permit. 
 (2) It is a principle of universal application that grants are liberally, 
exceptions strictly, construed against the grantor. 
 (3) Another applicable rule is that should there be any doubt as to the proper 
construction of the deed, that doubt should be resolved against the grantors, 
whose language it is, and be held to convey the greatest estate permissible 
under its language. 
 (4) Where a deed is capable of two constructions the one most favorable to 
the grantee and which conveys the largest interest the grantor could convey will 
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favor the grantee so that the largest estate, both in terms of duration and 
area, will be conveyed when the language is in doubt. As with many other 
canons, the origin of the greatest estate canon is Hancock v. Butler.539 In 
determining whether the grantor conveyed a life estate or a fee simple 
absolute, the court said: “The rule, then, that courts will confer the greatest 
estate on the grantee that the terms of the grant will permit, must 
necessarily be subordinate to the rule that every part of the deed should be 
harmonized and given effect to, if it can be done.”540 In the context of 
determining the duration of the estate, the court established a canon that 
would apply only after an attempt was made to harmonize all of the 
language within the four corners of the instrument. 
Cartwright v. Trueblood541 cited Hancock as authority for a case 
involving the quantum and area of a conveyance.542 The result was 
                                                                                                                 
be adopted. 
Id. at 423 (quoting Ladd v. Dubose, 344 S.W.2d, 480 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1961, no 
writ). This list clearly constitutes canon overkill. The issue in Davis was fairly simple. Did 
the grantors convey a twenty-year term for years or a fee simple absolute? The twenty-year 
term language appeared in the warranty clause while the granting and habendum clause had 
no such limitations. Davis is an example of a court not relying on the statutory presumption 
in TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.001 (Vernon 1984) that the grantor intended to pass a fee 
simple absolute. See infra note 540. The court concluded that the twenty-year term language 
applied only to the warranty and not to the estate that was conveyed. 361 S.W.2d at 425. 
 539. 21 Tex. 804 (1858). 
 540. Id. at 816. It is interesting to note that in more recent cases, when the issue has been 
the duration of the estate, the statutory presumption that a fee simple absolute is conveyed 
unless there is express language to the contrary, is rarely cited. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 
5.001 (Vernon 1984). The statutory antecedents of this presumption date back to 1839. 
 541. 90 Tex. 535, 39 S.W. 930 (1897). For other early cases embracing the greatest estate 
canon, see Davis v. Skipper, 125 Tex. 364, 83 S.W.2d 318 (1935); Stanbery v. Wallace, 45 
S.W.2d 198 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1932, holding approved); Arden v. Boone, 187 S.W. 995 
(Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1916), aff’d, 221 S.W. 265 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1920, holding 
approved); Merriman v. Blalack, 121 S.W. 552, 56 Tex. Civ. App. 594 (1909, writ ref’d). 
 542. 90 Tex. at 538, 39 S.W. at 931. In Spell v. Hanes, 139 S.W.2d 229, 230 (Tex. Civ. 
App.—Texarkana 1940, writ dism’d judgm’t cor.), the court interpreted a deed to determine 
if it conveyed a 1/4 interest in all of the minerals or merely a 1/4 interest in the 5/8 minerals 
owned by the grantors. The court, without stating that it was applying the harmonizing 
canon, attempted to harmonize and concluded that a 1/4 interest in all of the minerals was 
conveyed. Id. at 230–31. The court then stated that even if the court had determined that the 
deed was ambiguous, a different result would not be warranted because the court would then 
apply the greatest estate canon. Id. at 230. The use of the greatest estate canon should not be 
predicated on a finding that the deed is legally ambiguous, but only on a finding that after 
trying to harmonize, the language is still unclear. See also Curdy v. Stafford, 88 Tex. 120, 
124, 30 S.W. 551, 552 (1895) (holding that a part owner’s interest in part of a certificate 
means all interest in the part owned by him); Hasty v. McKnight, 460 S.W.2d 949, 953 (Tex. 
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consistent with the use of the greatest estate canon, but the court stated that 
it only harmonized the conflicting descriptions within the deed.543 Thus, 
Cartwright followed the Hancock lead in requiring a court to harmonize 
first, and then if there remained some doubt, utilize the greatest estate 
canon. 
The Texas Supreme Court continued to require harmonizing as a 
condition precedent to the use of the greatest estate canon. For example, in 
Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co. v. Masterson,544 a deed containing a call for 
acreage was more restrictive than other parts of the granting clause. By 
using the greatest estate canon the court construed the deed to ignore the 
call for acreage and transfer the larger quantum of mineral interests.545 
When a deed used language indicating that it conveyed either a vested 
remainder with a retained life estate, or merely a trust for the benefit of the 
grantors, the court applied the greatest estate canon to support the 
conclusion that the grantees received a vested remainder.546 Likewise, when 
the conflicting language was between the conveyance of a mineral and a 
leasehold estate, the courts have used the greatest estate canon to conclude 
that a mineral, rather than a leasehold estate, has been transferred.547 When 
a deed can be construed to pass either a corporeal estate subject-to an 
easement, or an easement, only the court in Bolton v. Dyck Oil Co.548 
                                                                                                                 
Civ. App.—Texarkana 1970, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (concluding that when provisions of a deed 
can not be harmonized and the language leaves the grantor’s intention unclear, the deed will 
be construed to convey the greatest estate). 
 543. 90 Tex. at 538, 39 S.W. at 931. While the court said it was harmonizing, it really 
looks as if the court was giving greater weight to the granting clause. The granting clause 
described the subject matter of the conveyance as two parcels, one containing 640 acres and 
the other 320 acres. The conflicting language later in the deed described the parcels as being 
1/2 of two parcels which would have been only 320 and 160 acres respectively. 
In some later cases the language of the greatest estate canon was slightly changed to: “The 
rule is too well established to admit of debate that a deed must be construed most favorably 
to the grantee so as to confer the largest estate which a fair interpretation of its terms wilt 
admit.” Gladewater County Line Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Hughes, 59 S.W.2d 351, 353 (Tex. Civ. 
App.—Texarkana), aff’d, 124 Tex. 190, 76 S.W.2d 471 (1933). 
 544. 160 Tex. 548, 551–52, 334 S.W.2d 436, 438–39 (1968). 
 545. See id. 
 546. See, e.g., Clark v. Wisdom, 403 S.W.2d 877, 882 (Tex. Civ. App.—Corpus Christi 
1966, writ ref’d n.r.e.). The greatest estate canon has also been used to find that a 
conveyance is a fee simple absolute with a covenant rather than a fee simple subject to a 
condition subsequent with a power of termination. See Dilbeck v. Bill Gaynier, Inc., 368 
S.W.2d 804, 806 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1963, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
 547. See, e.g., Gex v. Texas Co., 337 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1960, writ 
ref’d n.r.e.). 
 548. 114 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1938, writ dism’d). 
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applied the greatest estate canon to support the conclusion that the grantor 
received a corporeal estate. 
The canon was inappropriately used by the court in Fleming Foundation 
v. Texaco, Inc.549 when it determined that a reservation of oil, gas, and other 
minerals did not include the subsurface water. The issue of what is or is not 
a mineral within either a grant or reservation should not be resolved through 
the use of the greatest estate canon. The court supported the holding that 
subsurface water was not a mineral under various tests, including the 
“ordinary and plain meaning” test, thus making the use of the canon 
surplusage.550 As with the multiple grant case, the outcome of whether 
subsurface water is or is not a mineral should not depend on whether it was 
granted or reserved. 
The greatest estate canon also has been used to resolve problems relating 
to the transfer of royalty interests. For example, in Allen v. Creighton,551 a 
granting clause referred to the interest as a 1/8 of 1/8 royalty, while 
subsequent clauses referred to the interest as 1/8 of 1/8 of the 1/8 royalty. 
The court applied a combination of the greatest estate and “construe against 
the grantor” canons to find that a 1/64 royalty was conveyed, after finding 
that a harmonizing of the conflicting fractional signals was unsuccessful.552 
However, when a court can harmonize conflicting signals, the court is not 
required to use the greatest estate canon. 
In Arnold v. Ashbel Smith Land Co.,553 the reservation was either a 1/4 of 
royalty or 1/4 of 1/8 royalty. If the greatest estate canon was used, the 
reservation should have been the smaller fraction. However, the court found 
that by harmonizing the provisions of the reservation, it was clear that the 
parties intended to reserve a 1/4 of royalty interest.554 
Discrepancies between fractions can also arise because textual language, 
on its face, modifies a clear fractional grant. In Bryan v. Thomas,555 the 
granting clause provided in part that: “Grantor . . . do grant, bargain . . . 
unto said Grantee an undivided one-twelfth (l/12th) (same being a l/12th of 
                                                                                                                 
 549. 337 S.W.2d 846, 851 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1960, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
 550. Id. at 852. 
 551. 131 S.W.2d 47, 48–59 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1939, writ ref’d); see Farmers 
Canal Co. v. Potthast, 587 S.W.2d 805, 808 (Tex. Civ. App.—Corpus Christi 1979, writ 
ref’d n.r.e.) (reaching a similar result as Allen); supra notes 520-523 and accompanying text. 
 552. 131 S.W.2d at 50–51. 
 553. 307 S.W.2d 818, 820–21 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston 1957, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
 554. Id. at 824. 
 555. 359 S.W.2d 131 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1962), aff’d on other grounds, 365 
S.W.2d 628 (Tex. 1963). 
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the customary l/8th royalty, or l/96th of total production) interest in and to 
all the oil, gas and other minerals in and under. . . .”556 The heirs of the 
grantor argued that a 1/96 mineral interest was conveyed, while the grantee 
argued that a 1/12 mineral interest was conveyed. The court found that the 
fractions used in the deed were consistent with the grant of a 1/12 mineral 
estate, except for the parenthetical cited above, which might be construed to 
give only a 1/96 royalty.557 The court found no support for the grantor’s 
reading that a 1/96 mineral interest was conveyed and subsequently used 
the greatest estate canon to resolve any potential doubts against the 
grantor’s interpretation.558 
The greatest estate canon also has been used by courts to deal with the 
multiple grant problem. While Hoffman did cite the “construe against the 
grantor” canon, it did not cite the greatest estate canon.559 The greatest 
estate canon was cited, however, in Garrett v. Dils Co.560 as additional 
support for the conclusion that the grantee received the larger fraction 
contained in the future lease clause. The multiple fraction problem is 
probably an inappropriate forum for the use of the greatest estate canon. If 
the canon were used, the outcome would depend on whether the larger or 
smaller fraction was in the granting, subject-to, or future lease clauses and 
whether the fractional interest was reserved or granted. Because widespread 
use of the multiple grant form exists, a more uniform approach to resolving 
these issues should be taken rather than resorting to the greatest estate 
canon. Neither Alford, Luckel, or Snow used the greatest estate canon.561 
                                                                                                                 
 556. 359 S.W.2d at 132. 
 557. Id. at 133. 
 558. Id. 
 559. See Hoffman v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 273 S.W. 828, 829–30 (Tex. 1925). In 
Clemmens v. Kennedy, 68 S.W.2d 321, 323 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1934, writ ref’d), 
the court inferred that Hoffman used the greatest estate canon. Clemmens involved a deed in 
which the grantor claimed that he intended to transfer only 1/2 of his 1/2 mineral interest. 
The language of the deed was read as transferring the entire 1/2 mineral interest owned by 
the grantor, in part, supported by the court’s use of the “greatest estate” canon. Id. 
 560. 157 Tex. 92, 95, 299 S.W.2d 904, 906 (1957); see also Waters v. Ellis, 158 Tex. 
342, 347, 312 S.W.2d 231, 234 (1958) (citing Garrett in stating that “[a] deed will be 
construed to confer upon the grantee the greatest estate that the terms of the instrument will 
permit”). 
 561. See Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 819 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. 1991); Luckel v. White, 819 
S.W.2d 459 (Tex. 1991); Alford v. Krum, 671 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1984). In a somewhat 
unusual use of canons of construction the court of appeals in Richardson v. Hart, 183 
S.W.2d 235 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1944), aff’d as reformed, 143 Tex. 392, 185 
S.W.2d 563 (1945), found the deed ambiguous and admitted extrinsic evidence, namely the 
conduct of the parties, to interpret the deed. 183 S.W.2d at 236–37. The grantee was 
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As with the “construe against the grantor” canon, courts have used the 
greatest estate canon to support findings that when the grantor refers to 
“phantom” reserved interests, the grantee receives the largest estate possible 
under the terms of the deed.562 Likewise, courts have combined the greatest 
estate canon with the “construe to validate” canon to conclude that an estate 
in land was conveyed in an instrument whose validity was questioned.563 
In an unusual use of the greatest estate canon, the court in Extraction 
Resources, Inc. v. Freeman564 interpreted 366 separate, but identical, deeds. 
The deeds, on their face, conveyed a 1/64 mineral interest.565 The grantor, 
however, owned a 1/16 royalty interest. Successors in interest to the 
grantors argued that the grantees should receive 1/64 of the 3/16 leasehold 
royalty, leaving the successors with 13/16 of the royalty. The court 
concluded that the grantor intended to transfer a 1/64 royalty interest to 
each of the 366 grantees.566 Each of the deeds, while describing the con-
veyance of a mineral interest, was entitled “Royalty Deed.” If the court 
                                                                                                                 
claiming, in effect a 1/16 mineral interest, but the court interpreted the deed as conveying a 
1/128 mineral interest notwithstanding its use of the “greatest estate” canon. The supreme 
court affirmed the holding, but not the treatment of the deed as ambiguous. 143 Tex. at 395, 
185 S.W.2d at 564. It read all of the fractions of the multiple grant deed as consistently 
conveying a 1/128 mineral estate, entitling the grantee to a 1/1024 royalty upon production. 
Id. at 396, 185 S.W.2d at 565. 
 562. See, e.g., Sharp v. Fowler, 248 S.W.2d 322, 324 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana), 
aff’d, 151 Tex. 490, 252 S.W.2d 153 (1952); see also Ladd v. DuBose, 344 S.W.2d 476 
(Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1961, no writ) (refusing to recognize an implied reservation of a 
mineral interest and holding that the instrument conveyed the greatest estate possible). 
 563. See, e.g., Young v. Rudd, 226 S.W.2d 469, 473 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1950, 
writ ref’d n.r.e.); see also Texas Creosoting Co. v. Hartburg Lumber Co., 298 S.W. 645, 
648–49 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1927) (stating that “the instrument should be construed 
so as to confer upon the grantee the greatest estate that the terms of the instrument will 
permit”), aff’d, 12 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1929, judgm’t adopted); Summit Place 
Co. v. Terrell, 207 S.W. 145 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1918), aff’d, 232 S.W. 282 
(Tex. Comm’n App. 1921, judgm’t adopted) (retaining the clause that gave the greatest 
estate when clauses could not be reconciled). 
In Roswurm v. Sinclair Prairie Oil Co., 181 S.W.2d 736, 743 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort 
Worth 1944, writ ref’d w.o.m.) the court used the canon to support its finding that the 
instrument in question was a conveyance of the property interest and not merely a quitclaim, 
which would only convey the chance or right of title. 
 564. 555 S.W.2d 156, 157 (Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
 565. All of the deeds provided that the grantee was to receive “one sixty-fourth interest in 
and to all of the oil, gas and other minerals in and under and that may be produced 
from. . . .” Id. at 158. 
 566. Id. at 159. 
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would have applied the “construe to validate” canon,567 it would have given 
effect to the grantor’s obvious intent to convey something to each of the 
366 grantees. The grantor, as the owner of a royalty interest, could not 
convey a mineral interest which was owned by others.568 While the grantors 
were only seeking the residue of the royalty interest, if successful, they 
would own the entire royalty because the grantors did not have the power to 
convey a mineral estate. 
Another variation of the greatest estate canon that has developed is: “[A] 
warranty deed will pass all of the estate owned by the grantor at the time of 
the conveyance unless there are reservations or exceptions which reduce the 
estate conveyed.”569 This canon is often accompanied by the further 
requirement that reservations must be in clear language because courts do 
not favor reservations by implication.570 Courts have used this canon in 
phantom reservation cases and other cases in which the grantor has not 
explicitly reserved or excepted the claimed interest.571  
                                                                                                                 
 567. See supra part IV.D. 
 568. There is a rule of law that one cannot convey a “greater estate” than one possesses. 
That is a rule of law and not a canon of construction. 555 S.W.2d at 159. See generally 
Cockrell v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 157 Tex. 10, 299 S.W.2d 672 (1956) (stating that a “deed 
can pass no greater estate than that owned by grantor”). 
In Barrett v. Patrick, 724 S.W.2d 418, 419 (Tex. App.—Beaumont), rev’d, 734 S.W.2d 
646 (Tex. 1987), the court of appeals applied the greatest estate canon so that a mineral 
interest that had been reserved was burdened by its proportionate share of the outstanding 
royalty interest. On appeal, the Texas Supreme Court reversed, finding that the grantor 
rebutted the presumption that royalty interests are borne in proportion to the mineral 
interests granted. 734 S.W.2d at 648. The supreme court showed an express exception of the 
outstanding royalty interest from the deed. Id.; see also Klein v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 67 
S.W.2d 911, 913 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1934) (construing to whom an exception was 
meant to benefit), aff’d on other grounds, 126 Tex. 450, 86 S.W.2d 1077 (1935). 
 569. Cockrell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 157 Tex. 10, 15, 299 S.W.2d 672, 675 (1956); 
see also Harris v. Currie, 142 Tex. 93, 176 S.W.2d 302 (1943) (stating that “[w]hen the 
owner of the entire estate in land conveys it by ordinary form of deed containing no 
exception or reservation his grantee acquires the same title which his grantor had, and such 
title includes all minerals”). 
 570. See Monroe v. Scott, 707 S.W.2d 132, 133 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1986, writ 
ref’d n.r.e.); see also Ladd v. Dubose, 344 S.W.2d 476, 479 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 
1961, no writ) (stating that a reservation of mineral interests must be in clear language); 
Commerce Trust Co. v. Lyon, 284 S.W.2d 920, 921 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1955, no 
writ) (stating that to be effective reservation of minerals “must be by clear language”). 
 571. See, e.g., Day & Co. v. Texland Petroleum Inc., 786 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1990); 
Monroe v. Scott, 707 S.W.2d 132 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
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In Day & Co. v. Texland Petroleum Inc.,572 the greatest estate canon was 
stretched to include the executive power that attached to an otherwise 
reserved mineral interest. Keaton and Young reserved a 1/2 mineral interest 
in an eighty-acre parcel, but specifically conveyed the executive power to 
Day. Day then conveyed the east ten acres to Shoaf, reserving the 1/2 
minerals owned by Keaton and Young, and an additional 1/4 mineral 
interest. The issue was whether the executive power granted to Day, 
covering the Keaton and Young 1/2 interest in the entire eighty acres, was 
conveyed to Shoaf. The court of appeals specifically used the Cockrell 
canon, which stated that a warranty deed passed all of the estate owned by 
the grantor.573 The supreme court affirmed the use of the canon to transfer 
the executive power.574 Yet, it was unclear from the supreme court opinion 
whether the executive power covering the ten acres was transferred, or 
whether the entire executive power covering the non-conveyed seventy 
acres was transferred. The transfer of the executive power over the ten acres 
can be supported not only by the use of the greatest estate or the Cockrell 
canons, but also by the general rule that a transfer of a mineral interest will 
convey all of that interest’s constituent elements unless specifically 
reserved.575 Nevertheless, extending either canon to include the executive 
power over non-conveyed interests gives the canons an effect inconsistent 
with the purposes of the canon. For example, if A owned Blackacre and 
Whiteacre, and by warranty deed conveyed all of her interests in Blackacre, 
it would be foolish to say that because A did not reserve Whiteacre, B also 
receives Whiteacre. If Texland is interpreted so that Shoaf received the 
executive power over the non-conveyed seventy acres, the decision would 
require grantors to reserve unrelated interests they happen to own. Hope-
fully, the courts will restrict the Texland holding to transfers of executive 
powers over the conveyed mineral interests. 
VIII. The Transformation of a Canon into a Rule: Lands 
Described versus Lands Conveyed 
This article has focused on canons of construction, not rules of law. The 
choice and use of the canons is discretionary. Consequently, the results are 
                                                                                                                 
 572. 786 S.W.2d 667, 669 (Tex. 1990). 
 573. 718 S.W.2d 384, 389 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1986) (citing Cockrell v. Texas Gulf 
Sulphur Co., 157 Tex. 10, 15, 299 S.W.2d 672, 675 (1956)), aff’d, 786 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 
1990). 
 574. 786 S.W.2d at 669. 
 575. See Altman v. Blake, 712 S.W.2d 117, 118–19 (Tex. 1986). 
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not always consistent. Canons of construction are designed to carry out the 
intent of the parties as expressed in the written instrument. In contrast, rules 
of law, if applicable, are mandatory and the result certain. In many 
situations, rules are intent defeating. A good example is the Rule Against 
Perpetuities. The Rule Against Perpetuities destroys contingent future 
interests which would vest or fail to vest beyond a life in being plus twenty-
one years.576  
The rule of Hooks v. Neill577 was not originally proclaimed as a rule of 
law. The grantor reserved a 1/32 interest in oil under the “said land and 
premises herein described and conveyed.”578 The grantor owned a 1/2 
mineral interest. The grantor claimed that he reserved an unreduced 1/32 
mineral interest. In Hooks, the court disagreed and found that the key term 
was “land conveyed.”579 Because the grantor could only convey a 1/2 
mineral interest, the 1/32 was reduced by 1/2.580 The court did not resort to 
any traditional canons of construction, although one could have arguably 
used the “construe against the scrivener” or greatest estate canons to reach 
the same result. Thus, the result in Hooks is that when the description of the 
fractional reserved interest refers to lands or premises described and 
conveyed, the reserved interest is reduced again by multiplying the reserved 
interest times the interest actually owned by the grantor. 
                                                                                                                 
 576. Another classic rule was the Rule in Shelley’s Case, which has since been abolished 
in many jurisdictions, including Texas. A more recently developed rule came out of Duhig v. 
Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 135 Tex. 503, 144 S.W.2d 878 (1940). Thus, when a warranty 
deed purports to convey an entire interest, and an outstanding interest exists in a third party, 
the grantor will be estopped from claiming any reserved interest until the grantee can be 
made whole. While the case could have been decided using canons of construction, the court 
adopted its holding as a rule that will always be applicable. Id. at 507, 144 S.W.2d at 880. 
 577. 21 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. Civ. App.—Galveston 1929, writ ref’d); see Wilmer D. 
Masterson, Jr., Double Fraction Problems in Instruments Involving Mineral Interests, 11 
Sw. L.J. 281, 282 (1957); Ernest E. Smith, Oil and Gas, 29 Sw. L.J. 109, 115–16 (1975). 
 578. 21 S.W.2d at 534. 
 579. Id. at 538. 
 580. The court said: 
Now, it is clear, from all the facts and circumstances confronting the parties 
. . . , that the premises conveyed was at most not more than a one-half 
undivided part of the land in controversy. . . . The clear import and meaning of 
the words . . . [was] such deed passed the title . . . to [the grantee], subject only 
to the reservation of a one thirty-second of one-half of the oil on and under the 
tract of land, . . . or a one sixty-fourth of all the oil on and under the entire 
tract. . . . 
Id. at 538–39. 
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The issue in King v. First National Bank of Wichita Falls581 was similar 
to Hooks except that the deed reserved a royalty interest in production 
“from the hereinabove described land.”582 The conveyed interest was a 1/2 
mineral interest. If the court treated the term “described land” the same as 
“conveyed and described,” as in Hooks, the reservation of the fractional 
royalty interest would be reduced by 1/2. The court, however, distinguished 
Hooks and found that the term “lands described” referred to the undivided 
interest; therefore, the court would not further reduce the reserved fractional 
royalty interest by 1/2.583 Obviously, if the “construe against the scrivener” 
or greatest estate canons were applied, the result would have been the same 
as in Hooks. Thus, after King and Hooks, arguably two rules, which deal 
with reservations of fractional interests, exist when the grantor owns less 
than 100 percent of the interest. The determinative feature arises when the 
granting clause uses the terms “lands conveyed and described” or merely 
“lands described.” 
The canonization of the rule came with the Texas Supreme Court 
decision in Middleton v. Broussard.584 The deed conveyed a 1/64 royalty in 
various described lands. The grantor owned only fractional shares of each 
of the described lands and the descriptions included those fractions. The 
supreme court set out a rule depending on whether the parties used the term 
lands described or lands conveyed.585 The rule, which the court stated as 
“well entrenched in Texas oil and gas law,” is: 
                                                                                                                 
 581. 144 Tex. 583, 192 S.W.2d 260 (1946). 
 582. Id. at 584, 192 S.W.2d at 261. 
 583. Id. at 186. 192 S.W.2d at 262. Professor Masterson questioned the validity of the 
court distinguishing between the two different terms which were undoubtedly part of a form 
deed. Masterson, supra note 577, at 282–83. He said: “It is submitted that at best this 
distinction is a tenuous one.” Id. at 282. He also argued that the King result was probably a 
closer reflection of the actual intention of the parties. 
 584. 504 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. 1974). As Ernest Smith noted, the court was applying the 
King case and not Hooks v. Neill. Smith, supra note 577, at 115. The rule, until recently, was 
generally labeled the Hooks rule, not the King rule. See, e.g., Clack v. Garcia, 323 S.W.2d 
468, 469 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1959, no writ); Dowda v. Hayman, 221 S.W.2d 
1016, 1018 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1949, writ ref’d). This is now changing. See, e.g., 
Averyt v. Grande, Inc., 717 S.W.2d 891, 893 (Tex. 1986). 
 585. 504 S.W.2d at 842. The court ignored the fact that in the Hooks deed, the term was 
“lands described and conveyed.” 21 S.W.2d at 534; see Smith, supra note 577, at 115–16. 
As noted by the court of civil appeals, the distinction between a fractional interest in lands 
described in the deed, and a fractional interest in lands described and conveyed in the deed is 
not obvious. Middleton v. Broussard, 496 S.W.2d 766, 769 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 
1973), rev’d, 504 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. 1974). In fact, the court of civil appeals treated the term 
“lands described” and “lands described and conveyed” as the same, so it applied the Hooks 
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‘Where a fraction designated in a deed is stated to be a mineral 
interest in land described in the deed, the fraction is to be 
calculated upon the entire mineral interest;’ conversely, 
‘[W]here a fraction designated in a reservation clause is stated to 
be a mineral interest in land conveyed by the deed, the fraction is 
to be calculated upon the grantor’s fractional mineral 
interest. . . .’586 
No support is given for this new rule of law. It hopefully reflects the 
practice of attorneys in carefully drafting instruments with the knowledge 
of the Hooks/King holdings. Thus, the choice of words is critical. There is 
no room for applying any canons of construction. The words described or 
conveyed are the sole factor to determine whether the fractional interests 
should be reduced by the fractional share owned by the grantor. 
If the court had used either, or both, of the “construe against the 
scrivener” and greatest estate canons, a different result would have been 
reached depending on whether the interests were granted or reserved. In 
Middleton, the interests were granted, but the supreme court determined 
that the rule would operate regardless of whether the interests were reserved 
or granted.587 While the canon approach would create different results 
depending on whether the fractional interest was granted or reserved, the 
Hooks/King rule requires different results depending on the inclusion or 
exclusion of a single word, “conveyed,” in the granting clause. Many times 
the deed used will be a form deed. 
The Hooks/King “rule of construction” was applied by the Texas 
Supreme Court in Averyt v. Grande, Inc.588 The grantor reserved a 1/4 of 
royalty interest in two tracts. On one tract, the grantor owned a 1/2 mineral 
interest. The grantor’s reserved royalty interest was from “lands above 
described.” Falling under the King side of the rule, the court found the 
reserved 1/4 interest was in the entire second tract.589 While the court had 
                                                                                                                 
rule to conclude that the grantee only received a 1/64 royalty in the fractional shares owned 
by the grantor. Id. at 769. 
 586. 504 S.W.2d at 842 (quoting Will G. Barber, Duhig to Date: Problems in the 
Conveyancing of Fractional Mineral Interests, 13 Sw. L.J. 320, 322–23 (1959). 
 587. 504 S.W.2d at 842. 
 588. 717 S.W.2d 891, 893 (Tex. 1986). 
 589. Id. at 894. The grantee tried to argue that under Bass v. Harper, 441 S.W.2d 825 
(Tex. 1969) the location of the “lands described” phrase in the subject-to clause made it part 
of the description of the land. Because the 1/2 mineral estate was specifically excepted from 
the grant, the grantee argued that the land described did not include that 1/2 interest. Id. at 
894. 
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some misgivings about the Hooks/King rule, it felt constrained by the 
doctrine of stare decisis and longstanding reliance on the rule to change it. 
The court said: 
Since then, numerous cases have relied on the King rule to 
apportion ownership of minerals. . . . Undoubtedly, numerous 
deeds, in addition to the one in this case, were prepared ac-
cording to these rules. We should be loathe to change long-
standing rules in the oil and gas field when doing so would alter 
the ownership of minerals conveyed in deeds which rely on the 
law established by this court, and followed by lower courts, 
commentators, and especially lawyers advising their clients.590 
Thus, the Hooks/King rule is now a seemingly immutable part of the 
mineral deed construction arena. 
IX. Conclusion 
As with a typical encyclopedia, there is a beginning and an end. At times 
I felt that an alphabetical discussion of the cases starting with A and ending 
with Z might be as helpful as attempting to classify the canons. In the end, 
however, while I was unable to discern the “big picture,” I was able to 
begin the process of categorizing and rationalizing the myriad canons of 
construction that have been used and abused in Texas caselaw.591 
                                                                                                                 
 590. 717 S.W.2d at 895. The Hooks/King rule has been followed in a number of cases, 
however, neither Hooks nor King has been as extensively cited as for example, Duhig. See, 
e.g., Middleton v. Broussard, 504 S.W.2d 839, 842–43 (Tex. 1974); Gibson v. Turner, 156 
Tex. 289, 294, 294 S.W.2d 781, 783–84 (1956); Humble Oil Co. v. Harrison, 146 Tex. 216, 
224, 205 S.W.2d 355, 360 (1947); Clack v. Garcia, 323 S.W.2d 468, 469 (Tex. Civ. App.— 
San Antonio 1959, no writ); McElmurray v. McElmurray, 270 S.W.2d 880, 882 (Tex. Civ. 
App.—Eastland 1954, writ ref’d); Miller v. Speed, 259 S.W.2d 235, 237 (Tex. Civ. App.— 
Eastland 1952, no writ); Dowda v. Hayman, 221 S.W.2d 1016, 1018–19 (Tex. Civ. App.— 
Fort Worth 1949, writ ref’d); R. Lacy, Inc. v. Jarrett, 214 S.W.2d 692, 693 (Tex. Civ. 
App.— Texarkana 1948, writ ref’d). 
 591. To continue the Sisyphean analogy, the boulder has been pushed to the top of the 
hill several times, only to become dislodged and roll back over me on its headlong journey 
back down the hillside. I hope, that by exposing the difficulties encountered in the 
jurisprudence of deed interpretation, to have others join me in the task of pushing the 
boulder until it comes to rest at the top of the hill. In writing about Sisyphus, Albert Camus 
said: “The lucidity that was to constitute his torture at the same time crowns his victory. 
There is no fate that cannot be surmounted by scorn.” ALBERT CAMUS, THE MYTH OF 
SISYPHUS AND OTHER ESSAYS 121 (1955). 
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Canons of construction can be useful in assisting a court in making 
“good sense” of inartful drafting. They should not be used as a substitute 
for common sense and an understanding of the English language. When 
used consistently they assist those in the conveyancing industry trying to 
carry out the intent of individuals who seek to transfer real property. That 
should be the guiding principle for the use of canons. 
What I have learned in this adventure through the “looking glass” is that 
good drafting can resolve many of the problems that have plagued the 
Texas conveyancing jurisprudence. The continued adherence to outdated 
forms as well as the continued confusion as to the nature of the interests 
owned by the parties after an oil and gas lease has been executed have 
created difficult interpretational issues. These difficulties have led to a 
jurisprudence with little predictability and doctrinal upheaval. The long and 
tortured history of dealing with the multiple fraction issue as reflected in 
Hoffman, Garrett, Alford, Luckel and Jupiter Oil has added to the hidden 
transaction costs in conveying mineral interests. 
In the future I would hope that the courts and the practicing bar join 
together to eliminate some of these hidden costs through better drafting and 
more consistent use of canons of construction. The existence of conflicting 
or inconsistent canons encourage litigation. The listing of canons without 
reference to the issues being litigated should be discouraged. Canons, when 
appropriate, should be analyzed in terms of their resolution of the issues 
before the court. They should be intertwined with the court’s decision, not 
merely appended to it at the beginning. 
To repeat the words of Karl Llewellyn, “The good sense of the situation 
and a simple construction of the available language to achieve that sense, by 
tenable means,”592 should be the guiding principle. Canons when used as a 
tool in the interpretational process are useful. Canons when used as a 
substitute for the interpretational process are counter-productive. 
                                                                                                                 
 592. LLEWELLYN, supra note 6, at 521. 
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